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1 Abbreviations and definitions
Abbreviations:
ETT Finnish Association for Animal Disease Prevention
EU  European Union
Evira Finnish Food Safety Authority
FABA The Finnish Animal Breeding Association 
MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Mela The Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution
MTT Agrifood Research Finland
MVO Municipal Veterinary Officer
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health 
PVO Provincial Veterinary Officer
FGFRI The Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute (RKTL)
TIKE Information centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Definitions:
AI
Artificial insemination, a technique of placing semen from the male in the reproductive 
tract of the female by means other than natural service.
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
A criterion used to choose between competing statistical models that takes in account 
the likelihood-ratio statistic, degrees of freedom and the sample size.
Case of FMD
An individual animal infected by foot-and-mouth disease virus.
Coefficient of variation
The standard deviation divided by the mean; can be given as a percentage, which 
then indicates the proportion of the standard deviation from the mean.
Competent authorities
The authority of a member state competent to carry out veterinary checks.
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Confidence interval for the mean
An estimate of the range of the mean with a given certainty.
Consumer’s surplus
The excess of the benefit a consumer gains from purchases of goods over the amount 
paid for them. Typically obtained by integrating the area below the inverse demand 
curve minus the market value of goods purchased at the market price.
Demand curve
A graph relating the demand for a good or service to its price. Its reverse is the inverse 
demand curve, which represents the price as a function of the quantity of a good.
Detection time
The time between the introduction of FMD virus and the positive diagnosis of FMD 
on a farm.
Direct costs
Costs of implementation of disease eradication and preventive measures after an 
infection has been observed at the farm. In this study, direct costs mainly refer to 
expenditures that are paid by tax payers.
(Economic) welfare effects
Net change in the benefit to society due to a change in the economy. In this study, 
measured as the aggregate change in consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus and 
public expenditures due to an FMD outbreak.
Elite breeding farm
Farms producing breeding animals for the domestic market as well as for export. The 
farms participate actively in the national pig breeding program by sending animals 
to the performance test stations and producing AI boars. An elite breeding farm must 
comply with the requirements of the National Health Scheme for domestic swine 
breeding farms.
Endemic disease
The constant presence of disease within a given population or a geographical area.
Epidemic
Introduction of a highly contagious pathogen into a susceptible population followed 
by the spread of the pathogen within the susceptible population.
Export shock
A situation where importing countries prohibit the importation of cloven-hoofed 
animals and products originating from such animals from a country where FMD has 
been observed. Consequences of the shock are referred to as trade distortions.
Exposure assessment
Describing the biological pathway necessary for exposure of the population at risk to 
FMD, released from a given risk source, and qualitatively or quantitatively estimating 
the probability and magnitude of the exposure.
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Farrowing farm
Farms mainly producing piglets to be sold to finishing farms.
Farrowing-to-finishing farm
Farm producing piglets and raising all or part of the piglets until slaughter.
Finishing farm
Farm purchasing piglets from farrowing farms and rearing them until slaughter
Heifer
A female of the cattle species less than three years of age that has not borne a calf.
High risk period
The time period between the release of FMD virus into the susceptible population and 
the execution of the first restrictive measures due to a suspicion of disease. The high 
risk period includes the incubation period. 
Incubation period
The time period between the introduction of the pathogen into the animal and the 
occurrence of the first clinical signs of the disease.
Indicator
A variable that has a value of 1 when the argument is true and otherwise it has a 
value of 0.
Indirect costs
Indirect costs – or consequential costs – include all other economic effects of an FMD 
outbreak except direct costs. Trade losses, business interruption losses on farms loca-
ted in restriction and surveillance zones, and the costs of breeding a new animal stock 
after the outbreak are examples of indirect costs.
Intra-community trade
Trade within and between the countries of the European Union.
Iteration
One simulated outcome starting from a case of FMD infection on one farm to the end 
of an outbreak. In this report, an iteration is a Monte Carlo simulated outbreak.
Monitoring
On-going programmes to detect changes in the prevalence of disease in a given 
population.
Multiplying farm
Farms producing young crossbred or purebred breeding gilts for distribution to 
farrowing or farrowing-to-finishing farms.
Neighborhood spread
Transmission of FMD between herds in close proximity, where no other means of 
transmission of the disease can be identified.
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Outbreak of FMD
FMD virus has been introduced into a farm and caused more than one case of FMD 
after introduction.
Partial-equilibrium
A situation where the demand and supply in a certain sector are equal, and the 
buyers and sellers are in agreement over the prices required for the transaction. In 
the equilibrium, changes in this particular sector would not increase the net benefit 
to consumers and producers. However, changes in other sectors could contribute to 
the net benefit.
Percentile
An approximate value of cumulative distribution located on a given percentage of the 
distribution, whereby the same percentage of the population is either smaller than 
or equal to the given value.
Producer’s surplus
The excess of total sales revenue going to producers over the area under the supply 
curve for a good. The revenue obtained to cover fixed production costs.
Protective vaccination
Emergency vaccination is carried out on holdings in a designated area in order to 
protect animals of susceptible species within this area against foot-and-mouth disease 
virus. The animals are intended to be kept alive following vaccination (2003/85/EY) 
(“vaccination to live”).
Protection zone
An area with a minimum of a 3 km radius around the infected herd.
Risk
The likelihood of the occurrence and the likely magnitude of the consequences of an 
adverse event on animal health in a specified area during a specified time period.
Risk assessment
In this report, risk assessment includes the evaluation of the biological and economic 
consequences of the entry of a pathogenic agent within the cattle and pig population 
in Finland.
Simulation
A set of iterations that have been carried out with a certain set of parameters, in order 
to estimate the mean and variance of outcomes of iterations. Simulation typically 
includes several thousands of iterations.
Stamping-out
Killing of FMD-infected herds and/or other herds that have been exposed to infection 
by direct animal-to-animal contact, or by indirect contact likely to cause the transmis-
sion of FMD. All carcasses of killed animals are destroyed by burning or burial, or by 
any other method that will eliminate the spread of infection through the carcasses or 
products of the animals killed.
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Suckler farm
A farm with a herd of cattle composed of dams and their young calves up to the point 
of weaning.
Supply curve
A curve showing the amount that firms in an industry are willing to supply at each 
possible price.
Suppressive vaccination
Emergency vaccination that is carried out exclusively in conjunction with a stamping-
out policy in a holding or area where there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of 
foot-and-mouth disease virus circulating and to reduce the risk of it spreading beyond 
the perimeters of the holding or the area, and where the animals are intended to be 
destroyed following vaccination (2003/85/EY) (“vaccination to cull”).
Surveillance zone
The surveillance zone includes an area of a minimum radius of 10 km around the 
infected herd, excluding the protection zone.
Third country
Countries that are not members of the EU.
Trade ban
A trade ban in this study refers to the situation where other countries prohibit the 
importation of animals and animal products from Finland to their country because of 
an animal disease outbreak being observed in Finland.
Weaner farm
A farm where 1- to 2-week-old calves are moved and raised until they are 5–6 months 
old.
Worst-case scenario
A scenario that can occur with low probability and in which the consequences are 
most severe.
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2 Yhteenveto
Suu- ja sorkkatauti on sorkkaeläinten virustauti, joka kuuluu Suomen lainsäädännössä 
vastustettavien, helposti leviävien tautien ryhmään. Suu- ja sorkkatautia ei ole esiin-
tynyt Suomessa sitten vuoden 1959.
Taudille tyypilliset oireet naudalla ovat rakkulat suun limakalvoilla, kielessä, huulissa, 
sorkkaväleissä ja utareissa. Muita oireita akuutissa vaiheessa ovat kuume, maidon-
tuotannon lasku, syömättömyys ja runsas syljentuotanto. Sioilla näkyvin oire on on-
tuminen, joka johtuu sorkkien väliin kehittyvistä rakkuloista. Suu- ja sorkkatauti on 
taloudellisesti merkittävää vahinkoa aiheuttava tauti. Tauti ei aiheuta ihmisille oireita 
tai sairautta. Tartunta leviää nopeasti samassa tilassa pidettäviin sorkkaeläimiin sai-
rastuneiden eläinten eritteiden sekä hengitysilman kautta. Virusta erittyy jo muuta-
maa päivää ennen oireiden alkamista. Tartunta voi levitä tilalle joko ostettujen, tautia 
kantavien eläinten, kuljetusautojen, elintarvikkeiden, rehujen, ihmisten, villieläinten 
tai jopa tuulen mukana.
Riskinarvioinnin tavoitteena oli tutkia simulaatiomallin avulla 1) miten suu- ja sorkka-
tauti leviäisi Suomessa, kun se olisi jo levinnyt yhdelle suomalaiselle tilalle, 2) mitkä 
olisivat taudinpurkauksen taloudelliset seuraukset sekä 3) hätärokotuksen merkitystä 
taudinhallintakeinona. Tämä riskinarviointi perustuu vuoden 2006 tietoihin Suomen 
sika- ja nautatuotannosta.
Tulokset
Riskinarvioinnin tulosten mukaan jopa kolmasosa Suomen epidemioista olisi spora-
disia, eli vain yksi tila saisi tartunnan ennen kuin tauti saataisiin hävitettyä maasta. 
Mahdollinen epidemia jäisi suhteellisen pieneksi ja lyhytkestoiseksi. Tavallisimmin 
epideemisenä ilmenevä tauti leviäisi viidelle tilalle ja leviäminen saataisiin pysäytet-
tyä viiden viikon kuluessa ensimmäisen tilan tartunnasta. Pahimmassa skenaarios-
sa suu- ja sorkkatautivirus leviäisi 29 tilalle ennen kuin tauti olisi hävitetty ja taudin 
leviäminen kestäisi korkeintaan 10 viikkoa. Suomessa epidemia olisi siis pahimmil-
laankin huomattavasti pienempi kuin esimerkiksi Iso-Britannian vuoden 2001 suu- ja 
sorkkatautiepidemia. Pääasiassa tulos johtuu Suomen Iso-Britanniaa harvemmasta 
tilatiheydestä ja vähäisemmistä kontakteista tilojen välillä.
Simuloidut epidemiat olivat samankokoisia Suomen eri osissa. Välilliset seuraukset 
olisivat kuitenkin suurimpia tilatiheillä alueilla, suurempien suoja- ja valvontavyöhyk-
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keillä olevien tartuntaa saamattomien tilojen lukumäärän vuoksi. Lisäksi näillä alueil-
la vaikutusten laajuuden vaihteluväli oli hieman muita alueita suurempi.
Yhteen tilaan rajoittuvan taudinpurkauksen kansantaloudelle aiheuttamiksi taloudel-
lisiksi menetyksiksi arvioitiin keskimäärin vajaat 23 miljoonaa euroa. Yli 18 tartunta-
tilan epidemioiden aiheuttamat menetykset nousivat keskimäärin yli 38 miljoonaan 
euroon.
Taloudellisia menetyksiä kertyi elintarvikeviennin häiriintymisestä, tartuntatilojen 
puhdistuksesta, viranomaistoimenpiteistä uusien tartuntojen estämiseksi ja jäljittä-
miseksi, sekä näiden tiloille ja elintarviketeollisuudelle aiheuttamista häiriöistä. Tuot-
tajien menetykset olivat suuremmat kuin koko yhteiskunnan menetykset, sillä ku-
luttajat hyötyisivät hieman tukkoisen markkinatilanteen vuoksi laskevista hinnoista. 
Suu- ja sorkkataudin leviäminen Suomeen saattaakin aiheuttaa merkittäviä tappioita 
alkutuotannolle.
Kansainvälisen eläintautijärjestön ohjeiden mukaan toimittaessa vienti voi häiriintyä 
kuukausien ajaksi, vaikka maassa olisi havaittu vain yksi tartunta. Pitkittyessään vien-
tihäiriöt ovat merkittäviä, sillä yli 20 % Suomessa viime vuosina tuotetusta sianlihas-
ta, yli 2/3 voista ja lähes puolet juustoista on viety ulkomaille. Suurissa epidemiois-
sa myös tartuntatilojen määrä vaikutti tuloksiin, suuri tartuntatilojen määrä kasvatti 
suoria kustannuksia.
Epidemian koon luotettava ennustaminen on tärkeää rokotuspäätöksen tekemisen 
kannalta. Ensimmäisen tautitapauksen ja tartunnan saaneen tilan ominaisuuksien 
perusteella ei epidemian kokoa voida ennustaa luotettavasti. Tartuntatilalla tehdyn 
epidemiologisen selvityksen jälkeen ennustetta voidaan tarkentaa. Paras ennuste 
saadaan kuitenkin vasta kun tiedetään tartuntatilojen havaitsemisvauhti. Luotettavan 
tiedon saaminen viivästyttää päätöksentekoa epidemiatilanteessa vähintään viikolla. 
Epidemian pienen koon ja sen lyhyen keston vuoksi hätärokotus ei ole epidemiolo-
gisesti perusteltu taudinhallintakeino Suomessa. Pahimmissa tautitilanteissa rokotus 
voisi vähentää tartunnan saaneiden tilojen määrää vähäisesti, jos rokotukset kyettäi-
siin aloittamaan välittömästi ensihavainnon jälkeen.  Tämä ei kuitenkaan näytä mah-
dolliselta rokotuspäätökseen, rokotteiden saatavuuteen ja rokotusten käynnistämi-
seen liittyvien viiveiden vuoksi. Estorokotusta käytettäessä lopetettavia eläimiä olisi 
moninkertaisesti rokottamattomuus-politiikkaan verrattuna.
Hätärokotus suu- ja sorkkatautia vastaan ei ole myöskään taloudellisesti mielekäs 
taudinhallintakeino, sillä ilman rokotustakin taudinpurkaukset jäisivät melko pieniksi 
ja lyhytkestoisiksi. Lisäksi olisi vaikea tunnistaa tilanteet, joissa hätärokotus saattaisi 
olla taloudellisesti mielekäs ja aloittaa rokotukset riittävän ajoissa menetyksiä vähen-
tävän rokotesuojan saamiseksi. Suojarokotuksessa kannattavuutta heikensi se, että 
maan tautivapauden saaminen takaisin – ja siten vientihäiriöiden kesto – on lähtö-
kohtaisesti kolme kuukautta pidempi kuin ilman suojarokotusta. Markkinaongelmien 
mahdollisuus aiheuttaisi merkittäviä lisäkustannuksia suojarokotusta käytettäessä. 
Estorokotuksen kannattamattomuus puolestaan johtui pienehkön epidemiakoon li-
säksi siitä, että lopetettavia eläimiä olisi selvästi enemmän kuin ilman hätärokotusta.
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Loppupäätelmä
Riskinarvioinnin mukaan suu- ja sorkkataudin purkaus jäisi Suomessa verrattain pie-
neksi ja se saataisiin pysäytettyä käyttämällä EU:ssa säädettyjä vähimmäisvastustus-
keinoja. Hätärokotukseen ei yleisesti ottaen kannattaisi Suomessa ryhtyä, vaan tär-
keämpää olisi varmistaa tehokkaat vastustustoimet, jotka takaavat taudin nopean 
hävittämisen maasta ja joita tarvittaessa täydennetään vaikutuksiltaan hätärokotusta 
edullisemmilla toimenpiteillä. Muut taudinvastustustoimet saattavatkin olla hätäro-
kotusta kustannustehokkaampia.
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3 Introduction
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious epizootic disease of cloven 
footed animals such as pigs and ruminants. The mortality rate in FMD is low, but 
morbidity is very high and convalescence is extended, which makes this disease 
especially important in countries previously free from the disease. International 
agreements and restrictions regarding the trade of cloven-hoofed animals and 
products originating from these animals emphasize the economic significance of the 
disease, as the introduction of the disease can impact on the exportation of animal 
products. FMD may have a significant economic impact on food production in the case 
of an outbreak. This is due to the suppression of domestic meat production caused by 
eradication measures, such as the culling of large numbers of production animals and 
the loss of export markets and revenues.
Finland has been free from the disease since 1959. The largest epidemic in previously 
free European countries has been in the UK 2001, followed by outbreaks in neigh-
bouring countries such as France and the Netherlands. Another outbreak in the UK 
occurred as recently as in 2007.
The disease is controlled both by European directive (2003/85/EC) and domestic 
legislation. The primary control policy is eradication through stamping out, which 
means that all animals of the susceptible species on infected farms are killed and 
destroyed. Emergency vaccination is a possible control measure, but vaccination 
impacts on the trade of animals and animal products, so the economic and epidemio- 
logical gain must be accounted for. Vaccination has not been used in Finland as a 
preventive measure against FMD for 50 years.
The aim of this project was to assess the size, speed and duration of a possible spread 
of FMD (PanAsia serotype O), as well as the feasibility of emergency vaccination in 
the case of an outbreak in Finland.
This project was an assignment of the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
and was financed by MAKERA, Evira, MTT Agrifood Research Finland and the National 
Emergency Supply Agency.
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4 Objectives
The spread of foot-and-mouth disease into and within Finland and the role of emer-
gency vaccination in disease control in the case of an epidemic.
There were four main objectives, which were to determine:
1. How many farms would typically and at most become infected if either a pig or 
a cattle farm in Finland were to become infected by FMD (PanAsia serotype O) 
virus, and how long the outbreak would last;
2. How the minimum eradication measures laid down by EU legislation would 
affect the size and duration of an outbreak, and whether there would be spatial 
variation in the efficacy of eradication measures;
3. What could be the economic impact of an outbreak on the Finnish livestock sector, 
taxpayers and consumers; and
4. Whether there would be epidemiological or economic justification to suppress 
the spread of FMD by emergency vaccinations in Finland, and how a vaccination 
programme should be performed so that it would prevent the further spread of 
the disease and benefits would result from the vaccination.
The spread of Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) within Finland and emergency vaccination in case of an epidemic outbreak
19
5 Hazard identification and 
   characterization
FMD Virus
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is an extremely contagious epizootic disease caused by 
a small (23 nanometres) icosahedral, single-stranded RNA virus (genus Apthovirus),
which belongs to the family of Picorna viridae. Seven different serotypes are identi-
fied serologically (A, O, C, Asia 1, and South African Territories (SAT) 1, 2 and 3), and 
each serotype includes multiple subtypes totalling more than 60 subtypes (Grubman & 
Baxt 2004). Evolution of the virus is continuous and new types of virus have emerged 
during recent years, for instance in the Middle East (Knowles et al. 2010).
The FMD virus is stable between pH 6–9 (optimum pH 7.4–7.6), but is rapidly destroyed 
at a pH less than 4 and higher than 11. Inactivation in the environment is mainly due 
to a combination of high temperature, solar radiation and low humidity. The virus is 
stable at temperatures of up to 56 ˚C and can survive for one year at 4 ˚C. In freezing 
temperatures, it is stable and survives for a very long time.
The virus serotype in the UK outbreaks of 2001 has been identified as a serotype 
O PanAsia lineage virus (Knowles et al. 2001), and this is the serotype of primary 
interest in this risk assessment report. This particular serotype was selected because 
it is the one that has recently caused widespread epidemics in Europe, and sufficient 
literature was available to parameterize the model for this strain.
Host species
The host species for FMD virus are all cloven-hoofed animals. Those of greatest 
significance are found among domestic species: cattle, pigs, sheep and goats. Besides 
cloven-hoofed domestic animals, wild ruminants, wild boar (Sus scrofa), African
buffalo (Syncerus caffer), llamas and camels are also susceptible to FMD, but the risk 
of spread of the infection by wildlife is not well known. African buffalo (Syncerus
caffer) are, however, known to play an important role in FMD epidemiology in Africa,
where FMD is endemic and the buffalo can be a long-term carrier of the virus. In other 
countries, wildlife is not regarded to play an important role in the transmission of 
FMD, and as long as the infection is eradicated from the country the wildlife is not 
regarded to be able to spread the virus back to domestic animals (Anderson 2003). 
For instance, after a serosurveillance with negative results performed after the Dutch 
FMD outbreak in 2001, Elbers et al. (2003) concluded that wild boar and roe deer 
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(Capreolus capreolus) would be very unlikely to transmit FMD to cattle. Additionally, 
camelids (llama, alpaca and dromedary and Batrician camel) are found not to be as 
susceptible and not as efficient transmitters of FMD as cattle, sheep, goats and pigs 
(Wernery & Kaaden 2004; Alexandersen et al. 2008). On the other hand, Highfield et 
al. (2008), consider white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virgianus) to be a potential host 
species of FMD. There is a lack of information on Finnish moose (Alces alces) and 
reindeer (Genus Rangifer) and their susceptibility to FMD. It seems that elk (Cervus 
elaphus nelsoni) in North America are fairly insensitive to FMD and develop only mild 
clinical disease, and are also rather unable to transmit the virus (Rhyan et al. 2008). 
FMDV may also occur in non-cloven-hoofed wild animals, such as rodents, 
hedgehogs, elephants and grizzly bears (Meyer & Knudsen 2001). Horses and other 
hoofed animals are considered resistant to FMD.
FMD is not considered zoonotic. Humans are very rarely infected by FMD, but in those 
unusual cases, influenza-like symptoms or vesicular lesions can be seen. In humans, 
the disease is usually mild and self-limiting (CFSPH 2007). 
Pathogenesis
The virus most commonly enters through the naso-pharyngeal area or the lungs, 
but infection may also occur through a skin injury (Kitching 2002). The virus starts to 
replicate in the upper respiratory tract (pharynx), mucosa or skin. Thereafter, the 
FMD virus enters the bloodstream, muscles, lymph glands, bone marrow and organs 
(Alexandersen et al. 2001). The virus is excreted during viraemia (Davies 2002), and 
the viraemic stage is considered the period when the animal has the highest and 
most widespread virus titres in its tissues (Ryan et al 2008). There is, however, a 
considerable difference between animal species in the amount of virus excreted (see 
below “disease transmission). Antibodies appear three to five days and the early 
antibodies (IgM and IgA) peak 10–14 days post-infection (Salt 1997; De Clercq 2003). 
Animals stop being infectious when the lesions heal (Davies 2002). After this there is 
a lower probability of virus in the carcass and organs (Sutmoller 2001).
Incubation time
The incubation time is dependent on the dose, virus strain, route of transmission 
and susceptibility of the individual host (Kitching 2002; Quan et al. 2009). A smaller 
infectious dose requires a longer time to develop into clinical disease (Alexandersen 
et al. 2001). In general, the incubation time for cattle and pigs is approximately 
between 2–7 days (Sutmoller et al. 2001; Gibbens et al. 2001; Alexandersen & Mowat 
2005;  Ryan et al. 2008). It might last for up to two weeks (Kitching & Hughes 2002; 
Grubman & Baxt 2004; Ryan et al. 2008), or be as short as 1 day (Meyer & Knudsen 
2001; Alexandersen et al. 2003b; Quan et al. 2009). The incubation time in sheep is 
reported to usually be 3–8 days (Kitching & Hughes 2002; Quan et al. 2009).
Clinical signs
The clinical signs appear with different intensity depending on the virus strain, infec-
tious dose, species and the individual susceptibility of the host (Kitching 2002; Quan et 
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al. 2009). Cattle are the most sensitive to FMD, but swine and sheep are also severely 
affected. The signs are apparent for 7–10 days (Alexandersen et al. 2001), but in 
sheep vesicles may be visible for less than three days (Kitching & Hughes 2002). 
However, virus excretion usually starts 1–5 days before vesicles are apparent.
The first signs in cattle are usually fever (around 40 ˚C) (Kitching 2002), depression, 
decreased milk production and a reluctance to eat. Vesicular lesions on the tongue, 
nose, feet and teats, lameness and drooling develop within 12–24 hours from 
the first signs (Sutmoller 2001; Kitching 2002). Lameness and drooling are due to 
vesicular lesions and erosions on the feet and mouth, respectively. The mortality 
rate is low, except in young animals, but the morbidity rate is very high. According to 
Orsel et al. (2006), calves show milder clinical signs than cows; however, young 
calves may die due to virus invading and destroying developing heart muscle 
(myocarditis) (Kitching 2002).
The clinical disease in pigs is dominated by lameness and a reluctance to stand due to 
painful foot lesions. Vesicular lesions in the mouth are less prominent than in cattle, 
but large vesicles that quickly rupture are common on the snout.
FMD in sheep is difficult to detect due to mild clinical signs (Barnett & Cox 1999). The 
duration of viraemia in sheep is 1–5 days. The first clinical signs that appear about 
three days after the onset of viraemia in sheep, goats and wild ruminants are foot 
lesions accompanied by lameness. Sheep and goats also develop fever, are reluctant 
to walk and may separate themselves from the rest of the flock. Vesicles are not as 
common and more difficult to observe in sheep and goats. Deaths occur (up to 90% 
of an affected flock) among young lambs and kids due to heart failure and without 
the appearance of vesicles (Kitching & Hughes 2002).
Detection of FMD
The period between the first infection and first detection of disease is called the high 
risk period (HRP) and is considered crucial for the range of disease transmission. 
During the last epidemics, the HRPs are estimated to have been around 12–21 days 
in the UK in 2001 (Gibbens et al. 2001; Scudamore & Harris 2002; Tomassen et al. 
2002; McLaws & Ribble 2007) and 24 days in the Netherlands in 2001 (Tomassen et 
al. 2002). In recent epidemics in Europe (McLaws & Ribble 2007), HRPs have typically 
lasted 2–3 weeks.
The first suspicion of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK was raised at an abattoir in the 
ante-mortem inspection of pigs. The clinical signs observed in 27 animals were lameness 
and vesicular lesions in their interdigital clefts and around the coronary bands, but 
no vesicles were visible on their snout or in their mouths and they did not have any 
fever (Gibbens et al. 2001; Alexandersen et al. 2003a).
The clinical signs of FMD are most obvious in high yielding dairy cattle and in inten-
sively reared pigs. In adult sheep and goats, FMD is usually only a mild disease and 
the clinical signs in these animals can easily be missed by the farmer or veterinarian 
(Kitching et al. 2005). However, as stated by Sutmoller (2001): “If none of the cattle 
in the herd have developed macroscopic lesions, the herd is likely to pass all farm 
The spread of Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) within Finland and emergency vaccination in case of an epidemic outbreak
22
and slaughterhouse inspections.” A rule of thumb is that if vesicles or vesicular les-
ions are observed in the mouth region or feet of cattle, pigs, sheep or goats, it is to 
be suspected as an FMD infection until the suspicion is out ruled. According to Gibbens 
et al. (2001), FMD has been detected earlier in cattle than in sheep, probably due to 
the degree of morbidity or more intense management of cattle compared to sheep. 
FMD has most often been detected through a farmer alerting a veterinarian, through 
routine surveillance activities, ante mortem inspection at slaughterhouses, or more 
seldom by someone else (McLaws & Ribble 2007).
After the identification of the first case in an epidemic, determination of the FMD 
status can be fairly accurately based on clinical signs only (McLaws & Ribble 2007). A 
clinical diagnosis is easier to make for pigs and cattle than for sheep (McLaws et al. 
2006).
Disease transmission
The virus is excreted in aerosols and in all secretions including urine, faeces, saliva, 
milk and semen. Transmission between infected and susceptible animals mainly 
occurs through the respiratory route by virus aerosols.
Cattle are the most sensitive animals to FMDV aerosols. They are mainly infected via 
the respiratory route and considered as an “indicator host” for the disease. Pigs are 
relatively resistant to airborne FMDV infection compared to cattle and sheep (Alexan-
dersen & Donaldson 2002; Donaldson & Alexandersen 2002). According to Sørensen 
et al. (2000), pigs require a 128 times higher dose of virus than cattle to become 
infected by the airborne route. Pigs are mainly infected by direct contact with 
infected animals or ingestion of contaminated food or other materials.
Virus excretion already begins during the incubation period, and airborne excretion 
mainly occurs during a 4- to 5-day period in the infected animal (Sellers & Parker 
1969; Donaldson et al. 2001). The maximal excretion occurs during the early acute 
phase of the disease, i.e. the peak is when the vesicles appear (Alexandersen et al. 
2003b). The expression of clinical signs correlates positively with the ability to transmit 
infection (Quan et al. 2009). Virus can be excreted in the milk before clinical symptoms 
occur (Reid et al. 2006). Sheep differ from other species with their maximum viral 
emission 1–2 days before the onset of clinical disease (Donaldson & Alexandersen 
2002).
Pigs are considered an “amplifying host” because they act as effective disease trans-
mitters, exhaling more infective virus particles than cattle and sheep (Donaldson & 
Alexandersen 2002). As the number of animals is usually 10–50 times larger in a 
pig farm than in a cattle farm, pig farms are more potent emitters than cattle farms. 
Different coefficients indicating the relative efficiencies of pig and cattle farms in emit-
ting FMDV have been used in earlier simulation studies. Yoon et al. (2006) considered 
pig farms as 5 times more infective than cattle farms. Ward et al. (2009) considered 
only pig farms and large feedlot farms with over 50 000 cattle as possible sources 
of windborne spread. Because feedlots were 20 times larger than pig farms in the 
study of Ward et al. (2009), it was assumed that a cattle specimen is therefore at 
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least 20 times less efficient as an emitter than a pig. Larger differences between spe-
cies have also been applied, for instance by Rubel et al. (2004), who assumed in their 
worst-case scenario that pigs are over 1000 times more efficient emitters than cattle.
Due to their smaller lung volume, sheep excrete fewer viruses than cattle and pigs. 
In contrast to pigs and cattle, FMD can spread in a sheep herd without visible clinical 
symptoms.
Carriers
Animals that have recovered from the disease may remain as infective carriers for a 
variable period of time. A carrier is defined as an animal from which the virus can be 
recovered 28 days post-infection (Davies 2002). Under experimental conditions, up to 
50% of cattle can remain infective for weeks, months, or in extreme cases for several 
years. Sheep and goats less frequently remain as carriers than cattle (Sutmoller et al. 
2003), and for a shorter period of time of up to 6–9 months (Doel 2003; Wernery & 
Kaaden 2004).  Pigs do not remain persistently infected (Fenner et al. 1987; Davies 
2002). Among wildlife, the African buffalo (Syncerus caffer) is considered to act as an 
important carrier of FMD in Africa (Anderson 2003). 
Vaccination does not stop the virus from entering the body. In other words, vaccinated 
individuals can also be carriers of the virus that they are vaccinated against. Vaccinated 
animals may intermittently emit virus, but significantly less than unvaccinated 
infected animals.
Transmission routes
Previously developed models offer an insight into how separate epidemiological 
experiments and field observations have been summarized into a set of contact 
routes that are believed to be able to spread FMDV. Morris et al. (2001) and Stevenson 
(2003) applied a version of an InterSpread model in the prediction of FMD spread. 
The model contained several contact routes to spread the disease. These included 
direct animal contact, animal transportation vehicles and dairy tankers, persons 
visiting the farm, neighbourhood and airborne spread. According to Morris et al. 
(2001), the model operated reasonably well in the prediction of the final epide-
mic, as confidence interval was around the observed final size. A similar analysis in 
Cumbria later on led Stevenson (2003) to the same conclusion.
Airborne transmission
Aerosols containing FMDV may transmit the virus through the air. Aerosols have 
travelled very long distances, in exceptional cases up to 250 km (Donaldson et al. 
1982; Donaldson & Alexandersen 2002). The airborne spread of virus is dependent on 
the wind direction and speed and favoured by high humidity, low temperature, and 
overcast skies (Donaldson, 1972). The virus is highly dependent on the relative humi-
dity for survival. Humidity below 60% will rapidly destroy the airborne virus (Gloster 
et al. 2005). Airborne spread has in several models been applied as species-specific. 
Rubel et al. (2004) simulated the spread of virus from swine and concluded that in 
a worst-case scenario, 10 infected pigs were able to infect cattle 5 km, sheep up to 
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0.7 km and swine up to 0.2 km downwind in moderate wind conditions. Velthuis & 
Mourits (2007), Stevenson (2003) and Morris et al. (2001) all have applied species-
specific correction factors that in practice  mean that airborne spread is possible from 
pigs to cattle and sheep, but the relevance of cattle and sheep as a source of airborne 
spread is less important. In a recent Dutch study examining between-pen transmis-
sion of FMD – when only airborne transmission was possible – the ability of pigs to 
spread the disease, even within the same unit, appeared to be 10–20 times lower 
than within the pen (van Roermund et al. 2010). The results indicated that airborne 
spread between pig farms is probably not relevant.
In several InterSpread-based FMD simulations, airborne spread has been assumed to 
be relevant in a kernel of 3 km around the infected farm (for instance Sanson et al. 
2006). Similar results have previously been observed by Taylor et al. (2004) in northern 
Cumbria, where most of the spread was observed to occur within 3 km from the farm. 
Larger kernels have also been applied, for instance a kernel with a tail of up to 5 km 
in the Netherlands (Boender et al. 2010). Such a kernel was also applied in some 
models developed for the UK outbreak (Ferguson et al. 2001; Keeling et al. 2001; 
Yoon et al. 2006). Both airborne spread kernel and probabilities have been subject to 
species-specific estimates and variability in recent modelling literature on FMD.
Transmission by contact
The movement of infected live animals is one of the most important routes of infec-
tion. Infected animal products, fomites and indirect contact may also transmit FMD 
virus (Valarcher et al. 2008).
Transportation vehicles have been assumed to be an important transmission route in 
several FMD outbreaks and simulation models. If vehicles are considered as medium 
risk contacts, then the usual infectivity of vehicle contact would be 1/3 to 1/5 of the 
infectivity of direct animal contact (Stevenson 2003; Velthuis & Mourits 2007; Ward 
et al. 2009).
Milk tankers were involved in the 1967/68 FMD epidemic in UK by spreading FMDV-
infected milk aerosols and as a source in the spread in the UK epidemic in 2001 
(Gibbens et al. 2001). Milk tankers were also included as a component of spread 
models applied in the UK in 2001 (Stevenson 2003). In simulation models, milk 
tankers are considered to posses a very low risk, as one contact can have less than 
1.5% of the infectivity of one direct animal contact (Stevenson 2003).
Clinical examinations of animals in the incubation phase pose a high risk of transmis-
sion of the disease via the contamination of persons (veterinarians) who are unaware 
of the risk of spreading the disease. Humans are able to carry the virus in the respi-
ratory system or in the lung residual air (Jones 2007). Humans who might have been 
exposed to infected animals should avoid direct contact with ruminants for 3–5 days 
(Sutmoller et al. 2003). Humans in close contact with infected animals can carry and 
transfer FMDV on their skin, hair, clothes and in their nasopharyngeal area (Sutmoller 
et al. 2003; Jones 2007), and transmission occurs via direct contact to susceptible 
individuals. People can carry the virus in their nasopharynx for more than 24 (to 48) 
hours, which has been considered a risk for transmission of the disease. Veterinary 
surgical instruments and insemination equipment have transmitted the infection in 
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Denmark (1982) and in Italy (1993). FMDV can also be spread through vehicles and 
ova. In simulation models, human contacts are considered as a low risk, having 1/20 
to 1/40 of the infectivity of direct animal contact (Stevenson 2003; Velthuis & Mourits 
2007).
Neighbourhood transmission
Neighbourhood spread includes indirect spread by rodents, birds, dogs, cats and other 
contacts that show spatial tendencies, or where the contact route remains unidenti- 
fied. Neighbourhood transmission can be modelled, for instance, as a fixed trans-
mission probability within a given distance from an infected farm (Taylor et al. 
2004; Velthuis & Mourits 2007) or as a declining function with increasing distance 
(Stevenson 2003). Species-specific corrections are not usually applied in neigh- 
bourhood transmission.
5.1 Livestock production in Finland
Finnish farms
The agricultural sector in Finland has experienced a major structural change in the last 
few decades. The number of pig and cattle producers has decreased during recent 
years, whereas the herd size has increased, and the number of pigs and cattle has 
thus remained quite stable. Finnish pig and cattle farms are typically family owned 
and their average size is still quite small from a European perspective (Table 1). The 
Finnish cattle population is 1/10, the pig population 1/3 and the sheep population 
1/300 of the population in the UK.
Table 1. Number of live animals and holdings in some European countries: a comparison from 
2007 (EFSA 2009; NVI 2007).
Country Cattle Cattle holdings Pigs
Pig 
holdings Sheep
Sheep 
holdings
Finland 926 694 18 624 1 448 041 2 744 119 252 1 885
Sweden* 1 590 409 25 054 1 680 535 2 414 505 466 9 152
Norway* 918 200 20 500 813 800 3 000 2 334 200 16 000
Denmark 1 545 000 24 883 13 900 000 12 342 180 641 na.
Netherlands 3 762 784 48 256 11 662 654 11 234 1 369 343 29 505
United Kingdom 8 998 377 79 760 4 834 000 na. 33 946 000 na.
*2006; na. = not available
Pig production
Number of farms and animals
There were 3225 pig producers and about 1.44 million pigs in Finland on 1 May 2006. 
Of the Finnish farms, 228 (1% of all pig and cattle farms) had both pigs and cattle 
(Table 2).
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The pig farms were classified into three groups based on their type of production:
1. farrowing farms,
2. farrowing-to-finishing farms,
3. finishing farms.
These production types were equally represented in Finland (Table 2). The production 
type classification is our own and is based on the number of sows and the ratio of 
finishing pigs to sows on the farm. If there were <2 finishing pigs per one sow, the 
farm type was classified as a farrowing farm, and if there were >2 finishing pigs per 
one sow, the farm type was classified as a farrowing-to-finishing farm. A finishing 
farm is a farm without any sows. Farrowing herds are linked by animal transportation 
with finisher herds, as they deliver piglets, while farrowing-to-finisher herds are self-
sufficient in piglets and hence are less connected with other pig farms.
Table 2. Pig farm types in Finland (Finnish Farm Registry 2006).
Farm type Number of farms
Farrowing farm 1 090
Farrowing-to-finishing farm 1 046
Finishing farm 1 089
The number of pigs on the farms varies. Statistics for the number of pigs are based 
on mandatory monthly notifications by farmers and on subsidy notifications, which 
are given on 1 May every year.  For example, while the mean number of sows in a 
farrowing herd was 96, the maximum number was 1900 sows (Table 3). The mean 
number of piglets per sow on a farm was 5.7 (Finnish pig registry 2006) and was not 
included in Table 3.
Twenty-nine percent (29%) of the farms that had fattening pigs were managed by 
the all-in-all-out principle, 48% had a continuous flow system and 23% were com-
partmental all-in-all-out systems. Ca. 65% of farms had only one building for pigs and 
23% had two buildings, although maximum number of buildings was six. Typically, 
farms had only one holding in the farm registry (82%), so buildings are often within 
a 2 km range and are regarded as one holding. Six percent (6%) of the farms offered 
pigs an opportunity to go outside for at least part of the year (see the questionnaire 
to pig farmers in 2007 in the data sources section). 
Table 3. Number of pigs on different farm types (Finnish Farm Registry 2006).
Farm type
Number of sows Number of finishers
maximum mean median maximum mean median
Farrowing farm 1 900 96 51 2 306 69 28
Farrowing-to-finishing farm 1 210 69 46 4 183 318 209
Finishing farm 19 0 0 3 668 446 299
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The location of pig herds in Finland is presented in Figure 1. Pig production in Finland 
is largely concentrated in south-western and western Finland (PVO districts Vaasa and 
Turku) (Table 4), which together hold for two-thirds of the Finnish pig farm popula-
tion.
Table 4. Number of pig farms in different PVO districts in 2006.
Figure 1. Location of pig farms (n = 3225) in 
Finland in 2006. Each dot represents one farm. 
Finnish pig farms are concentrated in western 
and south-western Finland.
PVO district Number of farms Percent Number of holdings Percent of holdings
Helsinki 105 3.3 125 3.3
Vaasa 974 30.2 1 183 30.6
Oulu 108 3.3 120 3.1
Lappi 10 0.3 12 0.3
Turku 1 151 35.7 1 370 35.5
Hämeenlinna 238 7.4 291 7.5
Tampere 153 4.7 178 4.6
Kouvola 172 5.3 205 5.3
Mikkeli 73 2.3 86 2.2
Joensuu 50 1.6 59 1.5
Kuopio 95 2.9 115 3
Jyväskylä 96 3 118 3.1
Total 3 225 100 3 862 100
There is no concentration of pig production types in certain areas. The largest 
farrowing herds are located in Lappi and Oulu PVO districts, but the number of farms 
in these districts is low. Large finishing herds are more evenly distributed, but the 
smallest ones are in Joensuu and Jyväskylä (Table 5).
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Table 5. Number of pigs (mean) on different farm types in Finland in 2006.
PVO district
Farrowing farm Farrowing-to-finishing farm Finishing farm
sows finishers sows finishers sows finishers
Helsinki 96 79 59 261 0 489
Vaasa 97 59 62 337 0 497
Oulu 126 89 71 297 0 423
Lappi 181 19 25 134 0 411
Turku 102 78 82 355 0 476
Hämeenlinna 97 82 63 307 0 442
Tampere 91 89 63 240 0 314
Kouvola 76 53 58 232 0 313
Mikkeli 85 38 27 123 0 386
Joensuu 45 12 56 281 0 245
Kuopio 107 120 60 207 0 398
Jyväskylä 57 48 52 198 0 239
Total 96 69 69 318 0 446
Special production structures
Special production structures form a relatively small part of Finnish pig production, 
but their practices may differ from conventional production.
Sow pools
There were 22 sow pools in Finland in 2006 (ETU register 2006), and altogether 90 
satellite units. Four percent (4%) of the Finnish pig farms belong to these pools. Five 
percent (5%) of 571 respondents of the farm questionnaire were members of a sow 
pool and 2% had a central unit of the pool (questionnaire to pig farmers 2007).
In sow pool systems, all dry sows are kept at a central unit and before farrowing they 
are leased by piglet producing units (satellites). Following weaning, the sows are re-
turned to the central unit for mating or insemination. The system is operated in cycles 
of 16 weeks at the satellites, starting with the arrival of pregnant sows three weeks 
prior to farrowing, followed by weaning in this unit at 5 weeks of age and the return 
of sows to the central unit before the arrival of a subsequent group of sows eight 
weeks later.
Artificial insemination (AI) farms
FABA Sika Oy produces and delivers semen. Their boar stations were situated in Ilma-
joki and Kaarina (Kaarina station was closed down in 2009). The leading slaughter-
house companies purchasing pigs in Finland (LSO Oy and A-tuottajat) had their own 
semen production (Finnpig Oy) for their own farmers. 
AI centres received boars from performance test stations and elite breeding farms. AI 
centre boars were only distributed to slaughterhouses.
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Performance testing stations
Performance tested pigs were brought to the testing stations from elite breeding 
herds at approximately 25 kg (10–12 weeks) and were distributed to slaughterhou-
ses or to AI centres. Suomen Sianjalostus Oy, a subsidiary of FABA, had 4 performance 
test stations. Finnpig Oy (owned by LSO Oy and A-tuottajat) also had its own perfor-
mance test station for boars.
Elite breeding farms
Breeding animals were moved from the elite breeding farms to some of the follo-
wing: another elite breeding farm, AI centres, a performance test station, a multip-
lying farm, farrowing farms, farrowing-to-finishing farms, finishing farms or directly 
to the slaughterhouse. Breeding pigs were raised on 93 farms and cross-breeding 
pigs on 63 farms. These were partly the same farms.
Multisite systems and other networks
Four percent (4%) of the farms were members of a multi-site system and 10% were 
part of some other sort of joint production (questionnaire to pig farmers 2007). A 
multisite system consists of a number of herds that form a chain, through which all 
animals pass from birth until slaughter. Each herd in this chain is specialised in only 
one production stage. A multisite system consists of one or several farrowing herds 
where the insemination of sows and the weaning of piglets take place simultaneous-
ly. The piglets from one or several farrowing herds are reared at a separate rearing 
facility from where the young finishing pigs are distributed to several finishing herds. 
On the contrary, it is also possible that several small farrowing herds have joined and 
deliver piglets together to one or more large finisher unit/s without an intermediate 
phase.
Cattle production
Number of farms and animals
On 1 May 2006 there were 20 211 farms with cattle and about 950 000 bovines in 
Finland. As for pigs, the number of cattle is based on farmers’ subsidy notifications, 
which are given on 1 May.
Cattle farms were classified into seven types based on different factors. These factors 
were:
1. the main line of production (dairy or beef),
2. regular visits of a milk transport lorry to the farm,
3. participation in the national milk surveillance, indicating regular inspector visits, 
and
4. whether the farm had received or delivered cattle to other farms (Table 6).
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Table 6. Cattle farm types in Finland (Finnish Farm Registry 2006). 
Farm type Milk collection
Animals 
to other 
farms
Animals 
from other 
farms
Dairy 
cows
Suckler 
cows
Number of 
farms
Closed dairy farm, “self- 
sufficient”
yes no yes/no yes yes/no 2 717
Dairy farm yes yes yes/no yes yes/no 12 188
Finishing beef cattle farm no no yes/no no no 2 197
Weaner farm* no yes yes/no ≤ 3 no 288
Closed suckler herd farm, 
“self-sufficient”
no no yes/no yes yes 971
Suckler herd farm no yes yes/no yes yes 946
Other cattle farm** no no yes/no yes no 904
*identification from registers is problematic, true number is ca. 50 farms (in 2009)
**no dairy collection, no animal transportations, typically the number of animals is small
About 78% of the herds were dairy cattle, and hence formed the most common cattle 
farm type in Finland (Table 6). Altogether, 76% of questionnaire respondents had 
a cow house, 13% had a farm cow shed and 15% a cold cow shed. Some 3% of 
respondents produced organic milk or meat. Farms usually started the grazing season 
in May or June and finished it in September or October, so that it typically lasted 4 to 
6 months (questionnaire to cattle farmers 2007). The number of dairy cows and other 
cattle varies on different farm types (Table 7).
Table 7. Number of cattle on different farm types in Finland (Finnish Farm Registry 2006).
Farm type
Number of dairy cows Number of other cattle
maximum mean median maximum mean median
Dairy farm 209 23 20 304 9 4
Beef cattle farm* 3 0 0 1 913 65 39
Suckler farm 96 2 0 594 50 33
Other 71 5 4 436 9 3
*beef cattle farm includes finishing and weaner farms
Cattle production is concentrated in the PVO districts of Vaasa, Oulu and Kuopio (Table 
8, Figure 2). There is no clear difference in the number of dairy cattle between PVO 
districts. However, beef cattle herds are clearly larger in Vaasa and Kuopio than in the 
rest of the country, and big suckler farms are mainly represented in Oulu (Table 9).
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PVO district Number of farms
Percent of 
farms
Number of 
holdings
Percent of 
holdings
Helsinki 557 2.8 575 2.8
Vaasa 3 988 19.7 4 065 19.7
Oulu 3 177 15.7 3 230 15.6
Lappi 864 4.3 875 4.2
Turku 1 578 7.8 1 632 7.9
Hämeenlinna 1 134 5.6 1 167 5.7
Tampere 1 102 5.5 1 127 5.4
Kouvola 1 191 5.9 1 220 5.9
Mikkeli 1 379 6.8 1 413 6.8
Joensuu 1 427 7.1 1 460 7.1
Kuopio 2 446 12.1 2 525 12.2
Jyväskylä 1 368 6.8 1 396 6.7
Total 20 211 100.0 20 685 100.0
Table 9. Mean number of cattle on different farm types in Finland in 2006.
PVO district
Dairy farma Beef cattle farmb Suckler farmc Other cattle farmd
dairy 
cows
other 
cattle
dairy 
cows
other 
cattle
dairy 
cows
other 
cattle
dairy 
cows
other 
cattle
Helsinki 28 7 0 58 1 30 5 7
Vaasa 26 13 0 80 2 49 7 13
Oulu 23 10 0 76 3 72 6 11
Lappi 21 7 0 76 2 54 5 16
Turku 22 8 0 57 2 55 4 8
Hämeenlinna 24 7 0 55 2 46 5 6
Tampere 24 7 0 42 1 39 4 5
Kouvola 23 6 0 50 1 45 6 3
Mikkeli 20 7 0 52 2 38 5 6
Joensuu 21 8 0 59 1 55 5 10
Kuopio 23 8 0 82 2 51 7 16
Jyväskylä 21 7 0 59 1 47 6 5
Total 23 9 0 65 2 50 5 9
a both types of dairy farms,
b weaner and finisher farms,
c both types of suckler farms,
d other cattle farms
Table 8. Number of cattle farms in Finland in 2006.
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Figure 2. Location of cattle farms
(n = 20 211) in Finland in 2006. 
Each dot represents one farm.
Special production structures
Organic farming
The number of organic animal farms in Finland is low in both pig and cattle production. 
Organic production is much more common in the cattle sector (Table 10).
Table 10. Number of organic animal farms and the number of animals at the farms during 2007 in 
Finland (TIKE 2008) and their proportion (%) of all farms.
Species
Number of animals 
on organic animal 
farms
Percent out of 
total number of 
animals (%)
Number of organic 
animal farms
Percent out of all 
farms (%)
Cattle 18 261 1.9 368 1.9
Pig 2 050 0.1 15 0.5
Bull stations
FABA Palvelu is responsible for semen production in Finland. The bull breeding 
station is located in Muhos and the semen production is in Pieksämäki. Approximate-
ly 40 young bulls are in production at the same time.
Weaners
Calves aged 1–2 weeks are moved to a special rearing farm (weaner farm), where 
they are raised until they are 5–6 months old and then moved to a final rearing farm 
until they are 15–18 months old. The number of weaner herds is difficult to determine 
from registry data, as other farms may resemble the weaner farm definition (Table 6). 
According to meat companies, there were approximately 50 weaner farms in 2009.
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Co-production of pigs and cattle
Altogether, 228 farms (1% of all pig and cattle farms) had a combination of cattle 
and pigs in 2006. Every PVO district had at least one farm that produced both animals, 
although most of these farms were located in the Vaasa and Turku PVO districts (Table 11). 
Table 11. Number of farms that have both cattle and pigs in Finland in 2006.
PVO district Number of farms Percent out of mixed farms
Helsinki 13 5.7
Vaasa 68 29.8
Oulu 7 3.1
Lappi 1 0.4
Turku 57 25
Hämeenlinna 18 7.9
Tampere 17 7.5
Kouvola 13 5.7
Mikkeli 11 4.8
Joensuu 5 2.2
Kuopio 8 3.5
Jyväskylä 10 4.4
Total 228 100
The number of pigs and cattle on the farms correlated significantly (Pearson r = 0.485, 
p = 0.01) (Table 12): if a farm produced a relatively large number of pigs, it also had 
a high probability of having a relatively larger number of cattle than if it only had 
a small number of pigs. In comparison with a typical farm that produces only either 
cattle or pigs, the farms with mixed production were usually smaller (Tables 3, 7, 12).
Table 12. Mean, median and maximum number of different animal groups
on farms that have both pigs and cattle, in 2006.
Animal
Number of animals
maximum mean median
Sows 708 23 1
Finishers 1 764 151 31
Dairy cattle 263 13 2
Other cattle 529 33 9
Farm density in Finland
The farm density in Finland is low (Table 13, Figure 3). The farms are also clustered in 
a relatively small area. In larger areas the average density drops and is only a fraction 
(1/2 to 1/7) of the estimate that is based on a 3 km radius around a farm. Similarly, 
relative variation within the country also decreases with increasing radius. Within a 
3 km radius the coefficient of variation of farm density is 76%, but within a 20 km 
radius the figure is only 60%. The maximum density in an area within a 10 km radius 
around a farm is only one-third of the maximum density within a 3 km radius around 
a farm.
The spread of Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) within Finland and emergency vaccination in case of an epidemic outbreak
34
Table 13. Average and 95th percentile of the number of farms around a farm in a given PVO 
district in 2006.
PVO district
Number of farms Farm density/squared km
3 km 3-10 km 10-20km mean <97,5%
Helsinki 4.8  (11) 28.7  (53) 87.9  (178) 0.17 0.39
Vaasa 12.1 (29) 62.9 (119) 178.7 (279) 0.43 1.03
Oulu 8.7  (30) 36.8 (122) 101.2 (247) 0.31 1.06
Rovaniemi 3.7  (10) 8.9   (28) 22.7  (71) 0.13 0.35
Turku 7.7  (18) 49.7 (100) 143.2 (253) 0.27 0.64
Hämeenlinna 6.6  (14) 42.2  (80) 122.3 (217) 0.23 0.50
Tampere 5.6  (12) 35.3  (69) 111.2 (189) 0.20 0.42
Kouvola 6.5  (16) 41.0  (81) 96.5  (169) 0.23 0.57
Mikkeli 4.7  (11) 29.0  (56) 86.9  (139) 0.17 0.39
Joensuu 6.8  (17) 36.8  (76) 86.7  (152) 0.24 0.60
Kuopio 7.9  (19) 52.3 (107) 147.9 (276) 0.28 0.67
Jyväskylä 5.4  (18) 25.8  (51) 74.3  (124) 0.19 0.64
*densities are estimated within a 3 km radius around a farm
Farm density varies between PVO districts and according to the radius applied in 
analysis. In a single protection zone there would be 8 farms and one infected farm. In 
a single surveillance zone there would on average be 43 additional farms. In a 10 km 
wide area surrounding a surveillance zone there would on average be 122 farms. In 
the district of Vaasa there would be over three times more farms in a single protection 
zone than in Rovaniemi PVO district. Relative differences are even greater when 
surveillance zones are compared, as the difference between Vaasa and Rovaniemi 
PVO districts is seven-fold. (Table 13). 
Figure 3. Farm density (farms per km2) around a farm in Finland estimated by three different radiuses
(3, 10 and 20 km) in 2006.
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Co-operation between farms
When pig farmers were asked about co-operation between farms, 21% reported that 
they used the same equipment for manure transport (questionnaire to pig farmers 
2007). However, almost 60% of respondents stated that they had no co-operation 
with other farms. Buying and selling of services was also quite rare, as only 8% had 
sold manure spreading services and 11% threshing services. Altogether, 70% of farms 
had not sold any services. The most common services that farmers bought were 
manure spreading (16%) and maintenance services (7%); 65% of farms had not 
bought any services.
When cattle farms were asked about co-operation between farms, 34% told that 
they used shared forage harvesting equipment and 24% shared equipment for 
manure transport. Almost 40% of respondents reported that they had no co-operation 
with other farms. The most common services that cattle farmers bought were forage 
harvest (28%), threshing (27%), maintenance service of machines (25%) and manure 
spreading (15%). About one-fourth of the farmers stated that they did not buy any 
services. Six percent (6%) of cattle farms had hired workers.
Manure
Altogether, 92% of pig farmers and cattle farmers spread manure on their own fields. 
In addition, 39% of pig farmers and 14% of cattle farmers sold or gave manure to 
other farms. Pig manure was typically spread on the fields twice a year and cattle 
manure once or twice a year (questionnaires to pig and cattle farmers 2007).
Biosecurity on cattle and pig farms in Finland
The Finnish Association for Animal Disease Prevention (ETT) is an organisation that 
promotes animal health and welfare in the Finnish livestock sector. ETT prepares 
explicit instructions for the import of animals, semen and embryos and supervises 
every case. It contributes to instructions for farms for the management of disease 
risks and preventive measures. ETT also draws up rules for the management of 
animal feed imports and salmonella risks. Additionally, Sikava and Naseva are 
voluntary health databases for pig and cattle farmers, respectively, maintained by ETT.
There are several ways to enhance biosecurity and decrease the risk of disease trans-
mission between farms. Control measures applied to the trade and movement of 
animals, including quarantine, vaccination, veterinary inspection and documentation, 
as well as logistical planning of transport routes, are important ways of avoiding the 
spread of disease.
The transportation logistics are organised such in a way that contacts between 
farms are minimized. If there is a known transmissible disease at a farm, it is visited 
last or separately to avoid contact with other farms. Transport vehicles are cleaned 
every day and the driver avoids entering the animal buildings. All visitors should also 
be advised to follow strict hygienic routines when visiting a farm.
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Biosecurity measures performed by the producer that may reduce the risk of recei-
ving infection in the herds are several, for instance the use of protective clothing and 
boots, hand washing, a disinfection foot bath, a separate loading area for animals at 
the farm and a physical barrier (e.g. a bench) that separates the “clean” area from 
the “dirty” one.
Biosecurity data, especially the above mentioned, were collected from Finnish pig 
and cattle farmers through questionnaires (2007) and compared to similar data 
collected from veterinarians practitioners in Finland (2007) (see data collection in the 
section on risk assessment).
In general, pig herds have better biosecurity than cattle herds in Finland (Figure 4). 
The most common measures applied seem to be protective boots and hand washing 
facilities. On the contrary, barriers and disinfectant footbaths were used less frequently 
in both the pig and cattle production sectors (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Biosecurity at cattle and pig farms in Finland. Error bars indicate 95% confidence interval for 
the mean.
The analysis of the survey of farmers revealed that biosecurity actions were more 
frequently used on larger than smaller pig farms (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Comparison of the use of biosecurity measures on large and small sow (farrowing) and 
dairy farms, respectively.
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The use of biosecurity measures at different-sized farms was estimated by logistic 
regression. Analysis of the questionnaires to the farmers revealed that biosecurity 
actions were more frequently used on larger than smaller farms (Figure 5). In the 
comparison, the largest 10% of farms had on average 55 cows or 490 sows and the 
smallest 10% of farms had 7 cows or 30 sows.
Sheep and goats
The number of sheep and goats in Finland is relatively small (Table 1, Table14). 
According to the farmer questionnaires, 4.4% of cattle farms and 1.9% of pig farms 
also had sheep or goats.
Sheep are mainly kept either for wool or meat production in Finland. The sheep are 
kept on pasture from May (or from June in the north) to November, if the weather 
permits. The lambs are mainly slaughtered from September to November (60%), 
while 20% are slaughtered in spring and 10% during the winter. Goats in Finland are 
mainly kept for small-scale dairy production (Rosengren et al. 2009).
Other sensitive animal populations
There is a large population of reindeer in the northern parts of Finland in the Rova-
niemi PVO district. Moose (Alces alces), on the other hand, are distributed all over 
the country, except the most distant northern parts of Finland. In the southern parts 
of Finland and in Åland there is a smaller population of white-tailed deer (Odocoileus 
virginianus).
There is a fairly large population of farmed wild boar (Sus scrofa) in Finland, divided 
between 150 farms. The unfarmed wild boar population in Finland, however, is 
small, approximately only 200 but less than 1000 animals situated mainly close to 
the Russian border. The approximate sizes of the wildlife populations in Finland are 
presented in Table 14.
Table 14. Number of other FMDV-sensitive animals in Finland.
Species Number of animals Number of farms Description
Goat 
(Capra aegagrus hircus)a
6 600 483 Most of the producers are 
hobby farmers
Farmed wild pig 
(Sus scrofa)b
not available 151 Almost half of the farms are located 
in Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala, 
Pirkanmaa and Pohjois-Pohjanmaa
Wild pig 
(Sus scrofa)c
several hundred, 
<1000
- Mainly near Russian border in Ky-
menlaakso and Etelä-Savo
Reindeer 
(Genus Rangifer)d
200 000 - 300 000 Reindeer husbandry 
is practiced by 
reindeer herding 
cooperatives (n=56)
Reindeer husbandry area covers 
almost the entire area of the Province 
of Lapland and northern part of the 
Province of Oulu.
Moose (Alces alces)e 91 000** - Almost entire country.
White-tailed deer
(Odocoileus virginianus)c
ca. 30 000 - In South Finland, originally alien 
species.
Roe deer
(Capreolus capreolus)f
ca. 25 000 - In South and West Finland and on 
the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia
Finnish forest reindeer
(Rangifer tarandus fennicus)c
ca. 1 000 - Found in Kainuu, and a small 
population in central south Finland
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a TIKE 2006
b Finnish registry of animal holders 2009
c Ermala 2009
d Rosengren et al. 2009
e FGFRI 2009, data from 2008 after hunting season
f Finnish Central Organisation of Hunters 2007
Food industry
Slaughterhouses
In 2006 there were 17 large capacity slaughterhouses (EU establishments) in main-
land Finland and one in the Åland archipelago, which slaughtered either pigs or 
bovines, or both. These slaughterhouses had slaughtered >2000 bovines and/or 
>2000 pigs per year (Table 15). In 2006 these establishments altogether slaughtered 
290 000 bovines and 2.4 million pigs. Hence, they slaughtered a major proportion of 
the 293 789 annually slaughtered cattle and 2 401 089 pigs (TIKE 2006). The remai-
ning pigs and cattle were slaughtered at one of the 90 low-capacity slaughterhouses 
approved for the slaughtering of pigs and/or bovines.
Meat can subsequently be traced back to a certain pork or beef herd or to the retail 
level (one step back and forward). In cases of an outbreak of animal disease, it is 
essential to know where each animal has been, so that animals likely to have been 
infected can be traced and isolated from other animals. For bovines, pigs, sheep and 
goats, there are species-specific directions on identity marking and registration. The 
identity marking and registration are monitored by inspectors from the Employment 
and Economic Development Centre, inspecting veterinary surgeons, and municipal 
veterinary surgeons. Since the beginning of 2005, appropriate identity marking and 
registration of livestock has been a condition of payment of animal-related subsidies.
Table 15. Slaughterhouses in Finland in 2006 (According to directives 64/433/EEC, 71/118/EEC, 
77/99/EEC, 91/495/EEC, 92/45/EEC, 94/65/EC)
Establishment Number of establishments Description
Capacity of 
production
Large capacity 
slaughterhouses/pigs
6 approved for slaughtering 
of pigs
78% of pig 
slaughtering
Large capacity 
slaughterhouses/cattle
5 approved for slaughtering 
of bovines
50% of cattle 
slaughtering
Large capacity slaughter- 
houses/pigs and cattle
6 approved for slaughtering 
of pigs and bovines
21% of pig and 49% 
of cattle slaughtering
Low capacity 
slaughterhouses
90 approved for slaughtering 
of pigs and/or bovines
1% of pig and 1% of 
cattle slaughtering
Several slaughterhouses were owned by same meat production companies: there 
were only 13 meat production companies with large-scale slaughterhouses.
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Large pig slaughtering units are located in areas with a large number of pig farms 
(Figure 6). Note that since 2006, pig slaughtering has ceased at two slaughterhouses 
in the eastern parts of Finland. Because cattle farms are more scattered around the 
country, slaughtering is also more spatially spread (Figure 7).
Meat production companies have different strategies in animal collection. Some 
companies divide Finland into different collection areas, or the whole county can be 
the designated collection area for one truck. Trucks are cleaned at least once a day, but 
usually after each batch. Vehicles vary in size between and within meat companies. 
Figure 6. Locations of the largest pig slaughter-
houses in Finland in 2006. Black squares 
represent pig slaughterhouses (n = 6) and grey 
squares are pig and cattle slaughterhouses 
(n = 6). Each grey dot represents one pig farm 
(n = 3 225). 
Figure 7. Locations of the largest cattle slaughter-
houses in Finland in 2006. White squares 
represent cattle slaughterhouses (n = 5) and 
grey squares are pig and cattle slaughterhouses 
(n = 6). Each grey dot represents one cattle farm 
(n = 20 211). 
Dairy plants
Table 16. Approved dairy plants in Finland in 2006 (According to directive 92/46/EEC).
Establishment Number ofestablishments Description
Large dairy 36 >2 000 000 l/year
Small dairy 64 <2 000 000 l/year
There were 100 dairy plants in Finland in 2006 (Table 16) located in areas containing 
a large number of dairy farms (Figure 8). Milk collection routes are quite stable. Ro-
utes are usually altered only twice a year and the same dairy tanker always collects 
milk in the same order. Milk is typically collected every second day from the same 
farm. Dairy tanker capacity varies from ca. 12 000 to 40 000 litres. Dairy tankers are 
cleaned after every collection route.
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Figure 8. Locations of the largest dairies (n = 36) 
in Finland in 2006. Each black triangle represents 
one dairy plant and each grey dot represents 
one cattle farm (n = 20 211). 
Animal transportation
Meat production companies organise pig and cattle transportation to slaughter and 
the transportation of pigs between farms. However, according to meat production 
companies and the questionnaires to pig farmers, some farmers arrange transportation 
between farms themselves, although this is a clear minority (<10%).
The most common way to bring pigs to farms was to use an animal transport 
company (52%), and the second most common method was transport by the meat 
production company (29%). The most common way to transport pigs between farms 
was to consult or turn to an animal transport company (46%) or the meat production 
company’s transport (33%) (questionnaire to pig farmers 2007). Similar information 
on cattle transportation was unavailable.
Pigs and cattle in Finland are transported by entrepreneurs registered for animal 
transportation. Registration is mandatory, based on animal transport legislation 
(MAF 1429/2006). In 2006, there were 212 entrepreneurs registered in Finland for 
transporting animals (Finnish Animal Transporter Registry 2007). Ten percent of 
them had a licence to transport cattle, 9% to transport pigs and 81% had licence to 
transport both animals.
There were 328 EU inspections (EC 1/2005) of animal transportation in 2008. In these 
inspections, only two flaws concerning the origin or destination of the transport were 
found in the animal transport documents (Evira 2009c).
Production environment
Relief workers
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health supervises the provision of relief workers in 
agriculture. The Farmers' Social Insurance Institution (Mela) is the administrator of 
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this service. Local units composed of one or more municipalities handle the practical 
arrangements and employ an adequate number of relief workers. There were 135 
of these local units in 2006 and 4766 monthly salary-based farm relief workers. The 
farm relief services include substitute assistance, an annual leave entitlement of 25 
days, and subsidized help for 120 hours each year, as well as additional services at 
full price (Mela 2009).
The most significant sector for relief workers is milk production, but almost all 
other production types also regularly use relief workers. However, fattening pig farms 
use relief workers more seldom than other farm types. Approximately 10% of relief 
workers had their own farm, lived on a farm or worked on two farms simultaneously 
when they had been working as a relief worker in a pig farm (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 
2005).
Rendering
The Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira, the MVO and the PVO, as well as Veterinary 
Officers at slaughterhouses supervise the processing of animal waste. Two rendering 
plants are approved for the destruction of high risk materials in Finland. The capacity 
of these plants (Honkajoki and Kaustinen) during an outbreak of FMD is estimated to 
be 380 000 kg/day, which corresponds to about 700 cows or 2500 pigs (Evira 2009a). 
Finland is divided into three pig carcass collection areas. Cattle carcasses are only 
collected from areas with a high animal density (hence the northern part including 
Oulu and Rovaniemi PVO districts are excluded). It is still permitted to bury carcasses 
in the excluded northern parts of Finland.
Carcass collection was the most common way to take care of dead animals. There 
was little difference between production types among pig farms: 72% of farrowing 
herds, 76% of farrowing-to-finishing herds and 62% of finishing herds had their pig 
carcasses taken away by official carcass collection. Carcasses were usually stored in 
the same place on the farm (ca. 79%), and almost 70% of these farms had a cooled 
storage unit. About 20% of the respondents did not have a permanent place for the 
storage of carcasses.
There were only small differences between production types on cattle farms regarding 
carcass collection: 76% of dairy herds, 56% of beef cattle herds and 54% of suckler 
herds had their cattle carcasses taken away by official carcass collection. Carcasses 
were usually stored in the same place on the farm (ca. 30%), but almost none had a 
cooled storage unit. About 70% of the respondents did not have a permanent place 
for the storage of carcasses.
According to the questionnaires (Virtanen et al. 2008), the rendering vehicle visits 
a pig farm on average 5.6 times per year and a cattle farm 1.9 times per year. The 
number of collections is not dependent on the production type of the farm. There are 
different vehicles collecting pigs and cattle, and altogether there are 4 pig rendering 
vehicles (four independent enterprisers) and 10 cattle rendering vehicles (Lauhaluo-
ma Ky) in Finland.
In 2008, Evira carried out a study on cattle rendering (Evira 2009b). According to the 
cattle register, 35221 cattle died on farms located in the carcass collection area, and 
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3649 of them were buried. Burying of carcasses in the collection area is illegal, but it 
seems that it still happens to some extent (ca. 10% in 2008).
Agricultural production advisers
There are several production advisers who can visit farms. ProAgria, a consortium 
of mainly co-operative-based organisations, offers production consultation for pig 
and cattle production in several districts throughout the country. Every large meat 
production company has its own production advisers, who are specialised, for example, 
in construction planning or in animal nutrition. These advisers also have their own 
districts. In addition, dairies have their own production advisers.
The FABA provides services ranging from artificial insemination and embryo transfer 
to genetic evaluations and breeding advice. Mating plans are prepared by breeding 
advisors on the herd level, and the FABA also carries out genetic evaluations of pigs. 
The FABA has divided Finland into four districts.
Artificial insemination
About 200 000 artificial inseminations of pigs are performed every year in Finland. 
Most of the work is done by licensed farmers who order semen from AI centres (Finn-
Pig Ltd. or FABAsika Ltd.).
Each year approximately 700 000 artificial inseminations of cattle are carried out 
in Finland, and most of them are performed by AI technicians and pig farmers. In 
2006 there were 727 404 AI visits to farms by 420 AI technicians (AI register). Cattle 
farmers perform ca. 3% of artificial inseminations by themselves, while pig farmers 
almost always carry out insemination by themselves. In addition, 60 AI technicians 
also provide a fertility service and 50 of them transfer embryos.
Economic importance of livestock production
Production and consumption quantities
Information reported in this section is mainly based on data by Niemi & Ahlstedt 
(2008).The amount of milk delivered to Finnish dairies has been declining during the 
past decade. In 2006, Finnish dairy farms produced 2 279 million litres of milk (Figure 
9). Moreover, dairy and suckler cows produced 331 900 newly born calves. Milk 
production in Finland fell 36 million litres short of the national quota for the period 
that ended in 2006. Regarding the most important dairy products processed in 2006, 
the production of liquid milk totalled 710 million kg, yoghurts 109.1 million kg, sour 
milk 70.1 million kg, and creams 30.8 million kg. The consumption of liquid dairy 
products approximately equalled their production quantities in Finland. The produc-
tion of cheese was 99.9 million kg and the consumption of cheese 100.6 million kg. 
The production of butter was 50.2 million kg and domestic sales amounted to 12.8 
million kg. Milk powder production totalled 19.6 million kg.
The figures for the beef sector show that 85 million kg of beef was produced and 
95.2 million kg beef was consumed in Finland in 2006. Altogether, 152 000 bulls and 
103 000 cows were slaughtered. The average slaughter weights of cows and bulls 
were 264 kg and 324 kg, respectively. The average slaughter weight of bulls was 
almost 50 kg higher than in 2000.
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In 2006 the production of pigmeat was 207.8 million kg and consumption was 180.2 
million kg. This amount was obtained by slaughtering 2.4 million pigs. The average 
slaughter weight of fattening pigs was 84.6 kg.
On a per capita basis, the consumption of food has remained quite stable. There are 
consumption trends such as decline in the consumption of butter and an increase in 
the consumption of pigmeat since 2000, as illustrated in Figure 10. The per capita 
consumption of liquid dairy products (liquid and sour milk products and cream milk) 
also declined from 193.9 kg per capita in 2000 to 183.9 kg in 2006, but recovered 
thereafter to 189.2 kg per capita. Although there is both seasonal and annual 
variation, it is uncommon that per capita consumption of livestock products in Finland 
changes much from year to year.
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Figure 9. Livestock production in Finland from 1999 to 2009.
Source: Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
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Figure 10. Per capita consumption of cheese, butter, beef and pigmeat in Finland from 2000 to 2008 
(provisional). Sources: Gallup Food and Farm Facts, Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry.
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Producer and consumer prices
The market prices of livestock products in the other EU Member States influence their 
prices in Finland, but the Finnish prices also have special characteristics. For example, 
the producer prices for pigmeat and milk usually vary less in Finland than in most 
other EU countries. 
The prices paid to the Finnish dairy producers are slightly higher than the prices paid 
to the producers in the EU on average. In 2006 the average quality-adjusted producer 
price for milk was €0.36 per litre. On top to this, producers received on average €0.07 
per litre from public funds as production aid. 
The average producer price for beef was €2.12 per kg, and that for bull meat was 
€2.50 per kg (Figure 11). In the long term, the beef prices in Finland have been 4–5% 
lower than the average in the EU. The producer price for all pigmeat was €1.26 per kg 
in 2006. The purchase price of piglets was between €54 and €55 per 25 kg piglet. The 
producer price for pigmeat remained stable in Finland in 2005 and 2006. 
The ratio of the consumer price to the producer price for food varies according to the 
product. The average consumer price for light milk (typically with a 1.5% fat content) 
in 2006, for instance, was €0.73 per kg, which was approximately twice the producer 
price for milk with a 4.3% fat and 3.3% protein content, and of which 18 cents 
per kg of milk was left to the trade sector. The average consumer price for butter 
was €4.84 per kg and the price for Emmental cheese was €10.86 per kg. Regarding 
selected meat products, the price of beef roast was €9.9 and pork chops €7.8 per kg. 
Between 2000 and 2006, food prices in nominal terms rose by 10.9%, while the general 
consumer price index rose by 8.1%. The share of the wholesale and retail sector in 
the price for basic dairy products, such as light milk or Edam cheese, has grown in 
relation to the sale prices of the dairies (Statistics Finland 2010).
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2009200820072006200520042003200220012000
Year
€ 
pe
r l
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
€ 
pe
r k
g Milk
Beef
Pigmeat
Figure 11. Producer prices for dairy milk1) (€ per l) beef and pigmeat (€ per kg) in Finland from 2000 
to 2009, 1)including retroactive payment. Source: Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry.
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Foreign trade
Both the import and export of food has increased over the past decade. In 2006, the 
value of Finnish food exports was €1 104 million whereas the value of food imports 
to Finland was €2 810 million. Despite the record-high exports, the deficit in the 
food trade balance was €1 706 million. Traditionally, the deficit has been due to the 
import of fruits, vegetables, coffee, alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Cheese is also a 
significant import article.
Most of the food imports to Finland are intra-community trade, mainly with Germany, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. Although import from the countries that entered the EU 
in 2004 has increased, their share of imports was 5.6%. As opposed to this, imports 
from third countries accounted for a 24.6% share.
In 2006, Russia (22%), Sweden (16%) and Estonia (10%) were the main destinations 
for Finnish food exports. Countries that entered the EU in 2004 accounted for only a 
16% share of exports. The value of Finnish food exports was €1 104 million. In the 
late 1990s, the value of Finnish food rapidly increased, but from 2001 to 2005 the 
value of exports was quite stable.
Dairy products are the most important product group in Finnish food exports, as they 
represent almost one third of the total value of exports. The value of cheese ex-
ports was almost €138 million, thus representing 12.7% of the total food exports in 
2006. Other important export articles include cheese, butter, sugar industry products, 
pigmeat, cereals and cereal products and alcoholic beverages.
The quantity of exported liquid dairy products was 30.3 million kg, 5.6 million kg 
more than their imports. Cheese exports were 35.8 and imports 41.5 million kg. 
Milk powder exports were 12.9 million kg and butter exports were 35.4 million kg. 
The majority of Finnish butter production is for export markets and the main export 
destination is Russia.
Foreign trade in beef and pigmeat in Finland is mainly carcass meat. In 2006, beef 
exports amounted to 2.4 million kg, of which 88% was exported to Sweden. Beef 
imports were 14.4 million kg and represented 15% of consumption. Beef was mainly 
imported from Sweden, Brazil, Ireland and Germany.
The quantity of exported pigmeat in 2006 was 48.1 million kg, and exports 
represented a 23% share of production. Russia, Estonia, Sweden and Japan together 
accounted for 74% of the carcass meat exports, of which Russia’s share was 38%. 
Pigmeat imports to Finland amounted to 17.7 million kg, which was 10% of the 
consumption. During recent years, processed meat has mainly been imported from 
Sweden and Germany, whereas Denmark and Germany have accounted for 75–80% 
of carcass meat imports.
Finland exports very few live animals. However, in 2006 approximately 25 000 piglets 
were exported to Sweden, corresponding to about 1% of the annual pigmeat production 
potential in Finland.
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Economic size of agricultural, food and retail sectors
The returns, costs and economic results of agriculture and horticulture are examined 
based on a total calculation (see Niemi & Ahlstedt 2008). Income development in 
primary production is examined through agricultural income, which is the total return 
on agriculture minus the total costs, and thus indicates the compensation for the farm 
family’s labour and capital invested in agriculture.
In 2006, the total return on agriculture and horticulture exceeded €4 020 million for 
the first time since Finland joined the EU in 1995. The total costs of agriculture and 
horticulture were €3 118 million and the agricultural income totalled €893 million 
(Figure 12). The sales of agriculture and horticulture were €2 100 million, of which 
39% (€812 million) came from milk production and 26% (€584 million) from other 
livestock production. The sales return covered only 65% of the total costs. For instance, 
in 2005 the average producer price plus support paid 40.6 cents per kg dairy milk, 
whereas the average production cost of milk was 57.2 cents per kg.
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Figure 12. The total returns, costs and agricultural income (€ million) at nominal prices in Finnish 
agriculture from 2000 to 2009. Source: MTT Economie Research
The sales of groceries and daily consumer goods have increased over the past decade. 
In 2006 they totalled €12 404 million. Between 1995 and 2006, the sales of groceries 
and daily consumer goods at nominal prices increased by almost 40%. 
The turnover of the Finnish food industry in 2006 was €9 200 million, of which 12% 
originated from exported products. The turnover per person employed by the food 
industry was €257 000 and the personnel employed totalled 35 900. The two largest 
sectors of the food industry were the meat and dairy sectors. 
Milk processing markets were dominated by two major groups of companies, 
whereas meat processing was more fractioned in 2006. The two leading retail chains 
of food and daily goods had in total a 73% market share in 2006. The concentration 
of the retail sector and food industry has increased as the number of outlets has 
decreased, supermarket chains have increased their size and processing companies 
have merged.
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5.2 Laboratory diagnostics
At the Finnish Food safety Authority Evira, animals suspected to be infected with 
FMDV are diagnosed from vesicle fluids or epithelium using virus isolation by 
RT-PCR. The sensitivity of RT-PCR is estimated to be about 95% (Rikula 2010). There is 
also a non-structural protein (NSP) ELISA test designed to differentiate infected from 
vaccinated animals (DIVA), regardless of the serotype causing the outbreak. 
(PrioCHECK® FMDV NS, Prionics Lelystad B.V., Paltinastraat 33, P.O. Box 2271, NL-8203 
AG Lelystad, The Netherlands). There have been no problems diagnosing FMDV from 
reference samples with RT-PCR or ELISA tests. FMD virus must be verified from a 
positive PCR by sequencing the genome. This is expected to take 1–3 days. After the 
first preliminary positive diagnosis, the sample is sent from Evira to an FMD reference 
laboratory in Lindholm, Denmark or Pirbright, UK. These verifications are expected to 
take 4–7 days.
5.3 Administration in Finland
Veterinary administration in Finland
There are about 1800 veterinarians in Finland.
The Central Veterinary Service
Department of Food and Health of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is the 
supreme authority that steers the quality and safety of foodstuffs through the whole 
food chain. The Department is responsible for the safety and quality of food and 
production inputs of agriculture, animal health and welfare and plant health. 
Legislativework is carried out as part of the Finnish Government and the EU institu-
tions and decision making.
The Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira is the central government authority that licenses 
veterinary practitioners and acts as the authority ensuring compliance of veterinary 
practice with the legislation. 
Provincial Veterinary Officers (PVO)
Finland is divided into 13 Provincial Veterinary Offices (PVO districts, Figure 13). The 
PVOs are responsible for monitoring, surveying and controlling animal diseases on the 
provincial level. Each province has its own local contingency plan, created according 
to the special circumstances in each province. In 2009 there were changes in 
provincial governments, but the spatial distribution of districts remained the same as 
in 2006.
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Figure 13. The PVO districts in mainland
Finland. Coding of PVO districts: 
  1 = Helsinki 
  2 = Vaasa 
  3 = Oulu 
  4 = Rovaniemi 
  5 = Turku 
  7 = Hämeenlinna 
  8 = Tampere 
  9 = Kouvola 
10 = Mikkeli 
11 = Joensuu 
12 = Kuopio 
13 = Jyväskylä 
These names indicate the location of the 
office of the PVO.
Municipal Veterinary Officers (MVO)
All municipalities in Finland are obliged to provide round-the-clock veterinary services 
covering their area. In year 2006, the treatment of production animals was taken care 
of by 350 municipal veterinarians in Finland.
Veterinary emergency duty districts (96 in 2006) are formed by the municipalities 
(431 in 2006) and they are responsible for the treatment of production animals and 
urgent duties concerning animal protection and contagious animal diseases.
5.4 Risk management, treatment, prevention and control
FMD is an OIE-listed disease and the control is regarded as high priority (Cox & Barnett 
2009). Because FMD is a viral disease, there is no treatment for the sick animal, and 
as a notifiable disease it should be eradicated.
A possible FMD outbreak in Finland is dependent on the FMD situation in Europe and 
the rest of the world. Current control policies in Europe are based on strict import and 
quarantine regulations. 
FMD is controlled both by European directive (2003/85/EC) and through more 
detailed domestic legislation (27/EEO/2006, 304/2006, 5/EEO/96, 1363/1994) and 
a contingency plan. The national contingency plan contains detailed descriptions of 
operations in the case of an FMD suspicion and after confirmation of FMD. According 
to the law, all veterinarians under 50 years old and veterinary students are permitted 
to work as veterinarians and obliged, if needed, to contribute in inspections and other 
veterinary work needed in case of an outbreak of FMD.
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The Provincial Veterinary Officer (PVO), Municipal Veterinary Officer (MVO) and the 
Food Safety Authority (Evira) must immediately be notified about signs of FMD. In 
the case of a suspicion of FMD, a farm will be placed under restrictive measures. This 
includes the prevention of animals from entering or leaving the farm and all traffic to 
and from the farm is prohibited or strictly controlled. Samples for FMDV analysis are 
taken according to instructions from the competent authorities in the country (Evira). 
If diagnosis is confirmed, or even earlier if indicated by other evidence, animals of the 
susceptible species at the farm are immediately culled and the farm is cleaned and 
disinfected under the supervision of an official veterinarian.
Specifically trained veterinarians must carry out an epidemiologic inquiry that includes 
identification of the contact farms. Contact farms include all farms that in some direct 
or indirect way have been in contact with cloven-hoofed animals at the suspected 
farm, or may have acquired the infection from the same origin. All farms that have 
received or delivered animals from or to the suspected or infected farm during the 
14 days (cattle and pigs), or 21 days for sheep, prior to the first clinical signs are 
regarded as contact farms. Contact farms are also farms that are situated within a 
radius of 1 km from the suspected/infected farm. In addition, farms that have been 
on the same route as the suspected/infected farm regarding, for instance, a transport 
vehicle or veterinarian during 2–3 days prior to the detection are considered contacts 
according to the Finnish contingency plan.
All contact holdings are put under restrictive measures. Immediately after an outbreak 
of FMD is confirmed, the competent authorities shall establish a protection zone 
based on a minimum radius of 3 km and a surveillance zone based on a minimum 
radius of 10 km around the infected farm. In the protection and surveillance zones, 
no animals or products thereof shall be removed from their holdings. All animals 
dispatched from the zone during at least the period of 21 days before the earliest 
detected infection must be traced. All animals in the protection and surveillance zone 
and on contact farms outside the zones must be counted, clinically inspected and the 
measures documented by an official veterinarian at the latest 7 days after the zone 
is established or the contact farm is traced. The farms closest to the infected farm 
(1 km radius) are to be inspected within 2 days. In case of clinical symptoms, samples 
are taken according to instructions in the contingency plan. No animals are allowed to 
be moved from the farms were they are kept.
 
The restrictive measures can be lifted at the infected farm when all suspected 
animals have been eradicated and disinfection of the premises has been performed. 
Restrictive measures can be lifted in contact farms that are not in the restrictive 
zones, when clinical inspection has not indicated any symptoms of FMD, and in the case 
of sheep and goats, a negative serological survey has been conducted and 21 days 
has elapsed following the last contact with an infected farm. At farms in restrictive 
zones the restrictive measures can be lifted when at least 15 days in the protection 
zone and 30 days in the surveillance zone has elapsed since the culling of animals 
and preliminary disinfection of the infected farm, provided that a clinical examination 
and serological survey, in case of sheep and goats, has given negative results.
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5.5 Emergency vaccination
Vaccination against FMD has not been routinely practised in the European Union since 
1991. In Finland, the use of FMD vaccines is prohibited. However, emergency vaccina-
tions in case of an outbreak can under special conditions be decided upon separately 
(2003/85/EC).
Vaccination is used to diminish the clinical signs of disease and in an outbreak 
situation to stop or in emergency vaccination reduce the spread of the disease until 
it is under control. Vaccination triggers the natural immune response, in the same 
way as a natural infection, to produce antibodies against a specific virus and in this 
way recognise the viral antigens so that they can be eliminated as soon as they enter 
the body. Vaccinated animals show no or limited clinical signs in the case of infection 
(Parida et al. 2007).
The seven different FMD serotypes trigger different immune responses, which 
means that immunity to one serotype does not protect against another serotype (Cox 
& Barnett 2009). The level of protection achieved by the vaccine is dependent on 
both the potency of the vaccine and the antigenic relationship between the vaccine 
and the field strain (De Clercq et al. 2008). The possibility of subclinically infected 
animals is higher if the vaccine dose is small or the time between vaccination and 
infection is short.
The usual regime for prophylactic FMD vaccination is a booster 4–6 weeks after the 
initial shot, and subsequent boosts every 4–6 months or annually (Cox and Barnett 
2009). Vaccination is performed with inactivated vaccines, which consist of whole virus 
particles that trigger the immune response (Salt 1997; Davies 2002). Current vaccines 
are produced in cell culture, inactivated by treatment with aziridines such as binary 
ethylenemine, and mixed with adjuvant (Grubman & Baxt 2004).
Finland, like the other EU countries, is a part of the EU vaccine bank that orders and 
delivers vaccines as the need arises. High potency vaccines (6 PD50) are recommended 
by the EU to be used in the case of an emergency vaccination.
Vaccination complicates the discrimination between naturally infected animals and 
vaccinated ones, because both groups seroconvert and serologically test positive. The 
NSP-Elisa tests, however, are to some extent able to discriminate between naturally 
infected and vaccinated animals on a herd level (Paton et al. 2006).
Emergency vaccination alternatives
In an outbreak situation there are two emergency vaccination strategies to manage 
and reduce the risk of the disease transmission (2003/85/EC): either suppressive 
vaccination (“vaccination to cull”) or protective vaccination (“vaccination to live”). In 
the alternative of suppressive vaccination, all animals situated in the protection zone 
a minimum radius of 3 km from the infected heard are vaccinated and subsequently 
killed and destroyed. In the case of protective vaccination, the area for vaccination 
is regionalised into restricted and free zones, but the area is not as strictly defined. 
However, around the area of protective vaccination an area of at least 10 km is 
formed as a surveillance zone defined by the OIE (2003/85/EC).
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The goal with emergency vaccination is to reduce the rate of disease spread and 
also to diminish the final number of animals to be culled due to the eradication of an 
epidemic. The public reaction against the culling of healthy animals is also a reason to 
consider the option of emergency vaccination, at least if it saves animals.
The expert panel of this assessment (see the section on data sources) considered 
suppressive vaccination as a better option than protective vaccination in Finland. In 
some special cases, depending on the situation in Europe, protective vaccination could 
be considered in limited areas, to protect especially valuable or numerous animals.
Emergency vaccination and trade regulations
Trade regulations following an FMD outbreak and emergency vaccination are specified 
in detail in European directive 2003/85/EC. Moreover, the OIE and WTO (World Trade 
Organization) rules regarding the trade are different for no vaccination, protective 
vaccination and suppressive vaccination policies.
Vaccination affects the possibility to export meat and dairy products from the country. 
In short, an FMD-free status can be restored after at least 3 months have elapsed 
since the last vaccinated animal has been slaughtered. In the case of protective 
vaccination, the time is 6 months from the last outbreak or vaccination until the 
country/region is free to export products again (2003/85/EC).
If FMD occurs in a previously FMD-free country such as Finland and the disease is 
controlled by stamping out and serological surveillance, the FMD-free status can be 
regained and normal trade resumed 3 months after the last FMD case. On the other 
hand, if stamping-out and emergency (‘suppressive’) vaccination are applied, the 
waiting period is 3 months after the last vaccinated animal is slaughtered. Freedom 
from FMD must also be demonstrated with a serological survey.
If protective vaccination is used, it takes 6 months after the last case of FMD or 
the completion of emergency vaccination to obtain an FMD-free status. In addition, 
a serological survey, based on NSPs, must demonstrate the absence of infection 
in vaccinated animals (Figure 15).
Epidemiological criteria for the vaccination decision
In the case of a FMD outbreak, a decision must be made whether or not to use emer-
gency vaccination. The main criteria are to be able to reduce the costs (both indirect 
and direct) and save animals instead of a strict stamping-out policy. Another reason 
to vaccinate would be to control the rapid spread of the disease and gain time in case 
of a lack of adequate resources. Table 17 presents the EU criteria for and against the 
decision to using emergency vaccination in the case of a FMD outbreak in a member 
state that has earlier been free from the disease.
Many factors may influence the vaccination decision (Figure 14). The emergency 
vaccination decision depends on the size, duration and growth of the epidemic, which 
on the other hand is affected by, for instance, the detection time, contacts and animal 
density. In the case of an epidemic, it is crucial to know the criteria to make the decision 
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to vaccinate or not. Factors to take into consideration before the decision is made are 
among others:
 ■ the number of infected herds and animals
 ■ the expected final number of infected herds
 ■ the effect of vaccination
 ■ time delays to:
•	 receive a confirmed diagnosis
•	 obtain enough vaccine
•	 contact personnel to perform the vaccinations,
•	 have vaccinated all animals
•	 reach a protective level in the animals
Size, duration and growth of 
epidemic Emergency vaccination
Time of 
detection
Infectivity of 
contacts
Number of 
contacts
Number of animals and 
farms in the protection 
zone
Economy Speed of 
vaccination
Starting day of 
vaccination
Number of 
animals to be 
vaccinated
Develop immune 
response (effect and 
time)
Availability of 
vaccine
 Availability of 
personel
Species
Viral strain
Number of detected 
infected farms
Figure 14. Factors affecting emergency vaccination and epidemic size, duration and growth.
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Table 17. Criteria for the decision to apply protective vaccination and guidelines for the emergency 
vaccination programmes (2003/85/EC).
Criteria
Decision
For vaccination Against vaccination
Population density of 
susceptible animals High Low
Predominant species clinically 
affected Pigs Ruminants
Movement of potentially 
infected animals or products 
out of the protection zone
Evidence No evidence
Predicted airborne spread of 
virus from infected holdings High Low or absent
Suitable vaccine Available Not available
Origin of outbreaks 
(traceability) Unknown Known
Incidence slope of outbreaks Rising rapidly Shallow or slow rise
Distribution of outbreaks Widespread Restricted
Public reaction to total 
stamping out policy Strong Weak
Acceptance of regionalisation 
after vaccination Yes No
Acceptance of regionalisation 
by third countries Known Unknown
Economic assessment of 
competing control strategies
If it is foreseeable that a 
control strategy without 
emergency vaccination would 
lead to significantly higher 
economic losses in the 
agricultural and non-agricultu-
ral sectors
If it is foreseeable that a 
control strategy with 
emergency vaccination would 
lead to significantly higher 
economic losses in the 
agricultural and non- 
agricultural sectors
It is foreseeable that the 24/48 
hours rule cannot be 
implemented effectively for 
two consecutive days (1)
Yes No
Significant social and 
psychological impact of total 
stamping out policy
Yes No
Existence of large holdings of 
intensive livestock production 
in a non-densely populated 
livestock area
Yes No
(1) The 24/48 hours rule means:
(a) Infected herds on holdings referred to in Article 10 cannot be stamped out within 24 hours 
     after the confirmation of the disease, and
(b) The pre-emptive killing of animals likely to be infected or contaminated cannot be safely 
     carried out within 48 hours.
The spread of Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) within Finland and emergency vaccination in case of an epidemic outbreak
54
Figure 15. Operations and consequences according to EU legislation when 
either suppressive or protective emergency vaccination is performed 
(based on 2003/85/EC).
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Figure 16. Information which defines epidemiological feasibility of suppressive vaccination. 
Suppressive vaccination can be considered epidemiologically beneficial if the total 
number of culled animals can be reduced. This depends on how many of the farms 
that would become infected without suppressive vaccination have been infected 
before the vaccination campaign starts, how many of them are infected during 
the campaign and what proportion of the population is reached by the vaccination 
campaign. Time dynamics are important, as the progress of the vaccination campaign 
and the speed of development of the protective effect both influence the number of 
protected farms (Figure 16).
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development of protective 
effect
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Figure 17. Information which defines the epidemiological feasibility of protective vaccination.
The epidemiological reasoning behind protective vaccination is different from 
suppressive vaccination. A protective vaccination campaign can be feasible if any of 
the infected farms is saved by a vaccination campaign (Figure 17).
Economic importance of FMD
Contagious animal diseases such as FMD can cause heavy losses to agricultural producers 
and society (e.g. Berentsen et al. 1992; Thompson et al. 2002; Mangen & Burrell 
2003; Schoenbaum & Disney 2003). A survey of farm households in Cumbria, United 
Kingdom, for instance shows that the FMD outbreak in 2001 caused a 60% fall in 
revenue from traditional farm enterprises, a 17% reduction in earnings from diver-
sified activities and a 15% fall in salaries from off-farm employment (Franks et al. 
2002). Due to the threat of diseases to animals, livestock production, and in some 
events to human health, society puts great effort into preventing diseases from 
spreading.
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An outbreak of a highly contagious animal disease such as FMD typically impacts on 
the livestock market by 1) removing animals from the market, and 2) by causing 
trade and market distortions. Countries can prohibit the imports of animals and 
animal products from the infected country or region (hereafter referred to as a trade 
ban). Excess supply on the domestic markets due to a trade ban tightens competition 
and decreases producer prices, particularly if the domestic consumption responds 
sluggishly to changes in prices. A decreased price gives producers an incentive to 
reduce production and importers an incentive to reduce imports. An outbreak can, 
therefore, hit producers particularly badly in export-oriented countries. Consumers 
may increase the consumption of meat products if their prices decrease. The outcome 
of such interrelated adjustments can be analysed using sector- or product-level equi-
librium models of production and trade. Mangen & Burrell (2003), Schoenbaum & 
Disney (2003) and Paarlberg et al. (2008), for instance, examined changes in prices, 
trade, consumption and production when an animal disease outbreak occurs.
An FMD outbreak can reduce the income of farm businesses, their solvency and 
liquidity (cf. Franks et al. 2002; Saatkamp & Bruijnen 2009). Literature survey by 
Elbakidze et al. (2010) groups economic losses associated with FMD outbreak as 
follows:
 ■ Decreased productivity and the value of livestock destroyed because of infection 
or because of adopted disease control policy (Bates et al. 2003).
 ■ Task costs of operations associated with outbreak mitigation strategies (Elbakidze 
& McCarl 2006).
 ■ Suppressed demand and potentially decreased consumption of directly affected 
meat products (Burton & Young 1996; Marsh et al. 2004; Piggott & Marsh 2004; 
Schlenker & Villas-Boas 2009).
 ■ Losses associated with distortions in international trade (Paarlberg & Lee 1998). 
Regarding FMD, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE 2007) guidelines 
suggest that a trade ban could be lifted three months after the disease has been 
eradicated from a country free from FMD without vaccination.
 ■ In some regions, losses in tourism and supporting industries could comprise a 
major portion of the overall losses (NAO 2002; Risk solutions 2005).
 ■ Effects on stock prices of related companies (Henson & Mazzocchi 2002)
 ■ Environmental impacts, including the value of lost wildlife and environmental 
damage from the disposal of contaminated carcasses (Sumner et al. 2005).
Economics of policies to combat FMD
Several studies have assessed policies to combat FMD. Berentsen et al. (1992) studied 
routine vaccination versus non-vaccination policies and came to the conclusion that 
a slaughter policy is economically superior to a vaccination policy. This was primarily 
because animals from regions using vaccination would not qualify for premium 
export markets. Mahul & Gohin (1999) studied emergency vaccination decisions and 
illustrated that the uncertainty related to disease spread affects the choice of disease 
control policy. Risk solutions (2005) studied policies to control FMD in the UK with 
the result that the vaccination policy was economically superior to the policy of 
culling (contact) herds in only one out of three of the examined regions. This was the 
region that resulted in the largest number of infected farms under the culling policy. 
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Tomassen et al. (2002) studied control measures during the early stage of an FMD 
epidemic in the Netherlands with the conclusion that a vaccination policy was the 
economically optimal control policy for densely populated livestock areas, but not for 
sparsely populated livestock areas. Ge et al. (2010) demonstrated for a Dutch FMD 
case that a flexible control policy outperforms static evaluation of pre-fixed control 
strategies by providing guidance to decision making during the entire control process 
and generating more realistic estimation of the costs of overreacting or underreac-
ting in choosing the control options. It is common for European studies that in many 
regions emergency vaccination is not a particularly economic choice because of trade 
distortions imposed by other countries, low farm density and too slow a spread of the 
disease. However, in cases such as a large outbreak occurring in a farm-dense area, 
emergency vaccination has the potential to be an economic choice.
Vaccination and slaughter policies have also been commonly studied policies in other 
continents (e.g. Bates et al. 2003, Morris et al. 2001). Schoenbaum & Disney (2003) 
investigated the effectiveness of four slaughter and three vaccination strategies 
under varying scenarios of herd sizes and rates of disease spread in the United States. 
Their results showed that the choice of the best mitigation policy depended on herd 
demographics and on the rate of contact among herds. They found the slaughter of 
all herds within a 3 km radius from infected herds usually to be more costly than 
other slaughter policies, and vaccination of all herds within 10 km radius from infected 
herds to be more costly than controlling the outbreak with slaughter only. However, 
early vaccination reduced the duration of the outbreak. Kobayashi et al. (2007) analyzed 
policies to combat FMD in California. Their results suggested that to control FMD in the 
region, pre-emptive culling was not an optimal policy, vaccination, if allowed, and an 
increased carcass disposal capacity were able to reduce the total cost, and that dairy 
operations should be given preferential attention in allocating limited resources.
Garner & Lack (1995) investigated the effectiveness of combating FMD by two 
vaccination policies: the culling of infected herds only, or additionally the preventive 
culling of dangerous contact herds. Their results showed that if FMD is likely to spread 
rapidly then the slaughter of dangerous contacts and infected herds reduced the 
economic impact of the FMD outbreak. In contrast to this, a vaccination policy reduced 
the size and duration of an outbreak, but was uneconomic when compared to a 
culling only policy. Keeling et al. (2001) also found that both preventive culling and 
vaccination policies were effective if implemented rigorously, although culling was a 
more effective policy. They also argued that the spatial distribution, size, and species 
composition of farms influenced the pattern and regional variability of outbreaks.
Besides policies mentioned above, prior literature has addressed the effectiveness 
of traceability (Elbakidze 2007; Zhao et al. 2007), the timing of culling (Morris et al. 
2001), and the role of regional heterogeneity in designing vaccination and culling 
policies (Rich and Winter-Nelson 2007). Recently, Elbakidze et al. (2010) examined 
early detection, enhanced vaccine availability, enhanced surveillance, and culling as 
part of a set of available FMD mitigation strategies. No studies have examined the 
economics of FMD in Finland. Regarding other highly contagious animal diseases, 
Niemi et al. (2008) have simulated the costs of classical swine fewer outbreaks in 
Finland.
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6 Risk assessment
6.1 Introduction
An epidemiological simulation model was developed to simulate the spread of 
infectious diseases between the pig and cattle farms in Finland. The model is a 
type of network model, which means that the spread is simulated in real networks. 
The model was parameterized using data from 2006, and it describes a situation in 
which foot and mouth disease would have spread in Finland during that year. The 
network model is especially suitable to simulate the spread of FMD in Finland, because 
events that spread the disease occur relatively infrequently and contacts are variously 
correlated in time and space. The FMD spread model resembles models such as 
InterSpread (Sanson 1993; Mourits et al. 2002; Stevenson 2003; Velthuis & Mourits 
2007), NAADSM (Harvey et al. 2007) and the earlier Finnish Classical Swine Fever 
(CSF) model (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2005). The spread of the disease is simulated 
between farms using the Monte Carlo approach. The model has been programmed 
in the Matlab environment. Sampling from distributions (other than normal and 
uniform) is performed by functions of the Econometrics Toolbox (Le Sage 2002).
The model describes how the virus can spread between farms by different 
contacts. Relevant contacts are those that have occurred during an infective period on 
a farm. Because the model uses detailed historical data (from databases, as described 
later) in defining contacts, it can be considered as a network model that describes all 
potential networks connected with infected farms in a given time. Using registry data 
also means that the model is mainly a non-parametric model, because the contact 
processes are not parameterized but used as they are in the databases. This approach 
is complemented by adding parameterized data on contact types obtained from 
questionnaires.
All relevant modes of spread were included in the model. A description of the 
animal transportation network includes a description of the animal transport and farm 
registries that describe the time, origin and final destination of animal transportation. 
Related vehicle contacts are simulated according the animal transport registry. The 
network description of neighborhood and airborne spread is based on the coordinates 
of the farm. In addition, the registry of artificial insemination technicians and milk 
tankers describe the network of cattle and dairy farms. Other persons visiting the 
farm may spread FMD within the operational region of the visitor. For instance, a 
veterinarian can only spread FMD within the region in which he/she operates.
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The frequencies of contacts are determined according to databases formed from 
registries or parameterized according to questionnaires (persons visiting animal 
holdings and other rarely occurring events). Disease will spread during the infective 
period and is specified by the frequency and infectivity of contacts. The spread 
happens within the region and to the farms according to databases and contact type 
specific definitions of the susceptible population.
Contact type specific infectivity and the duration of the infectious period prior to the 
first detection of the disease in the country are two major parameters of the model 
that are parameterized using existing models of the same type, namely the outbreaks 
in Great Britain and The Netherlands in 2001 (Stevenson 2003; Taylor et al. 2004; 
Velthuis & Mourits 2007). The first detection of disease was assessed by means of 
actual outbreaks: by estimating how long the suddenly occurring European outbreaks 
would have lasted before the first observation of disease was made (McLaws & Ribble 
2007).
Simulation is started by sampling a random farm from the farm database. Contacts 
during the infective period are simulated by sampling different databases or, depending 
on the type of contact, some other ways. For the contacts that occurred during the 
infectious period, their target farms are defined in various ways, and later on, it is 
tested whether these contacts were causing the spread of the infection. The same 
approach was applied for the new infected farms during the simulation.
The detection time is speeded up by the administrative actions taken on farms other 
than the primary infected one: an infected farm can be detected earlier if it is located 
in the protection zone of the infected farm, or if it is traced as a contact farm. The 
detection of disease may be accelerated by the livestock producer's own intensified 
activity if the farm ends up in the surveillance zone, or by the general heightened 
awareness of the disease in the country after the first observation. These routes may 
shorten the detection time and infective period of a farm. Different routes are compared 
and the fastest route defines the detection time of the farm. Farms are subject to 
restrictive measures if they are traced as contact farms, or they are located in the 
protection or surveillance zone. No contacts are formed from the infected farms 
during the restrictive measures, even though the disease has not been detected. All 
suspicions of disease are diagnosed in a laboratory, and after a time lag the corres-
ponding administrative operations are engaged. After positive confirmation of the 
infection status, the animals are killed and the initial cleaning of the farm is carried 
out. This is expected to end the neighborhood and airborne spread of the virus from 
the farm. Simulation continues until no new transmission of the FMD virus arises.
6.2 Datasources
The FMD spread model applies several databases that either describe or define 
the potential group of susceptible farms, relevant contacts of the farm during the 
infective period and/or the time when contacts have occurred. All databases were 
constructed using data sources from 2006.
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Farm database
In Finland, it is mandatory (2008/71/EC, regulation 1760/2000; MAF 1391/2006, 
MAF 1296/2001) to register livestock premises. The Finnish farm registry was used 
as the source of data for the location and the number of cattle and pigs on the farms 
(registry was maintained by TIKE, Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry). The registry covers the majority of the Finnish cattle and pig farm 
population, and a further economic incentive for registration is that registration is 
required to receive livestock subsidies.
The farm database combines several information sources. Identification codes were 
used to link data from the Finnish farm registry with the yearly notifications for EU 
subsidies and monthly notifications of the number of animals on the farms. The farms 
that did not keep cattle or pigs and did not sell or buy cattle, pigs or milk in 2006 
were excluded from the database. If a farm had several animal holdings, the infor-
mation on these sub-units was aggregated into one row of information. Altogether, 
3.9% of farms had more than one animal holding in the registry. Different classes 
of animals were combined into two classes of animals: for pig farms into sows and 
finishers, and for cattle farms into dairy and other cattle.
Finnish farm coordinates are based on either the address, the centre of the fields of 
the farm or the location of central unit of the farm. Each farm was assigned to regions 
according to the veterinarian, relief worker, PVO, advisor, municipality and carcass 
collection. The proportion of different production types in the database are given in 
Tables 2 and 6 in the hazard identification section.
Database of animal transportation between farms
Data on the transportation of pigs and cattle are collected in the Pig Registry and the 
Cattle Registry, which are maintained by TIKE (Information Centre of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry) and Evira. The animal movement database was constructed 
from the official animal movement registries of 2006.
Pig transportations between farms were based on the pig registry, which contained 
information on the pigs sold, purchased and transported between farms in Finland. 
The full database of pig movements between farms contained 34 000 notifications. 
The linking of pig trade events was based on farm-specific marks of sold piglets and 
the date, which were used to link separate notifications of farms either selling or 
buying pigs. By linking the notifications of farmers with those of pig traders, it was 
possible to link over 90% of the pig transportations with the transport vehicle.
Cattle movement database was constructed by linking two notifications of an 
animal with the same identification number: the first from the farm from which it 
was transported and the second from the farm that received it. Because the informa-
tion on the trader could not be linked with these events, linking of the vehicle with 
the transportation event was not possible and the database therefore contains no 
information on transportation vehicles. The full database of cattle movements 
between farms contained 70 200 notifications.
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Domestic animals traded in Finland are mostly transported by entrepreneurs 
registered for animal transportation. Registration of the vehicle and the case/event is 
obligatory, based on animal welfare legislation (MAF 1429/2006).
Slaughterhouse transportation database
Data on the transportation of pigs to slaughter were directly retrieved from the 
pig movement registry and contained over 68 000 notifications of pig deliveries to 
slaughterhouses.
Data on the transportation of cattle to slaughter were directly retrieved from the cattle 
movement registry and contained over 92 000 notifications. Neither registry 
contained information on the transportation vehicles, so detailed information on 
vehicle movements could not be included in the slaughterhouse transportation 
database.
AI technician movement database
Artificial insemination technicians mostly visit dairy farms. The Finnish Agriculture 
Calculation Centre holds a registry that contains the daily movements of every AI 
technician operating in Finland. AI technicians are obliged to register the farms they 
have visited and the time and the date of visit to the centre. Because the registry 
contains the farm identification numbers and times of the visits, it was possible to 
construct a database that contained every route of AI technicians during 2006. The 
database contained 536 900 notifications of AI technician visits.
Dairy logistics database
The dairy industry provided us the routes of each dairy tanker for weeks 22 and 50 in 
2006. A dairy tanker typically visits a farm every second day and routes are changed 
approximately twice a year, during spring and autumn. These routes were adequate 
data sources to construct the dairy logistics. The database contains over 90% of farms 
classified as dairy farms in the country. The dairy industry plans the logistics of the 
tankers, so the order of visits within a day could also be included in the dairy logistics 
database. Database contained the collection routes of 12 690 dairy farms.
Questionnaires to farmers
Two postal questionnaire surveys, one directed to Finnish cattle farms and the other 
to Finnish pig farms, were conducted in the spring of 2007. The aim was to obtain 
information on the contacts of the farms that is not registered elsewhere. To estimate 
the frequencies of contacts, the farmers were asked about the number of visits per 
year that may lead to contacts with other farms. Data for 2006 obtained from the 
questionnaire were applied to estimate the unknown frequency of contacts. Both 
questionnaires consisted of 6 printed pages.
A wide variety of people visit farms, including animal caretakers, holiday substitutes, 
agricultural advisers, artificial inseminators, veterinarians and others. The frequencies 
of visits by people to cattle and pig farms or production units were estimated from a 
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questionnaire study performed during 2007. The number of posted questionnaires, 
2 699, covered 13.1% of Finnish cattle farms (n = 20 652). The recipient farms were 
randomly selected from the whole Finnish cattle farm population. Another questi-
onnaire was send to pig farmers (n= 1 118) that covered 34.6% of the Finnish pig 
farms (n = 3 228) (National Farm Registry 2006). Sampling in this questionnaire was 
partitioned, as all farms that belonged to the highest 10% fraction according either 
the number of sows or finishers received the questionnaire (13.6% of the Finnish pig 
farm population). The rest of the questionnaires were send randomly to 21% of the 
other pig farms. There were 1180 respondents among the cattle farmers (response 
rate of 44%) and 571 respondents among the pig farmers (response rate of 51%).
Questionnaire to veterinarians
To estimate how many farms a veterinarian visits during a day and how the farm 
production type would influence this frequency, a questionnaire was sent (in 2007) 
to 350 municipal veterinary officers in Finland, of whom 134 (38%) returned the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was completed like a diary, where the practitioners 
reported their daily visits to farms during two five-day periods. They were asked to 
report which farms (pig, cattle or other) they visited during a 2-week interval.
Expert panel
By using an expert panel, relevant information was gathered regarding information 
required in the assessment of an emergency vaccination policy and the decision 
rules. An expert panel was gathered on 24 April 2009 to evaluate the measures that 
affect emergency vaccination, the time lags before some events during the vaccination 
would be either started or completed, and what would influence the vaccination decision. 
The expert panel consisted of 7 veterinarians with an expert knowledge of vaccination, 
disease transmission, epidemiology, laboratory diagnostics/methodology and/
or virology. The experts were asked to answer and evaluate some questions and 
statements regarding the decision to vaccinate, the time and the delays in detection, 
diagnosis and vaccination that would occur if FMD infection were to appear in Finland. 
The experts completed the form before a discussion, and the same form was also 
completed after the discussion, which was a modification of the Delphi method. 
Based on the expert opinions, the parameters used in the calculation of vaccination 
results were revised.
Other sources
Other sources were applied when needed to define parameters that were not 
estimable from the previous mentioned sources. This additional information was 
required to parameterise vehicle movement patters when animals were transported 
to slaughter and when cattle were transported between farms. The carcass collection 
of both pigs and cattle, and operation of relief workers were also parameterised using 
additional information.
A telephone questionnaire to slaughterhouses was performed to define how many 
farms a vehicle would visit per day transporting either animals to slaughter or cattle 
to another farm.
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Cattle carcass collection data from one week in Finland were used to estimate the 
spatial range of carcass collection vehicles and the number of cattle farms visited on 
one route. For pig carcass collection, the average number of visited farms during a 
route was estimated from the statistics for the whole of 2006.
Official statistics of the Farmers' Social Insurance Institution were used as a parameter 
indicating how much a relief worker might work on a single farm during a year.
Assumptions and exclusions
 ■ After the primary infected farm is detected, FMD-infected animals are identified 
based on clinical signs only (McLaws & Ribble 2007). This assumption also 
includes the fact that at least some animals on the farm will always show clear 
clinical signs and will be detected.
 ■ Laboratory tests always confirm a positive case.
 ■ Sheep and goats, which might have less visible clinical signs, are excluded from 
the model.
 ■ The Åland archipelago, which is not a part of mainland Finland, is excluded from 
the model.
 ■ Each Finnish farm is assumed to be an equally probable candidate for the primary 
infected farm in the country.
 ■ Animal transportation vehicles and milk tankers are cleaned at least once a day; 
thus, we assumed that a day is an adequate limit for vehicles
 ■ All visitors are assumed to remain infective for the rest of the day if they have 
visited an infected farm.
 ■ Every relevant contact will be traced.
 ■ Restrictive measures, protection and surveillance zones will prevent all animal 
transportation away from infected farms, zones and traced contact farms.
 ■ The infective period will end at the time when initial cleaning has ended on the 
infected farm.
 ■ The spread of infection to another production sector is possible by veterinarians, 
AI technicians and relief workers, as well as airborne and neighbourhood spread
 ■ Spread to another production sector is also possible via the animal transportation 
of some meat companies that may occasionally mix cattle and pigs during 
transportation.
 ■ Quantitative assumptions are given in model description (Tables 18-21).
6.3 FMD spread model – The simulation process
The simulation process has five distinctive phases: 1) an initial phase that is required 
once per iteration, 2) estimation of the infective period of a farm, 3) estimation of 
the infective contacts, 4) the selection of a new infective farm and 5) if there are no 
new infected farms, the end phase of the iteration.
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Figure 18. The basic process describing the simulation principle of the Finnish FMD model. Iteration 
starts by randomly selecting the first infected farm in the country. After knowing the length of the 
infective period and the identity of the farm, it is possible to define the infective contacts (see details 
later). By selecting new infective farms (end points of infective contacts), the iteration continues until 
no new infective contacts are formed.
Initial phase
One farm is sampled randomly from the Finnish farm population to be the first 
infected farm of the iteration (Figure 18). In this assessment, the iterations were 
started on 15 March 2006 and the contacts of the first infected farm were simulated 
for the following infective period (Figure 18). Some of the contacts are sampled 
directly from the databases and are thus dependent on the date of starting the iteration. 
In the initial phase of an iteration, all parameters used in equations estimating the 
number of visits to a farm (Table 20, Figure 21) are simulated by sampling from 
a covariance-variance matrix and estimated parameters of the model (Appendix 2, 
Table 20). The level of other country-level parameters containing uncertainty due to 
information sources is also sampled at the start of the iteration.
Infective period of a farm
The length of the infective period is given as an input parameter for the first infected 
farm, but for the following infected farms it is simulated by comparing different 
routes that could put a farm under restrictive measures and/or allow it to become 
detected according to EU legislation. For the first infected farm it is assumed that the 
 Which is the 
1st infected farm?
No infective contacts
End of 
iteration
Start of 
iteration
Infective periodWhich farm(s) become infected?
 infective contacts
Initial phase
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detection is always initiated by a suspicion of FMD. For other infected farms there is no 
closed form to define the length of the infective period, because it is also dependent 
on other events such as which farms have already been detected as infected during 
the iteration (Figure 19). If a farm is infected by a detected farm, it can be traced as 
a contact farm. If it is in the protection or surveillance zones of an already detected 
farm, it can be detected earlier than by suspicion. Events defining the infective period 
are simulated conditionally: this means that an initial condition has to be met before 
the next event could be simulated. Because different operations take time, there are 
time lags between events (Table 18).
The infective period of a farm has two phases: In the first phase all contact types can 
be infective and the farm is not under restrictive measures. When restrictive measures 
are effective for the farm, only neighbourhood and airborne spread remain as infective 
pathways, until the farm has been initially cleaned (Figure 19).
*under suspicion are meant here only those farms which are not detected by administrative operations, namely due 
 to zone and contact farm inspections
**McLaws & Ribble 2007
Parameter Initial condition
Duration of 
period or 
time-lag (days)
Event following after the 
end of period or after the 
time-lag
Latent period Virus has been introduced to the farm 4
Clinical signs  are possible 
on infected farm
Non-infective period Virus has been introduced to the farm 2 The start of infective period
The day of suspicion of farms 
infected before 1st detection
Virus has been introduced to 
the farm 20
The end of first phase of 
infective period of farms 
under suspicion* 
The day of suspicion of farms 
infected after the 1st detected 
farm in the country 
Virus has been introduced to 
the farm 14
The end of first phase of 
infective period of farms 
under suspicion*
Time lag of diagnosis of primary 
infected farm
Farm has been suspected to 
be FMD positive 1-3 Positive diagnosis of FMD
Time lag of sending samples 
of farms in protection zones
Farm is in the protection 
zone 0-7
Laboratory has received 
samples
Time lag of sending samples 
of farms in surveillance zone
Farm is in the surveillance 
zone 0-7
Laboratory has received 
samples
Time lag of tracing Farm is diagnosed as FMD positive 0-7
Connected farms can be 
traced
Time lag of sending samples 
of traced contact farms 
Farm is traced as a contact 
farm of a farm diagnosed as 
FMD positive
0-7 Laboratory has received samples
Time lag of diagnosis of farms 
after 1st detected farm in the 
country
Samples have been sent 
due to clinical screening or 
protective zone serological 
screening or due to farmer 
notification or activity
0-1 Positive diagnosis of FMD
Time lag of eradication** Farm has been diagnosed as FMD positive 1-7
Animals of infected farm 
have been culled
Time lag of initial cleaning** Culling on the farm has been completed 1-8
Initial cleaning of farm has 
been completed, the end of 
second phase of infective 
period 
Table 18. The duration of an infective period, time lags and parameters used to simulate events relevant in the de-
termination of the infective period of a single infected farm during an iteration.
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The following definitions are used in the model:
Infective period: The infective period begins on the starting day of the infective 
period (see below). When a farm is under restrictive measures, the infective period 
of all contact types except neighbourhood and airborne spread will end. The infective 
period of neighbourhood spread and airborne spread lasts until the initial cleaning of 
the farm has been completed.
Introduction of virus: The day when the virus has entered a specific farm.
Starting day of the infective period: The infective period starts two days after the 
introduction of the virus on the farm.
The day of suspicion of FMD: The day when a farm is placed under suspicion of
having FMD without contact tracing or inspections based on the location of the farm 
in the zone around a farm with a detected infection.
The day of positive diagnosis: For the primary infected farm, a positive diagnosis 
is assumed to be obtained 1–3 days after suspicion, because confirmative diagnosis 
is to be carried out before the farm is culled. On suspected farms and those infected 
following the primary infected farm, the decision to cull would be made according to 
the first positive indication of FMD. For the later infected farms, following the primary 
infected farm, the day of a positive diagnosis also depends on whether the farm is 
traced as a contact farm of an infected farm, or is located on the protection or surveil-
lance zone around a positively diagnosed infected farm.
The day of restrictive measures = Restrictive measures are put in force on those 
farms located in the surveillance or protection zone around an infected farm that has 
been diagnosed to be FMD-positive. Farm tracing is contact type-dependent and has 
a time lag (0–7 days). After the traced farms are put under restrictive measures, all 
other contact types, except neighbourhood spread and airborne spread, are assumed 
to be non-infective after this time point.
The end of eradication: Eradication is performed X days (Table 18) after the day 
of positive diagnosis. The time lag is defined according to recent epidemics in the 
EU (McLaws & Ribble 2007) (Table 18). The end of eradication is the day when the 
eradication is completed.
The end of initial cleaning: Initial cleaning is completed X days (Table 18) after the 
day of eradication. The time lag is defined according to recent epidemics in the EU 
(McLaws & Ribble 2007). The end of the initial cleaning is the endpoint of neighbour-
hood and airborne spread.
Duration of outbreak: The time in days from the first infection until the last infected 
farm is initially cleaned.
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The day of suspicion of farm A
The day of inital cleaning of farm A
The day of positive diagnosis of 
farm A
The starting day of infective 
period of farm A
The day of introduction of virus to 
a certain farm A
Non-
infective 
latent 
period
The day of eradication of farm A
The day when farm A is put 
under restrictive measures
Time lag 
from
positive 
diagnosis to 
eradication
Time lag from 
eradication to 
inital cleaning
Farm A is located in the 
surveillance or protection  
zone of a detected and 
infected farm
Farm A is traced  to be a 
contact farm of another  
already detected and 
infected  farm
End of infective period of eventless 
contact types (neighborhood and 
airborne spread) from farm A
End of infective period of event 
driven contact types from farm A
Another farm or farms have 
earlier  been dianosed  positive 
for FMD virus 
Time-lag 
of tracing
If Farm A is NOT the primary infected farm
Time lag of 
official EU 
measures
Always
End of infective period
Figure 19. The events that define the infective period of an infected farm.A farm can always become 
detected by suspicion. If a farm is not the first infected farm in the country, it is also possible that a farm 
becomes detected either by the tracing of contact farms of already detected farms, or by location in the 
protection/ surveillance zones of other infected farms. The detection process has several time-lags due 
to time limits in EU legislation and resulting from other processes that require resources or efforts. See 
Table 18 for applied values of time lags and periods preceding the events. The infective period partially 
ends when restrictive measures are in force and finally when farm is initially cleaned.
Simulation of spread from infected farm(s)
Infectivity and contacts during the infective period define the number of new farms 
becoming infected from an already infected farm (Figure 20). If new farms become 
infected, infective contacts of these farms are then simulated and iteration continues.
When the infective period of a farm is known, it is possible to sample those events 
from databases. This sampling also partly defines the contact farms. If the contacts 
following a visit to an infected farm are not explicitly known, for instance if information 
on the order of events is lacking within a day, the order of events (contacts due to a 
visit) is randomly simulated to estimate the contacts and contact farms. If events such 
as visits to the farm are not sampled from the database, they are estimated by equa-
tions (Figure 21). Each visit is then further simulated to estimate the contacts, their 
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timing and contact farms from the population of susceptible farms (Table 19). Neigh-
bourhood and airborne spread are tested separately for each farm in the susceptible 
population, which is determined by the distance from an infected farm (Table 19).
Steps applied in the simulation of a certain contact type are as follows:
1. Estimate or sample visits to an infected farm(s), (Figure 21, Table 19 and Table 
20);
2. Estimate or sample potential contacts due to every visit to an infected farm 
(if applicable) (Figure 21);
3. Estimate contacts from the potential contacts (Figure 21);
4. Test which contacts are infective (Bernoulli trials) (Figure 22 and Table 21);
5. If the number of infective contacts is less than the number in the susceptible 
population, sample contact farms that will become infected (Table 19).
The steps are repeated for each contact type to estimate all farms that a single 
farm would infect. If same farm is infected by several farms or by several different 
contacts, the fastest route of spread is taken into account. When there are no more 
new infections during the iteration, the iteration ends (Figure 20).
Farm has become 
infected by FMD 
virus
What species?
How many animals?
Which farm?
On what date has 
the virus been 
introduced?
Duration of infective  
period?
Animal transportation
Slaughterhouse 
transportations
AI technician movements 
Dairy tanker logistics 
Predictive models for 
number of contacts
Farm 
database
Number of contacts during 
infective period
Contact type-specific rules for 
selection of new infected 
farms
Contact type-specific 
infectivity per contact
How many 
infective 
contacts ?
Initial questions concerning the infected farm
What production 
type ?
End of 
iteration
Which farms?
When infective 
period of the farm 
ends?
Farm characteristics
Where is it located?
Infective contacts >0
D
at
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as
es
Infective contacts =0 
Figure 20. The information used to simulate the infective process of a farm. Different information sour-
ces and characteristics of the infected farm influence how many contacts within an infective period an 
infected farm would promote and which farms would become infected. The number of infected farms 
is also dependent on the infectivity of the contact types.
The spread of Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) within Finland and emergency vaccination in case of an epidemic outbreak
70
The following definitions are used in the model:
Contacts are estimated for the infected farm or farms and only for the infective period
(see the simulation of the infective period above). A contact is an event during the 
infective period that links farms and can potentially cause the transmission of FMD 
to the extent that it could cause new outbreaks among the population of susceptible 
farms.
Animals transported from infected 
farm
Veterinarian  has visited an 
infected farm
Carcass transportation 
vehicle has visited an infected 
farm
Dairy tanker has visited an  
infected farm
Number of cattle farms within 3 
km radius from infected pig farm
Vehicle transporting animals to 
slaughter has visited an infected 
farm
Vehicle transporting cattle has 
visited on infected farm
Number of other farms within 1.5-
3 km  radius from infected farm
Number of other farms within 1.5 
km radius from infected farm
Advisors have  visited an  
infected farm
Relief worker has worked on 
two farms and the other is an 
infected farm
Animal transportation 
between farms database
Questionnaires
Dairy tanker database
Vehicle transporting pigs has 
visited on infected farm
0-100% of other 
transportations are 
after the infected 
farm
0-100% of other 
transportations are 
after the infected 
farm
0-100% of other 
transportations are 
after the infected 
farm
0-100% of visits 
are after the 
infected farm
AI technician movement 
database AI technician has visited on an infected farm
0-100% of visits 
are after the 
infected farm
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production companies
0-100% of other 
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Potential contacts during 
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Farm database
Slaughterhouse 
transportation database
Figure 21. Schematic description how different information sources will affect potential contacts by 
different contact types of a certain infected farm and how these are related to the contacts during the 
infective period. See parameters and definitions in Tables 19 and 20.
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Figure 22. Different contact types have a different infectivity per contact Contacts during the infective 
period and the infectivity of contact types together define which contacts are simulated to be infecti-
ve. Because different contact types may infect the same farms, the number of infected farms may be 
smaller than the number of infective contacts. See parameters and definitions in Tables 19, 20 and 21.
Animals are transported from 
infected farm
Veterinarian has visited  an 
infected farm
Vehicle transporting carcasses  
has visited  an inefcted farm
Dairy tanker has visited  an 
infected farm
Number of cattle farms that are 
located within 3 km radius from 
an infected pig farm
Vehicle transporting animals  
to slaughter has visited  an 
infected farm
Vehicle transporting cattle 
between farms has visited an 
an infected farm
Number of other farms that are 
located within 1.5-3 km radius 
from an infected farm
Number of other farms that are 
located within 1.5 km  radius 
from an infected farm
Advisors have  visited  an 
infected farm
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P6 (Taylor et al. 2004)
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Potentially infective contact types: all those types of contacts that are assumed to 
be able to transport the virus to another farm (Figure 21). Those operators who only 
visit the farm but not the animal holdings were not regarded as infective contact 
types. Potentially infective contact types can be divided into two categories: event-
driven contact types, where the transmission can be tested for a specific event such 
as a visit to the animal holdings, and eventless contact types (neighbourhood and 
airborne spread), where there are no distinctive events leading to transmission (Table 
19, column 4).
Infectivity of contact types: probability that one contact of a certain contact type 
from an infected farm would introduce an adequate dose of virus to another farm and 
initiate an outbreak of FMD on that farm. Values for infectivity were retrieved from 
epidemiological literature (Table 21).
Visits to the farm: Visits of any contact type during the infective period to a certain 
farm. The number of visits is defined directly by a database, and is sampled for the 
infective period of the farm (Table 19) or estimated by equations (Table 20). If equa-
tion or parameter is used as a value for the number of visits per year, the number of 
visits during the infective period is sampled by a binomial distribution, Bin(number of 
visits per year,  t/365), where t is the length of the infective period.
Potential contacts due to a visit: Farms visited by a vector on the same day that it 
has visited an infected farm. Potential contacts are contact-type dependent and are 
either directly sampled from a database or estimated according to questionnaires and 
other data sources (Figure 21).
Contacts due to a visit: The farms that either a vehicle or a person has visited on the 
same day AFTER a visit to an infected farm. This is the proportion of potential contacts 
(0-100%), if not known specifically (Figure 21).
Infective contact: a contact that promotes an FMD outbreak on another farm. This is 
defined by performing a Bernoulli trial for contacts due to visits by using the infectivity 
of a contact type as the probability rule of the trial. If the random number is less than 
the probability rule, then a contact promotes a new infected farm.
Susceptible farms: Those farms that can be potentially connected with the infected 
farm during the infective period. The definition of susceptible farms is dependent 
on the contact type and the identity of the infected farm (due to the location and 
membership of different operational regions) (Table 19).
Contact farms: Those farms that can acquire the infection if a contact turns out to 
be infective in a Bernoulli trial. The definition of contact farms is dependent on the 
contact type, and the identity of infected farm (due to the location and membership 
of different operational regions). Contact farms are sampled from the contact type-
specific population of susceptible farms by a fraction defined by infective contacts, if 
not specified in the databases (Table 19).
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Table 19. Potentially infective contact types in the FMD model, spatiality, temporality and the rule for defining
susceptible and contact farms during the infective period of an infected farm.
Vector Incident leading to 
transmission of 
infection
Spatiality of 
network
Source for 
temporal events
Susceptible 
farms
Contact 
farms
Pigs or 
cattle
Transportation of live 
pigs or cattle between 
farms from an infected 
farm
Animal 
transportation 
database
Animal 
transportation 
database
Year 2006, 
animals are 
transported from 
infected  farms
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Vehicle Vehicle,  transporting 
pigs or cattle between 
farms, has visited an 
infected farm earlier on 
the same day
Animal 
transportation 
database
Animal transporta-
tion database, in 
addition cattle: farm 
database, slaughter-
house transportation 
database
Year 2006, pigs: 
same tran- 
sportation vehicle 
and day, cattle: 
same slaughter-
house, day and 
closeness
Sampled 
from 
susceptible 
farms
Vehicle Vehicle transporting pigs 
or cattle to slaughter has 
visited on an infected 
farm earlier on  the same 
day
Slaughter 
transportation 
database
Slaughter tran- 
sportation database
Year 2006, same 
slaughterhouse 
and day of 
slaughter
Sampled 
from 
susceptible 
farms
Dairy 
tanker
Same vehicle transpor-
ting milk to dairy has 
visited on an infected 
farm earlier on the same 
day
Dairy logistics 
database
Dairy logistics 
database
Year 2006, same 
dairy tanker 
after a visit to the 
infected farm
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Carcass 
collection 
vehicle
Carcass collection 
vehicle has visited on an 
infected farm earlier 
during the collection 
route 
Carcass 
collection 
regions, 
distance from 
infected cattle 
farm within 
defined region
Simulated Poisson 
process
Pigs: same 
carcass collection 
region, Cattle 
within a given 
distance from an 
infected farm
Sampled 
from 
susceptible 
farms
Advisor Visit to the production 
unit on another farm after 
a visit on the production 
unit of an infected farm 
earlier on the same day
Depending on 
the operational 
region of the 
visitor
Simulated Poisson 
process
Same opera-
tional region as 
infected farm
Sampled 
from 
susceptible 
farms
AI 
technician
AI technician has visited 
production unit of an 
infected farm earlier on 
the same day
AI technician 
movement 
database
AI technician 
movement database
Year 2006, same 
AI technician 
after a visit to the 
infected farm
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Veterinarian Veterinarian has visited 
the production unit of an 
infected farm earlier on 
the same day
Depending on 
the operational 
region of the 
visitor
Simulated Poisson 
process
Same opera-
tional region as 
infected farm
Samp-
led from 
susceptible 
farms
Substitute 
worker
Substitute worker 
operates in two farms 
during the same day and 
one of them is infected
Depending on 
the operational 
region of the 
visitor
Simulated Poisson 
process
Same opera-
tional region as 
infected farm
Sampled 
from 
susceptible 
farms
Unknown Neighbouring pig farms 
within 1.5 km
Farm database Eventless Proximity from 
infected farm 
below the given 
value
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Unknown Neighbouring pig farms 
within 1.5-3 km
Farm database Eventless Proximity from 
infected farm 
within given 
values
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Unknown Neighbouring pig farms 
within 3 km
Farm database Eventless Proximity from 
infected farm 
below the given 
value
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
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Table 20. Number of visits per year and number of potential contacts per a visit for those contact 
types where potential contacts during the infective period are estimated by a equation or a para-
meter.
Contact type Number of visits per year Number of  potential contacts per  visit
Relief worker, pig farm a, c 31 0-1
Relief worker, cattle farm b, c 31 0-1
Carcass transportation, 
pig farm d
Bin(Poisson 
(0.376Zmax+2.035) 
2, 0.66)
0-11
Carcass transportation, 
cattle farm e
Bin(Poisson 
(0.026Ndai+0.003Noth+1.507)
2, 0.27)
0-14
Advisor, pig farm d Bin(Poisson 
(0.376Zmax+2.035) 
2, 0.34)
0-2
Advisor, cattle farm e Bin(Poisson 
(0.026Ndai+0.003Noth+1.507)
2, 0.73)
0-2
Veterinarian, pig farm Sow herd = 7.5; Mixed Herd =7.9; 
Finisher herd = 4.2
0-2
Veterinarian, cattle farm 0.30Ndai+0.02Noth+1.53Idai+1.53 0-2
a The probability that a pig farm uses a relief worker =
  exp(0.171+0.871If
+0.792I
m
+0.660 Z
max
)/[1+exp(0.171+0.871If
+0.792I
m
+0.660Z
max
)]
b The probability that a cattle farm other than a dairy farms uses a relief worker was 10%
c The probability that a relief worker has two farm at the same time is sampled from beta(21,110)
d Carcass collection and advisors for pig farms are simulated together: the total number sampled
   from a Poisson distribution is divided  by binomial sampling between advisors and carcass 
   collection
e Carcass collection and advisors for cattle farms are simulated together: the total number
   sampled from a Poisson distribution is divided  by binomial sampling between advisors and 
   carcass collection
Symbols: If = Indicator of farrowing farm, Im = indicator of farrowing-to-finishing farm, Zmax =
standardised sum of pigs and cattle on the farm, Nda = Number of dairy cattle on the farm, Noth = 
Number of other cattle on the farm, Idai = Indicator of dairy farm, random distributions: Bin =
binomial distribution, Poisson = Poisson distribution
Parameter Value Contact types Citation
P1 0.4 Direct animal contact Stevenson 2003
P2 0.15 Animal transportation vehicles, Carcass 
collection vehicles
Stevenson 2003
P3 0.005 Dairy tanker Stevenson 2003
P4 0.01 Relief worker, Advisor, Veterinarian, AI 
technician
Stevenson 2003
P5 0.063 Neighbourhood spread up to 1.5. km Taylor et al. 2004
P6 0.025 Neighbourhood spread within  1.5-3 km Taylor et al. 2004
P7 0.00438 Airborne spread from pig farms Velthuis & Mourits 2007
Table 21. Infectivity (probability of transmission of disease / one contact) of contact types in the 
Finnish spread model when used in the risk assessment of FMD.
Note: Airborne spread from a cattle farm to other cattle farms is included in P5 and P6 –Taylor et 
al. (2004) estimated the spread among cattle farms.
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Epidemiological simulations
The results are based on 100 000 iterations, which ensures that each Finnish cattle 
and pig farm has acted as the first infected farm at least once during the simulation. 
The average and variance of the iteration run are stabilized during the run (Figures 23 
and 24), indicating that the Monte Carlo run is adequately long to define the country 
and PVO district level results for the expected value and variance. A preliminary 
study of three different days also indicated that the starting dates of iterations did not 
influence the results at the country level.
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Figure 23. Effect of the number of iterations on 
the estimated mean epidemic size.
Figure 24. Effect of the number of iterations on 
the probability of the worst-case scenario.
Output of epidemiological simulation
The simulation model produces two basic output files: one with summary results for 
each iteration and another that contains the information on each farm that has been 
infected during iterations and events relevant to define the infective period of the 
farm.
The summary file contains the number of the infected farms, the duration of the out-
break, and the identity, type and location of the primary infected farm and parameter 
values containing uncertainty.
A detailed file contains the identity of the infected farm, the infection date, the date 
when the farm was put under restrictive measures, the day when animals on the 
farm had been culled and the day of initial cleaning. It also contains information on 
the farm that has caused the infection and what contact type led to the infection.
These results can be linked with farm-specific data (such as location and farm production 
type) and also with the information calculated afterwards from the databases.
Parameters of the vaccination decision
In the spring of 2009, an expert panel was gathered to collect the views of Finnish 
experts on the circumstances that would influence the decision to conduct emergency 
vaccination in Finland.
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Time lags regarding the vaccination decision are based on the expert panel (held 24 
April  2009) and the scientific literature.  After the vaccination decision there is a time 
lag before the vaccination can be started. Vaccination is possible only after the type 
of virus has been identified and the vaccine for that type is produced in adequate 
quantities.  After the first observation of FMD, the virus type has to be determined. 
Samples would be sent to Great Britain or Denmark. According to the experts, the 
typing of the FMD strain would be confirmed 6–14 days after the first suspicion of 
disease, meaning 3–11 days after the confirmation of suspicion. After typing of the 
virus, it should be possible to manufacture the vaccine. Vaccinations could begin no 
earlier than 14–18 days after the first confirmed diagnosis. If the disease were to be 
found earlier in other European countries, a vaccine could be delivered one week 
earlier.
Vaccination teams would be gathered. The expert panel estimated that 10–25 
(maximum 50) teams could be assembled. Vaccination would protect 80% of unin-
fected, vaccinated farms 10 days after vaccination closure. Since the holdings in 
protection zones are under restrictive measures, vaccination would protect farms 
from receiving the virus from undetected infected farms from the same protection 
zone or nearby areas.
The expert panel considered that Finland would use commercial vaccines that would 
require 10 days after the vaccination to produce the maximum protection in 80% 
of cases.  The experts did not consider it possible to use more effective vaccines in 
Finland due to the lack of availability.
The expert panel suggested that suppressive vaccination would be started when there 
would be at least 18 detected outbreaks and protective vaccination would start when 
there would be at least 30 detected outbreaks. As a precondition for starting emer-
gency vaccination, the experts wanted to be 80–90% certain that the disease would 
spread out of control without vaccination.
6.4 Economic simulation model
Principle
Previous research has provided important viewpoints regarding the economic effects 
of an animal disease outbreak, such as 1) modelling domestic, export and import 
demand for the main livestock commodities. Moreover, epidemiological models can 
simulate the distribution of the size and duration of the disease outbreak, and the 
outcomes of these models can be consistently integrated with economic models. In 
terms of economic research, our contribution is to extend the existing approaches 
towards two aspects that are crucial in determining optimal mitigation policies. We 
extend the analysis by 2) treating the management of an animal stock explicitly, 
by taking into consideration the dynamic and biological nature of production and 
irreversible consequences of production decisions and 3) accepting that the duration 
of the market shock is unknown, a priori. The examination of the issues listed above 
is of wider interest, because they are relevant for various market shocks.
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Our analysis elaborates that the risk of a trade distortions affects the producer and 
the consumer, by adjusting their decisions and market prices during and after an 
outbreak. However, if a large outbreak occurs, animal production can quickly decrease 
due to extensive disease eradication measures. Producers on uninfected farms are 
unable to change aggregate production volumes quickly, because it takes time to 
raise reproductive and fattening animals and because long-term investments in an 
animal stock with a high yield potential are sunk costs. Models of agricultural product 
markets often operate at the annual level or assume a static economic equilibrium 
where production and the animal stock are fully adjusted at little or no adjustment 
cost. In these models, the market most often fully clears at relatively small changes 
in market prices, compared to relatively large price fluctuations on markets distorted 
by an animal disease. Applications of market-level economic models of a shorter time 
span than one year (e.g. Mangen & Burrell 2003; Paarlberg et al. 2008) are rare.
Models should consider future events to produce consistent results for the volume 
and the value of production over time. For instance, culling animals prematurely 
incurs irreversible costs. Despite the sunk costs and dynamics of the animal stock, 
the optimal adjustment of production would be relatively straightforward if the size 
and the duration of the epidemic event were known beforehand. Unfortunately, the 
duration of an epidemic and the duration of the trade distortions can vary conside-
rably.
Our approach allows producers to adjust their animal stock through inter-temporal 
decision-making. Moreover, we argue that production adjustments, or the lack of 
adjustments, must be modelled endogenously by using a structural-form stochastic 
dynamic optimisation framework. In this way, it is possible to cater for the rigidity 
of production more explicitly than by using econometric estimates. The main source 
of economic losses in a highly contagious animal disease outbreak, i.e. the negative 
price shock from the markets due to trade bans, requires the modelling of demand 
and supply in a sufficiently short time span to reflect the actual time scale in which 
production and trade decisions are made under uncertainty (Figures 25 and 26).
The economic effects of FMD are estimated in two steps by using a partial-equilibrium 
model and partial budgets. Firstly, it is estimated how an outbreak impacts on the 
number of animals kept on farms. These estimates are used to quantify the direct 
costs of an outbreak, which are mainly financed by tax-payers. Direct costs include cost 
incurred by measures such as culling and rendering infected animals and material, 
disinfection and cleaning of infected premises, tracing and surveillance of susceptible 
farms, administrative work, operations in national and local crisis centres, emergency 
vaccination and other official measures. Secondly, information on the animal stock 
and duration of an outbreak is used to quantify impacts on uninfected farms affected 
by restrictive measures and on livestock.
Market effects are estimated with a dynamic partial equilibrium model, which 
maximises the societal value of the livestock sector and thus minimises the societal 
costs of an FMD outbreak. The partial-equilibrium model simulates how an FMD 
outbreak and the related trade distortions would affect the dairy, beef and pork 
production, export, import and market in Finland. Export demand equations are 
further separated into intra-community trade with Finland and third-country 
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trade with Finland for products that have sufficient trading quantities in the dataset. 
This procedure allowed us to examine the role of trade restrictions imposed by third 
countries. In addition, milk was divided into six different product groups (liquid milk, 
cream, cheese, butter, yoghurt, milk powder), and each group of products behaved 
as a separate product. The pig market was simulated with the model documented by 
Niemi & Lehtonen (2010). Another model was developed to simulate dairy and beef 
markets.
The models simulate dairy, beef and swine markets at the monthly level. This is 
an exceptionally short time frame for a partial-equilibrium model, because these 
models usually operate at an annual level. The short time span is of special importance, 
because losses are incurred in quite a short period. For instance, models operating 
at an annual level are fully adjusted to each new market price and marginal cost 
situation to minimise the losses and they are therefore likely to underestimate losses 
incurred in the short term.
The starting point for this study is that there are limited options to adjust production. 
For instance, production can be significantly increased only after several months or 
even years. Milk and meat prices are the key production and consumption decisions 
of factors (Figure 26). Hence, the decision problem is dynamic in nature, and dynamic 
optimisation better suits analysis of the problem than static optimisation.
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Figure 25. Principal changes in the livestock market when a disease outbreak results in a shift in the 
export demand curve and hence the aggregate demand curve for domestic products, and temporarily 
reduces the supply of livestock products.
Demand equations for six dairy products, beef and pigmeat export, import and 
domestic demand were estimated using three-stage least squares (Zellner & Theil 
1962) procedure provided by Le Sage (2002). This method corrected for estimation 
bias caused by the endogeneity of Finnish product prices, i.e. the price variable 
having strong links to other variables in the model, and simultaneity of export, import 
and domestic demand.
The partial equilibrium model simulates the utility obtained by domestic consumers 
from imported and Finnish products and returns obtained by producers from the 
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domestic and export markets. The model accounts for costs incurred due to changes 
in the use of production capacity in livestock production, distortions in the standard 
production process, an increased need to produce replacement animals and the 
effects of changes in the removal of animals. Both production and consumption are 
allowed to adjust according to the new markets situation emerging after the discovery 
of FMD in Finland. Biological factors that constrain rapid changes in the production 
quantity in the very short term are taken into account. For instance, milk production 
and piglet production can be increased only after a time. In each simulation, the 
actual duration of trade distortions is unknown, but its expected duration is known 
(Figure 27).
It is assumed that information about the presence of FMD in Finland halts the exporting 
of pigmeat, beef and milk production from Finland to third countries. Moreover, the 
expected duration of halted exports is assumed to follow OIE regulations. Hence, 
trade will be distorted on average three months after disinfection of last detected 
infected farm. In contrast to this, intra-community trade is assumed to continue 
according to EU regulations.
Production
decisions
Shock
Domestic
consumption
Export
(EU, ROW)
Import
Animals to 
slaughter Shock
Cows
Sows
Meat price
Milk price
ShockMilk
Figure 26. The partial-equilibrium model simulates simultaneous and interrelated changes in production
decisions and production quantities, import, export and domestic consumption decisions and market 
prices over time, and the implications of a disease (shock) on these as well as on the animal stock.
Figure 27. The duration of a trade ban is unknown beforehand in the partial-equilibrium model, and 
the probability of a trade ban being lifted before the next month is represented by 1-Pcont. 
Trade ban Trade ban
No trade ban
Month t+1
Pcont
1-Pcont
Month t
Time
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Key parameters for FMD in economic simulation
Direct costs
The material resources for each task were estimated according to procedures 
characterised by the terms of reference for veterinary officers with regard to an FMD 
outbreak in Finland. Labour requirements, the expenditures of which are paid from 
public funds, were estimated using data provided by Risk Solutions (2005). These 
data indicate the labour resources needed for field operations during hypothetical 
FMD epidemics of different sizes in the United Kingdom. Estimates of the labour 
required by a national crisis centre were based on a Finnish study (Niemi et al. 2008) 
and consultation with officials. Unit prices for each resource were collected from 
official statistics or requested from officials and companies capable of executing 
measures. Values given in Table 22 were used to calculate the direct costs.
Table 22. Values used to compute the direct costs.
Unit of measure € per unit1)
Infected farm, maximum for a farm-type dependent fixed cost 119 576
Per fattening pig in an infected farm 175
Per sow in an infected farm 572
Per dairy cow in an infected farm 1 550
Per heifer in an infected farm 1 211
Per suckler cow in an infected farm 1 296
Per growing cattle in an infected farm 1 726
Per farm in a protection zone 638+6 028*duration in months
Per farm in a surveillance zone 425+468*duration in months
Per contact farm 1 130
Vaccination, excluding the cost of culling vaccinated animals 892 per farm+8.53 per animal
1) Including the value of culled animals, if applicable.
Indirect costs
Production costs in milk and beef production were mainly based mainly on ProAgria 
(2006), but supplemented by information from other publications such as Heikkilä 
(1999, 2006). The cost structure of suckler cow production was based on updated 
information similar to that provided by Heikkilä (2005). Piglet production costs for 
the year 2006 used in the dynamic programming model were provided by the rural 
advisory organization ProAgria (2006). Feed costs were based on the assumption 
that pigs are fed according to Finnish feeding recommendations (MTT 2006) and they 
grow according to a structural-form growth model by Niemi (2006). Feeds used in 
the analysis were barley, soybean meal and premix. Their prices were based on 2006 
prices. Extra feed costs due to production disturbances were estimated using informa-
tion from the Finnish feeding recommendations (MTT 2006). 
Processing costs and the division of market returns to different stakeholders in the 
food chain as well as information on the protein and fat composition of dairy products 
were needed for the model. These parameters were based on Lehtonen (2001) and 
Statistics Finland (2008).
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Own-price elasticity estimates for six dairy products, pigmeat and beef as used in the 
analysis are given in Table 23. Moreover, it was assumed that extreme price fluctua-
tions are eliminated through marketing contract arrangements between the Finnish 
food industry and retail. The common practice is that food deliveries to retail are 
contracted for four to six upcoming months. Moreover, the food industry has a limited 
storage capacity that can be used to smooth out extreme fluctuations in the markets. 
On the other hand, processing capacity is also limited in volume. The storing capacity 
was indirectly taken into account as a buffer that reduces the impact of the trade 
shock in the short term. Moreover, the impact of the limited milk product processing 
capacity was taken into account by imposing a constraint such that the manufacturing 
of each milk product cannot exceed the maximum historical amount in 1995 to 2007.
Table 23. Elasticity estimates used in the model and their standard errors (SE).
Intra-community 
exports
Third-country 
 exports Imports
Domestic 
demand
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estima-te SE
Pigmeat -0.968 0.283 -0.512 0.169 0.872 0.828 -0.138 0.064
Beef -1.016 0.213 -2.631 0.213 0.939 0.936 -0.376 0.191
Liquid 
milk -6.261 0.499 -6.261 0.499 6.804 1.842 -0.157 0.083
Creams -4.574 0.391 -4.574 0.391 01) 01) -1.925 0.626
Butter -1.768 0.661 -0.249 0.373 01) 01) -0.168 1.062
Yoghurt -0.327 0.302 -0.327 0.302 01) 01) -0.464 0.183
Cheese -2.326 0.623 -0.154 0.749 0.555 0.624 -1.594 0.475
Milk 
powder -1.300 1.218 -1.866 0.769 0.009 0.367 -1.523 0.525
1) The parameter was restricted at zero.
The economic simulation process
The model was developed in Matlab version 7.8.0.347. Pigmeat markets were simu-
lated with one partial-equilibrium model and milk and beef markets with another 
model, as pig and cattle production are in an economic sense not particularly strongly 
related to each other. Partial-equilibrium models were calibrated for the average 
monthly figures for the year 2006. Simulations were performed for a standardised set 
of epidemiological scenarios to determine the value of the epidemic size and duration. 
Thereafter, these results were incorporated with epidemiological simulations and 
direct and indirect costs incurred in each iteration were estimated by using previously 
simulated value results.
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7 Results
The results are based on 100 000 iterations. They are divided into three groups based 
on the final size of the epidemic: 1) a sporadic outbreak = no further spread 2) 
a typical outbreak = 2–17 farms will become infected, 3) the worst-case outbreak = 
at least 18 infected farms at the end of iteration. The typical and worst-case outbreaks 
represented 67.8% of iterations (Table 24).
Table 24. The distribution of simulated outbreaks.
Outbreak type  Number of infected farms
Average number of 
infected farms
Duration from 
infection to 
disinfection (weeks)
% of all 
iterations
Sporadic 1 1 3.5 32.2
Typical 2-17 5 5 62.3
Worst case >=18 29 8 5.5
Sporadic outbreak
Sporadic outbreaks occurred in 32.2% of the iterations. The farm was initially cleaned 
on average 3 days (95% of the infected farms were cleaned after 7 days) after 
the positive diagnosis. The duration from the first introduction of the virus until 
disinfection was on average 3.5 weeks. The number of animals on infected farms was 
obviously dependent on the production type of the farm (Table 26).
Sporadic outbreaks had the largest indirect influence due the administrative obliga-
tions associated with an outbreak when the first infected farm was in Vaasa, Turku 
or Oulu PVO district. In outbreaks starting from these PVO districts, the number of 
uninfected farms within the protection and surveillance zone of the single infected 
farm was on average 3 to 8 times higher than when sporadic outbreaks occurred in 
Rovaniemi district (Table 25). In addition, about 20 traced contact farms would not 
have become infected. The number of traced contact farms varied little between PVO 
districts. The proportion of sporadic outbreaks in the different PVO districts varied 
between 27.3–38.6%, so an epidemic outbreak was more probable than a sporadic 
outbreak in every PVO district (Table 25).
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Table 25. Mean number of uninfected farms in the given PVO district that are located in protection 
and surveillance zones or have been traced as contact farms in the case of a sporadic outbreak. 
The 95th percentile is shown in parentheses.
PVO district
Number of farms
P(no outbreak) 
% In Protection      
zone
In Surveillance 
zone Traced contacts
Helsinki 3 (8) 26 (50) 20 (56) 38.2
Vaasa 11 (25) 62 (109) 20 (51) 30.1
Oulu 7 (24) 34 (104) 23 (57) 30.0
Rovaniemi 2  (7) 8 (23) 20 (49) 34.6
Turku 7 (15) 50 (92) 20 (57) 38.6
Hämeenlinna 5 (12) 42 (75) 20 (57) 38.2
Tampere 4 (10) 35 (65) 18 (53) 37.7
Kouvola 5 (13) 40 (75) 20 (59) 32.2
Mikkeli 3  (8) 28 (51) 20 (54) 30.2
Joensuu 5 (13) 35 (71) 19 (53) 31.6
Kuopio 7 (15) 51 (92) 22 (57) 27.3
Jyväskylä 4 (11) 25 (47) 16 (49) 33.5
Note: Only farms outside the zones are estimated as traced contact farms
In sporadic outbreaks, the number of animals on the infected farms was low. There 
were differences among PVO districts, as in some districts it is quite unlikely that there 
would be any pigs on infected farms. Among cattle farms the relative differences 
between districts were low. Variability within PVO districts was large, as the 95th 
percentile could be 5–6 times larger than the expected value. By contrast, the range 
between expected values and the 95th percentile of dairy cattle was only two-fold 
(Table 26).
PVO 
district
Sporadic outbreak
Sows Piglets Finishers Dairy cows Other Cattle Total
mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95%
Helsinki 3 23 17 131 37 248 11 39 17 77 87 467
Vaasa 7 48 40 274 69 432 11 39 22 89 152 686
Oulu 1 0 6 0 11 0 14 38 24 100 53 159
Rova-
niemi 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 31 36 90 36 96
Turku 13 80 74 456 115 568 6 29 15 84 227 914
Hämeen- 
linna 6 48 34 274 48 385 10 36 17 79 113 613
Tampere 3 19 17 108 18 105 10 36 18 78 65 258
Kouvola 3 17 17 97 33 216 9 32 17 78 78 353
Mikkeli 2 0 11 0 10 5 8 31 21 99 50 166
Joensuu 1 0 6 0 8 0 11 34 21 88 44 151
Kuopio 1 0 6 0 7 0 13 38 22 87 49 173
Jyväskylä 2 0 11 0 10 45 8 29 22 88 52 192
Table 26. Number of animals on infected farms in sporadic outbreaks that occurred in a given PVO district.
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Losses in a sporadic outbreak
In the sporadic outbreak scenario, the median total loss was simulated at €22.8 million. 
In 95% of iterations, simulated losses were less than €23.5 million per outbreak. The 
majority of losses were paid by producers, and the direct costs of an outbreak were 
considerably smaller than the indirect costs. In fact, producer losses were larger than 
the total loss, because consumers were able to gain a little from an outbreak. In the 
median case, consumers gained €68.4 million, whereas producers lost €91.0 million.
The variation in losses caused by a sporadic outbreak was quite small, as these 
outbreaks were quite equal in their duration and other size measures. Regional 
differences between PVO districts in their simulated losses in the case of a sporadic 
outbreak were small. For almost every PVO district, the median loss caused by a 
sporadic outbreak and the upper 95% percentile results were the same as reported 
in Table 27 for the entire country.
Table 27. Mean, median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the change in economic surplus of producers, 
consumers, taxpayers (public funds) and society as a whole in millions of euros due to a simulated 
sporadic FMD outbreak.
Producers Consumers Public funds Total
<5% -90.0 67.8 -0.2 -22.5
Median -91.0 68.4 -0.3 -22.8
Mean -91.5 68.9 -0.3 -22.9
<95%  -93.8 70.6 -0.5 -23.5
Typical outbreak
A typical outbreak was the most common outcome, as it was achieved in 62.3% of 
iterations. An outbreak lasted 5 weeks from the first introduction of the virus and 5 
farms were typically infected. The infected farms were initially cleaned approximate-
ly 2 weeks after the first suspicion (Table 28).
The size and duration of an outbreak varied only slightly between PVO districts in 
which the outbreak had started (Table 29). Typical epidemics could spread out of the 
PVO district, but it was more probable that further spread of FMD would occur in the 
same PVO district where the outbreak had started. There was a tendency that typical 
outbreaks would in some districts stay in the PVO district, while in other districts it 
tended to spread to another PVO district (Table 37).
Table 28. The size (number of infected farms) and duration (days) of a typical outbreak.
Number of infected 
farms
Number of infected 
production units 
Duration of 
outbreak*
Mean 5 5 36
Median 4 4 35
95th percentile 13 14 51
*From the first infection until the disinfection of infected farms
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PVO district
Number of infected 
farms
Number of infected 
production units Duration of outbreak
(qty) (qty) (days)
Mean 95th Mean 95th Mean 95th 
Helsinki 5 12 5 13 35 50
Vaasa 5 14 6 15 36 51
Oulu 5 13 5 13 36 50
Lappi 5 13 5 13 35 50
Turku 5 13 5 15 35 50
Hämeenlinna 5 12 5 13 35 49
Tampere 5 13 5 14 35 49
Kouvola 5 14 6 15 37 51
Mikkeli 6 14 6 15 37 52
Joensuu 5 14 5 14 36 52
Kuopio 5 14 6 14 36 52
Jyväskylä 5 14 6 14 36 51
Table 29. The outcomes of typical outbreaks in PVO districts in Finland.
Although typical outbreaks were similar-sized in different PVO districts, the
consequences were quite different: a typical outbreak starting in the district of Vaasa 
caused 3 times more uninfected farms in protection zones and 4 times more in 
surveillance zones than in typical outbreaks starting in the district of Rovaniemi (Table 
30). In addition, with the uninfected farms in zones, the number of traced contact 
farms was also 4 to 5 times higher than in a sporadic outbreak, but the differences 
between PVO districts were small (Table 30).
Table 30. Mean number of uninfected farms in protection and surveillance zones and traced con-
tact farms when a typical outbreak started in a given PVO district. In parentheses are given 95th 
percentiles.
PVO 
district
Number of farms N 
protection/ 
N infected
N 
surveillance/  
N infectedInfected
In protection 
zones
In surveillance 
zones
Traced 
contacts
Helsinki 5 16 (52) 97 (300) 95 (254) 3.2 19.4
Vaasa 5 40 (107) 160 (416) 92 (216) 8.0 32.0
Oulu 5 28 (88) 99 (308) 102 (245) 5.6 19.8
Rova- 
niemi 5 13 (44) 41 (164) 90 (211) 2.6 8.2
Turku 5 24 (67) 130 (342) 103 (243) 4.8 26.0
Hämeen- 
linna 5 19 (51) 104 (264) 88 (220) 3.8 20.8
Tampere 5 19 (59) 106 (303) 96 (243) 3.8 21.2
Kouvola 5 22 (60) 115 (290) 109 (258) 4.4 23.0
Mikkeli 6 19 (58) 103 (287) 107 (256) 3.2 17.2
Joensuu 5 23 (63) 99 (272) 97 (233) 4.6 19.8
Kuopio 5 27 (75) 138 (360) 105 (251) 5.4 27.6
Jyväs-
kylä 5 19 (57) 86 (262) 99 (248) 3.8 17.2
Note: Only farms outside the zones are estimated as traced contact farms
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Typical outbreak involved much larger numbers of animals than a sporadic outbreak. 
The animal production in different PVO districts varied, and thus in several districts it 
was not probable that large numbers of pigs would be involved in the outbreak (Table 
31). Differences between PVO districts in the expected number of cattle on infected 
farms were small.
Table 31. Number of animals on infected farms in a typical outbreak that has started in a given PVO district.
PVO district
Typical outbreak
Sows Piglets Finishers Dairy cows Other Cattle Total
mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95%
Helsinki 49 253 279 1 442 332 2 232 88 288 104 422 851 4 088
Vaasa 49 295 279 1 682 307 1 960 110 322 136 528 884 4 055
Oulu 8 0 46 0 39 0 109 299 130 529 328 974
Rovaniemi 3 0 17 0 14 0 92 259 120 519 249 783
Turku 131 727 747 4 144 806 474 66 254 104 523 1 855 8 986
Hämeen-
linna 43 190 245 1 083 267 267 84 263 92 396 729 2 819
Tampere 26 150 148 855 174 1 070 87 280 119 489 553 2 333
Kouvola 27 129 154 735 186 998 102 299 104 405 575 2 184
Mikkeli 10 18 57 103 72 119 99 278 118 430 354 924
Joensuu 5 0 29 0 40 0 98 271 127 467 299 741
Kuopio 9 0 51 0 55 0 109 296 146 575 371 989
Jyväskylä 10 23 57 131 56 170 94 274 121 420 337 883
Losses in a typical outbreak
In the typical outbreak scenario, the median total loss was simulated at €25.3 million. 
In 95% of iterations, simulated losses were less than €31.4 million per outbreak. 
Hence, the median loss was larger and losses also varied more than in the sporadic 
scenario. In the median case, consumers gained €73.5 million, whereas producers 
lost €97.5 million. In 95% of iterations, the costs paid by public funds fell below 
€4.1 million (Table 32).
Differences between regions in the mean losses were still quite small, whereas 95th 
percentile losses were more volatile. Outbreaks beginning in different regions were 
able to reach €30 million in losses (Table 33).
Table 32. Mean, median, 5th and 95th percentiles of change in the economic surplus of producers, 
consumers, taxpayers (public funds) and society as a whole in millions of euros due to a simulated 
typical FMD outbreak.
Producers Consumers Public funds Total
<5% -91.5 68.9 -0.4 -23.1
Median -97.5 73.4 -1.1 -25.3
Mean -99.3 74.8 -1.5 -26.0
<95% -113.1 85.2 -4.1 -31.4
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Table 33. Mean and the 95th percentile change in society’s economic surplus (million €) due to a 
typical FMD outbreak according to the PVO district.
Mean <95%
Helsinki -25.6 -30.8
Vaasa -26.4 -32.0
Oulu -26.0 -31.3
Rovaniemi -25.5 -29.9
Turku -25.9 -31.4
Hämeenlinna -25.6 -30.7
Tampere -25.7 -31.0
Kouvola -26.1 -31.6
Mikkeli -26.2 -31.4
Joensuu -26.0 -31.2
Kuopio -26.1 -31.6
Jyväskylä -25.9 -31.1
Worst-case outbreak
The proportion of worst-case outbreaks was 5.5% of 100 000 iterations. The number 
of infected farms ranged from 18 to 134, and outbreaks lasted 2–4 weeks longer than 
typical outbreaks on average (Table 34). The number of animals on infected farms 
was typically much larger than in typical outbreaks.
Table 34. The size (number of infected farms) and duration of a worst-case outbreak.
Number of infected 
farms
Number of infected 
production units
Duration of outbreak*
Mean 29 30 57
Median 25 25 55
95th percentile 54 55 77
*From the first infection until disinfection of infected farms
The probability of worst case epidemics in different PVO districts varied from 
2.4–8.9%. The number of uninfected farms in protection and surveillance zones was 
larger, but relative differences between different PVO districts were smaller than in 
typical outbreaks. In protection zones there were be 3.8–6.8 farms per infected farm 
in a worst-case outbreak, but in a typical outbreak there were 3.2–8.0 uninfected 
farms per infected farm. A similar tendency could be seen in surveillance zones, 
where worst-case outbreaks produced 16.8–24.6 uninfected farms in surveillance 
zones per infected farm, while a typical outbreak produced 8.2–32.0 uninfected farms 
in surveillance zones per infected farm (Tables 30 and 35). The number of traced 
contact farms was approximately 4 times higher in a worst-case outbreak than in a 
typical outbreak. Differences between PVO districts were relatively small (Table 35).
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Table 35. Mean number of farms in protection and surveillance zones when a worst outbreak started in a given 
PVO district.
PVO- 
district
Number of farms 
Traced 
contacs
P(Worst) 
%
N protection/ 
N infected
N surveillance/ 
N infected Infected In Protection zones
In Surveillance 
zones
Helsinki 29 134 (269) 686 (1361) 475 (904) 2 5 24
Vaasa 29 203 (402) 733 (1433) 359 (666) 6 7 25
Oulu 29 166 (326) 629 (1279) 442 (836) 4 6 22
Rovaniemi 28 133 (348) 503 (1223) 430 (858) 3 5 18
Turku 29 127 (272) 524 (1151) 360 (678) 5 4 18
Hämeen-
linna 27 121 (234) 578 (1200) 422 (756) 3 4 21
Tampere 28 133 (294) 622 (1413) 430 (813) 4 5 22
Kouvola 29 127 (260) 573 (1137) 430 (770) 6 4 20
Mikkeli 30 119 (256) 547 (1094) 418 (757) 9 4 18
Joensuu 30 134 (265) 527 (1159) 393 (722) 7 4 18
Kuopio 29 158 (318) 664 (1305) 429 (763) 7 5 23
Jyväskylä 28 126 (283) 538 (1180) 428 (849) 5 5 19
Note: Only farms outside the zones are estimated as traced contact farms
In worst-case outbreaks the proportion of iterations in which the whole outbreak 
stayed in the same district as the primary infected farm was lower than in a typical 
outbreak in every PVO district (Table 37). This means that the worst outbreak 
was less dependent on the production structure of the PVO district of the primary 
infected farm. The strongest tendency of the worst outbreak to remain within the PVO 
district of the primary infected farm was in Vaasa and Turku PVO districts. The lowest 
tendency to remain within one PVO district appeared to be in Helsinki, Hämeenlinna, 
Tampere, Jyväskylä, Rovaniemi and Kouvola PVO districts, and thus the further spread 
from these PVO districts to other PVO districts was more probable.
In worst outbreaks, differences between PVO districts in the number of cattle on 
infected farms were small, while there were clear differences in the number of pigs 
that would be eradicated (Table 36). The largest quantities of pigs on infected farms 
were in those outbreaks that started in Turku PVO district, where the total number of 
animals on infected farms was also be 2–3 times higher than if the outbreaks started 
elsewhere.
The number of pigs on uninfected farms that would be in protection and surveillance 
zones varied more between PVO districts than the number of cattle. In Turku PVO 
district, the number of pigs on uninfected farms within these zones was 5–9 times 
higher than in Joensuu and Mikkeli PVO districts. By contrast, the highest mean number 
of cattle on uninfected farms of the zones in a PVO district was less than two times 
higher than in the PVO districts that on average had the lowest number of cattle in 
the zones (Table 38).
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Table 36. Number of animals on infected farms when a worst-case outbreak started in a given PVO district.
PVO 
district
Worst outbreak
Total
Sows Piglets Finishers Dairy cows Other Cattle
mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95% mean <95%
Helsinki 200 1 590 1 140 9 063 919 7 408 660 1 424 1 127 2 854 3 753 20 631
Vaasa 271 2 097 1 545 11 953 1 462 10 486 632 1 224 1 015 2 530 4 780 24 209
Oulu 70 30 399 171 287 282 614 1 166 1 029 2 536 2 297 4 788
Rovaniemi 197 2 371 1 123 13 515 902 7 682 532 1 060 1 159 2 912 3 673 22 025
Turku 519 3 562 2 958 20 303 2 598 17 679 555 1 156 785 2 184 7 203 39 374
Hämeen-
linna 174 1 233 992 7 028 882 6 824 556 1 035 953 2 375 3 415 15 314
Tampere 172 1 177 980 6 709 863 5 588 606 1 169 959 2 184 3 447 14 001
Kouvola 25 37 143 211 108 355 623 1 133 934 2 034 1 793 4 042
Mikkeli 19 27 108 154 137 355 574 1 108 866 1 972 1 620 3 456
Joensuu 18 2 103 11 132 200 590 1 136 945 2 319 1 706 3 674
Kuopio 46 53 262 302 232 424 608 1 171 1 137 2 628 2 271 4 858
Jyväskylä 53 113 302 644 317 767 572 1 119 905 2 238 2 024 4 907
Table 37. The proportion of iterations in which all infected farms were situated in the same PVO 
district as the primary infected farm in typical and worst outbreak scenarios.
PVO district
Proportion (%) of outbreaks which remain in PVO-district
Typical Worst
Helsinki 66.4 21.7
Vaasa 91.5 71.7
Oulu 82.5 45.4
Rovaniemi 82.7 39.1
Turku 86.0 73.4
Hämeenlinna 71.5 33.8
Tampere 71.2 36.2
Kouvola 75.8 44.6
Mikkeli 75.5 54.3
Joensuu 81.4 56.9
Kuopio 85.1 59.5
Jyväskylä 74.5 39.7
Table 38. The mean number of animals on uninfected farms in protection and surveillance zones 
when an outbreak started in a given PVO district under the worst-case scenario.
PVO district
Protection Surveillance zones
Total mean
Pigs mean Cattle mean Pigs mean Cattle mean
Helsinki 9 700 3 700 44 000 19 200 82 600
Vaasa 13 600 7 200 37 800 25 200 82 500
Oulu 4 500 6 700 14 300 24 000 43 800
Rovaniemi 5 700 4 800 10 800 18 300 34 300
Turku 15 100 3 200 42 300 12 900 76 900
Hämeenlinna 7 900 3 400 33 300 16 400 62 300
Tampere 9 700 3 800 40 400 17 600 71 300
Kouvola 3 700 3 900 16 700 17 400 41 600
Mikkeli 2 100 3 800 9 600 17 200 33 800
Joensuu 1 900 4 800 7 800 18 200 39 200
Kuopio 3 300 5 900 11 800 24 700 38 600
Jyväskylä 3 400 4 300 12 900 17 600 20 600
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a) b)
c) d)
typical typical
worst worst
Number of infected farms Duration of epidemic (days)
Number of infected farms Duration of epidemic (days)
Figure 28. The distribution of size and duration of a typical outbreak (n = 62299) and a worst-case outbreak (n = 5502).
Note that the scale is different for typical and worst outbreak histograms.
Losses in the worst-case outbreak
In the worst-case outbreak, the median total loss was simulated at €36.5 million. 
In 95% of iterations, simulated losses were less than €52.4 million per outbreak. 
In the median case, consumers gained €85.8 million, whereas producers lost €113.7 
million. Hence, the losses were larger and losses also varied more than in the 
sporadic scenario. The loss distribution overlapped with the distribution obtained for 
the typical outbreak, but not with distribution obtained for the sporadic scenario. 
Median costs paid by public funds were simulated at €7.9 million, but two times higher 
losses were also possible. In relative terms, public expenditures were boosted by 
the worst-case scenario more than the economic effects of consumers on producers. 
Higher variation in public expenditures was mainly because public expenditures were 
quite strongly related to the number of infected farms, whereas losses to producers 
were mainly related to the duration of trade distortions (Table 39).
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Differences between regions were more prominent in the worst-case scenario than in 
other scenarios. The highest median loss was simulated for outbreaks beginning from 
Vaasa PVO district. When considering the 95th percentile, outbreaks beginning from 
Vaasa, Oulu, Joensuu and Kuopio districts were able to result in more than €53 million 
in losses, whereas outbreaks beginning from Hämeenlinna or Tampere district did not 
result in losses higher than €49 million (Table 40). These results were explained by 
differences in outbreak size and duration.
Figure 29 illustrates the accumulation of the total loss over time in the worst-case 
scenario. More than 50% of final outbreak costs are already incurred by the time 
the first farm has been detected. In a few cases, losses are accumulated until about 
two months have elapsed, whereas in most cases no further losses are accumulated 
after some 3 to 4 weeks time following the detection of the first case. The costs of an 
outbreak are sunk costs after it has occurred. Even if the costs are realized afterwards, 
they cannot be recovered, as the infection – and the costs – cannot be cancelled. In 
less than 5% of worst-case outbreaks, i.e. in fewer than 0.25% of all iterations, no 
preventive measures could save costs when approximately 60 days have passed after 
the first farm has become infected. This pattern is not fully captured by Figure 29, 
because in a few cases the very end of the iteration can boost the losses and thus 
shift the 95% curve in Figure 29. There are some differences between iterations 
in their pattern of accumulation of losses. The observed epidemic size makes a 
difference to the accumulation curve. The more infected farms have been observed 
by a specific date, the more extra losses are expected to be incurred before the last 
farm has been disinfected. The information value of the number of detected farms is 
at the largest around 40 days after the first infection.
Table 39. Mean, median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the change in the economic surplus of
producers, consumers, taxpayers (public funds) and society as a whole in millions of euros due to 
a simulated worst-case outbreak of FMD.
Producers Consumers Public funds Total
<5% -103.9 77.9 -4.8 -31.0
Mean -117.7 88.6 -9.4 -38.5
Median -113.7 85.8 -7.9 -36.5
<95%  -145.7 109.3 -18.9 -52.4
Table 40. Mean and the 95th percentile change in society’s economic surplus (million €) due to a 
worst-case FMD outbreak according to the PVO district. 
Mean <95%  
Helsinki -38.1 -51.8
Vaasa -39.7 -54.8
Oulu -39.2 -53.8
Rovaniemi -37.4 -51.1
Turku -38.3 -51.6
Hämeenlinna -37.1 -47.5
Tampere -38.2 -48.6
Kouvola -37.6 -50.9
Mikkeli -37.2 -50.9
Joensuu -38.3 -53.7
Kuopio -39.0 -53.5
Jyväskylä -37.5 -50.0
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Figure 29. Accumulation of societal losses in the event of a worst-case outbreak.
Major determinants for losses
In the event of a worst-case scenario, the direct costs of an outbreak were quite 
prominent, whereas in other scenarios they generally represented only a fraction 
of the losses. Direct losses were quite strongly related to the number of infected 
farms. Each infected farm contributed, on average, €0.33 million in additional 
losses. The direct cost could soar for a number of reasons. The effort required to clear 
the infected premises is quite labour-intensive and therefore costly. Moreover, the 
culling of animals kept in infected farms, disinfection measures taken at the farm and 
the loss of value of animals were more costly the more animals were involved. The 
costs of maintaining surveillance and protection zones were high, especially when a 
large number of farms were located in these zones, such as in herd-dense areas, and 
when the outbreak was long-lasting. Direct costs were the highest in the worst-case 
scenario, where both the number of infected farms and the number of farms located 
in a surveillance or protection zone or traced as a contact herd were the highest.
The number of infected premises also contributed to the total loss, but less than indirect 
losses did. Each infected farm contributed on average €0.56 million in additional 
losses to society. To a large extent, economic losses resulted from distortions in the 
foreign trade of pigmeat, beef and dairy products. When information about the 
introduction of FMD into Finland was obtained, third-country exports were halted. 
This resulted in difficulties in marketing pigmeat and dairy products because the 
Finnish dairy and pig sectors were exporting a considerable share of their products 
outside the EU. Producer prices fell and market revenues to the dairy and pig sectors 
decreased, because domestic consumers were unable to increase their food 
consumption as much as excess supply in the domestic markets would have required. 
This problem could partly be solved by increasing intra-community trade and by 
adjusting the processing quantities of dairy products each month. Given the short 
time perspective, these adjustments were insufficient to prevent prices from falling.
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Producer prices for pigmeat fell by 20 to 25 cents per kg (16-20%), whereas the 
producer price for beef fell only modestly, generally less than 5%. The most important 
contributor was milk production, where simulated losses amounted to approximately 
€8 per 100 kg milk (-18%) and the producer price for milk fell close to prices paid in 
countries such as Germany. The importance of milk production is mainly because of 
the larger economic size of the dairy sector when compared to the pig or beef sectors, 
and because of the export orientation of fatty milk product manufacturing. The losses 
in milk exports were mainly due to distortions in the trade of high-fat-content dairy 
products such as cheese or butter.
The supply shock caused by a sporadic or typical outbreak was generally small, 
because the outbreak was quite small. Worst-case outbreaks also had quite a limited 
impact on the number of animals and large number of animals were not removed 
from the markets due to FMD. If the disease had removed a large number of 
animals from the markets, it would have changed the result a little. When the supply 
of milk and meat decreased, market prices were able to recover slightly, both during 
and after the export shock. Although market losses of the worst-case outbreak were 
reduced by an elevated number of animals removed from the markets, they were 
also increased by the prolonged duration of trade distortions when compared to other 
scenarios.
As market prices in Finland were falling due to trade distortions, consumers were able 
to benefit in the short term. The benefit per consumer was deemed small, because 
it was divided between a large number of people. In the worst-case scenario, the 
95th percentile result implied a benefit of only €20 per consumer. The loss per farm 
enterprise was larger, as farms are fewer in number than people. When producer 
losses were normalized by agricultural income, an outbreak was able to reduce the 
agricultural income by 10% to 16%, depending on the scenario and the value that 
was being examined. However, the impact on pig and cattle farms would be more 
significant, because only 36% of Finnish farms have cattle or pigs. It is likely that 
the profit margin of livestock farms would have been negative in the year when the 
outbreak occurred.
Consumers and retailers were able to benefit from the trade shock, e.g. by 
substituting the consumption of imported cheese with Finnish cheese. Hence, 
Finnish production was able to increase its market share in the domestic markets, 
even though Finnish products are not identical to imported products. A similar result 
was obtained for pigmeat. When market prices for pigmeat fell, domestic consumers 
were able to substitute part of their imported meat consumption with domestic 
pigmeat. This was important for pig production, as imports were approximately 20% 
of production. In contrast to this, changes in the consumption of beef were negligible, 
because beef is exported in small amounts and exported products are mostly of a 
type that does not have adequate markets in Finland.
Impacts on production
As noted above, the direct impact of an outbreak on production was quite small. In a 
median of all simulations (n = 100 000), restrictive measures were imposed on less 
than 1% of cows and sows in Finland. In 95% of iterations, the outbreak resulted 
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in less than a 0.13% immediate decrease in milk production and less than a 0.08% 
immediate decrease in piglet production. Distortions due to restrictive measures 
affected a larger number of animals. In 99% of iterations, protection zones controlled 
a maximum of 1.3% of milk production and 2.3% of piglet production, and surveil-
lance zones controlled a maximum of 4.7% of milk production and 9.3% of piglet 
production. Hence, in worst-case epidemics, a larger share of pig production than 
milk production can be under restrictions. These figures also illustrate that pig 
production is spatially more concentrated than milk production. Pig farms are on 
average larger and fewer in number than dairy farms.
Despite large market losses and the reduced ability of the food processing industry to 
pay for livestock products, adjustments in production were small. Slaughter weights 
of fattening pigs were virtually unchanged in the short term. Adjustments in feeding 
were not considered as an important adjustment method, as it could result in distor-
tions in the production process. For instance, the production potential of dairy cows 
could be reduced due to inadequate feeding. Hence, the most important modes of 
adjustment in the model were changes in the number of inseminated and removed 
cows and sows and changes in milk processing.
The sluggish adjustment was mainly driven by biological constraints in production 
and the short expected duration of trade shocks. In the event of pig production, 
producers had incentives to increase the number of inseminations to quickly recover 
the sow stock (Figure 30). Hence, when an outbreak occurred, piglet production 
was able to recover close to pre-outbreak figures within approximately 18 months. 
A similar result was obtained for milk production, but the time span was longer due 
to longer biological production cycle. When an outbreak and trade shock are expected 
to be short (less than one reproductive cycle of cows or sows), it is unlikely that 
producers would adjust their animal stock, because it would require costly invest-
ments to remove animals prematurely from the stock and to recover the animal stock 
later on. However, if the trade shock were be expected to continue for more than six 
months in the pig sector, or for more than 9 months in the milk sector, then producers 
would gradually start using their adjustment options. The least productive sows and 
cows would be prematurely removed from the stock and inseminations of gilts would 
be reduced.
As noted above, adjustments in primary production are small. In a large or long-
lived outbreak, they could play a role in determining losses. For instance, consider a 
hypothetical FMD outbreak where either 1% or 5% of dairy cows would be removed 
from the stock due to the outbreak (e.g. due to animal welfare reasons), and the 
trade shock would be expected to last on average 4.5 months. It would then take 
approximately two years for the cow stock to recover to the pre-outbreak level and 
the milk price would be stabilised only after almost 3 years. The cow stock would be 
unable to recover quickly, partly because the number of heifers that could be inse-
minated immediately is limited. Even if the cow stock recovered after two years, not 
all these cows would be producing milk by that time. As the milk price is affected by 
milk production and the trade shock, prices could fluctuate for several years. In beef 
production, the effect could last even longer, as it takes almost two years to fatten 
beef cattle after they have been born. Besides the above-mentioned pattern, Figure 
30 illustrates that if a large number of animals is removed from the market, producer 
prices can recover above the pre-outbreak level after the trade ban has been lifted.
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The storing of livestock products was examined as a potential method to reduce 
economic losses caused by the trade shock. The storage capacity would be used 
up in a few weeks and the potential for increasing meat and milk product invento-
ries was limited. Based on statistical time-series regarding the volume of monthly 
milk production and pigmeat inventories in Finland, and information obtained from 
stakeholders, the storage capacity corresponds to one to two months of production. 
Approximately 75% of the storage capacity is in use at all times. Hence, there is very 
limited extra storage capacity in the Finnish meat and dairy industry.
Because approximately half of milk fat produced in Finland is exported and it is mainly 
exported to third countries, there would quite a severe temporary excess supply 
of milk fat in Finland. Without any adjustments in milk processing, more than two 
million kilograms of excess cheese and butter per month would have been entering 
the domestic market. Hence, the manufacturing of butter and cheese was reduced 
during the trade shock and the production of some other more profitable products 
was increased (Table 41). However, these adjustments were unable to eliminate the 
problem of excess supply in the short term. The disease was not assumed to alter the 
demand for livestock products in Finland. The relationship between price and quantity 
demanded was assumed to be fixed. All changes observed in the markets were solely 
due to the export shock and changes in prices.
The result that the manufacturing of creams for the domestic market increases by 
42% due to the trade shock is probably because the demand for cream is better 
able to respond to changes in market prices than other products. For instance, the 
demand for liquid milk is almost unaffected by its price. Increased manufacturing of 
cream with a high fat content is one way to mitigate market losses. Moreover, cream 
exports have represented quite a small percentage of production in Finland, so that 
relative changes in the cream market can be quite large. However, is questionable 
whether dairies would be interested in selling creams at discounted prices in the 
domestic market for a long time. Another important option to reduce market losses 
is to increase the manufacturing of milk powder, which can be stored and exported 
after the lifting of the trade ban. This option could be attractive because it reduces 
the amount of water to be stored with the product. The problem with milk powder is 
that the processor’s margin from selling milk powder is generally smaller than that 
of selling other dairy products.
Product
Monthly production Change Exports Change in economic surplus, million €
Not halted Halted %2) % production3) Consumers Producers Total
Liquid milk 60.6 61.1 1 0.3 -2.1 2.5 0.4
Creams 2.7 3.9 42 7.7 0.1 2.7 2.8
Yoghurt 16.5 17.1 3 9.8 -1.0 1.5 0.5
Butter 4.6 4.3 -6 51.5 -8.6 3.8 -4.8
Cheese 7 6.6 -7 35.1 -6.5 4.5 -2.0
Milk powder 2.3 2.6 12 74.3 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total - - - - -18.1 15.1 -3.0
Table 41. The monthly production of dairy products (1000 t) when exports are halted or are not halted and the impact 
of halting exports on the economic surplus to the consumer, producer and society1).
1) The results are produced for an outbreak that has a negligible direct impact on animals kept on farms, such as a
   sporadic outbreak.
2) Percentage change in production when exports become halted.
3) Percentage share of export from production when exports are not halted.
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Figure 30. Expected change in the number of dairy cows in the stock and in the producer price of milk compared to the 
pre-outbreak price (zero impact) due to an outbreak that directly removes either 1% or 5% of cows from the market 
and for which the export shock is expected to last for 4.5 months.
The effect of the production sector and location of the primary infected 
farm on the consequences of a typical and worst outbreak
To study the effect of the production sector on the course and consequences of an 
outbreak, farms were divided into two categories according to whether they mainly 
had pigs or cattle. The lowest probability of a typical outbreak was in the Turku PVO 
district when outbreak started either from the pig or cattle production sector. By 
comparison, the highest probability of the worst-case scenario would be if an outbreak 
started on a cattle farm in the PVO district of Turku (Figure 31).
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Figure 31. The effects of production sector 
and location of primary infected farms on the 
probability of a typical and worst-case 
scenario.
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If the primary outbreak were to start from a farm mainly having pigs, the probability 
of the outbreak remaining solely within the pig production sector would be lower 
than the probability that an outbreak starting in the cattle production sector would 
remain in the cattle sector only (Figure 32). The location of the primary infected 
farm also seemed to influence the probability, as Turku had the highest probability 
for an outbreak starting in the pig sector and the lowest probability for an outbreak 
starting in the cattle sector. In the worst-case outbreak, the probability of the outbreak 
remaining within one production sector was generally lower than in a typical outbreak 
(Figure 32).
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The production sector of the primary infected farm had clearer influence on the 
proportion of infected farms operating in the same production sector as the pri-
mary infected farm. In the pig sector, the proportion was highest in the Vaasa and 
Turku PVO districts, while in the cattle sector the location had little influence on the 
proportion, and almost all infected farms were in all cases cattle farms (Figure 33). In 
worst-case outbreaks, the proportion of infected pig farms was lower than in typical 
outbreaks if the primary infected farm was in the pig production sector (Figure 33).
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Figure 32. The effects of outbreak
magnitude, production sector and 
location of primary infected farm on 
the probability that all infected farms 
are in the same production sector. Vaa-
sa and Turku districts are examples of 
districts with a dense animal popula-
tion and “other” includes the rest of 
Finland. Error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence limits for the expected 
value.
Figure 33. The effects of outbreak 
magnitude, production sector and 
location of primary infected farm 
on the proportion of infected farms 
that are in the same production 
sector as the primary infected farm. 
Vaasa and Turku districts are examples 
of districts with a dense animal popu-
lation and “other” includes the rest of 
Finland. Error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence limits for the expected 
value.
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The location of the primary infected farm and the size of the outbreak influenced 
the proportion of infected farms that were located in the protection zone of another 
infected farm. In typical outbreaks, the proportions were lowest if an outbreak started 
in Turku or Rovaniemi PVO districts. In worst-case outbreaks, this proportion clearly 
declined in all other PVO districts except for Turku (Figure 34).
Figure 34. The effects of outbreak
magnitude and location of primary 
infected farm on the proportion of 
infected farms located in protection 
zones.
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The proportion of infected farms located in the surveillance zone of another in-
fected farm was higher in worst-case scenarios than in typical outbreaks. In a typical 
outbreak the lowest proportion was observed when it had started in the Rovaniemi 
PVO district (Figure 35).
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Figure 35. The effects of outbreak
magnitude and location of the 
primary infected farm on the 
proportion of infected farms 
located in surveillance zones.
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The production sector and location of the primary infected farm also influenced the 
quantity and distribution of the production sector of uninfected farms that are in 
protection and surveillance zones in typical outbreaks. The highest number of unin-
fected farms in administrative zones was achieved when an outbreak had started in 
Vaasa PVO district. Most farms would in this case be operating in the cattle production 
sector. In Turku PVO district the proportion of the pig sector affected would be slightly 
higher than the cattle sector if an outbreak started in the pig sector. Overall, the 
lowest number of uninfected farms under administrative zones would be for an 
outbreak starting in a PVO district other than Turku or Vaasa. If the outbreak started in 
the cattle sector, most uninfected farms in the zones would be cattle farms (Figure 36). 
0
50
100
150
200
250
Va
as
a, 
pig
Tu
rku
, p
ig 
Ot
he
r, p
ig
Va
as
a, 
ca
ttle
Tu
rku
, c
att
le 
Ot
he
r, c
att
le
PVO district and production sector 
of primary infected farm
Nu
m
be
r o
f f
ar
m
s
cattle farms in surveillance zones 
pig farms in surveillance zones
cattle farms in protection zones
pig farms in protection zones
Figure 36. The effects of production
sector and location of the primary 
infected farm on the number and 
production sector of uninfected farms 
in protection and surveillance zones in 
a typical outbreak.
In worst-case outbreaks, the lowest number of uninfected farms in administrative 
zones was observed when an outbreak started in the Turku region and the highest 
when an outbreak started in the Vaasa PVO district. The division between production 
sectors is similar to that in typical outbreaks (Figure 37).
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The number of traced, uninfected contact farms was highest for an outbreak starting 
from a PVO district other than Turku and Vaasa and when the primary infected farm 
is operating in the pig production sector. The worst-case scenario would produce 
approximately four times more traced, uninfected contact farms than a typical 
outbreak (Figure 38).
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Figure 38. The effects of out-
break magnitude, production 
sector and location of primary 
infected farm on the number of 
traced, uninfected contact farms. 
Error bars indicate the 95th percen-
tile of the outcomes. 
Factors influencing the probability of a worst-case outbreak
Generalized linear models (binomial family, logit link) were developed to predict 
the probability of a worst-case outbreak in simulations. Two separate models were 
developed:
1. when characteristics of the primary infected farm are known, and
2. when the rate of new detected FMD cases is additionally known.
The final model was selected by minimizing Bayesian information criteria (BIC). 
Individual predictors were also excluded from the model if the Wald test gave a larger 
than 5% probability that the parameter value is not different from zero.
The probability of a worst-case outbreak can be estimated for an individual case by 
applying the following transition of the model:
 ■ Predicted probability of worst-case outbreak = 1- [exp(equation)/
(1+exp(equation)]
The models were developed using the GENLIN application (generalized linear 
model, see for instance McCullagh & Nelder 1989) of the PASW Statistics 18.0 
statistical package (SPSS Inc., IL, USA).
a) The predictive value of information on the characteristics of the primary infected 
farm
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The model in equation 1 (Table 42) corresponds to a situation when only information 
concerning the first infected farm is known. The generalized linear model indicated 
that knowledge of the characteristics of the primary infected farm will improve the 
ability to predict a worst-case scenario. A less probable worst-case scenario appears 
to be if “other cattle farm” is the primary infected farm, as all other production types 
have a higher probability of developing a worst-case outbreak. If a farm is located 
in either Vaasa or Turku PVO district, it has a slightly higher probability of inducing a 
worst-case outbreak. Similarly, if a farm is located in a risky region, the probability of 
a worst-case scenario appears to be higher. Naturally, the probability of a worst-case 
outbreak increased with increasing number of contacts (Table 42). The parameter was 
standardized within the farm type before analysis and standardized [(value – mean 
of farm type)/ standard deviation of farm type], so it actually represents how one 
standard deviation of number of contacts will influence the outcome within a farm 
type. Prior to standardization, each contact type was weighted applying coefficients 
(see details in Appendix 1). Typically, dairy and sow herds had the highest weighted 
contact numbers (Table 43) and the highest probabilities of a worst-case outbreak 
(Table 44).
Table 42. Parameters and their significance in equation 1.
Parameter Explanation Value SE Wald chi-square P
Intercept 5.778 0.199 888.0 0.000
Sow farm indicator of a farrowing and farrowing-to-finishing farm -1.872 0.201 86.7 0.000
Finisher farm indicator of a finisher farm -1.077 0.224 23.0 0.000
Dairy farm indicator of a dairy farm -2.724 0.193 199.0 0.000
Beef cattle farm indicator of a beef cattle farm -1.465 0.202 52.5 0.000
Suckler farm indicator of a suckler farm -0.662 0.215 9.5 0.002
Vaasa PVO district indicator of a farm being in the Vaasa PVO district -0.098 0.037 7.2 0.007
Turku PVO district indicator of a farm being in the Turku PVO district -0.321 0.520 38.1 0.000
Located in most 
risky regions
Indicator that a farm is located in the six regions 
with the highest probability of a worst-case 
scenario (probability 16.80-27.5%)
-1.760 0.084 437.5 0.000
Located in risky 
regions
indicator that a farm is located in regions where 
the probability of a worst-case scenario is between 
10.8%-16.7%
-0.836 0.044 364.1 0.000
Contacts
standardized square root of the sum of weighted 
contacts within the farm type during 30 days before 
suspicion 
-0.929 0.017 3039.9 0.000
Table 43. Number of contacts of the primary infected farm with different farm types. Column 0 
corresponds to the mean number of contacts during 30 days before the first detection of FMD 
(See Appendix 1).
Production type
Number of weighted contacts
- 1SD 0 +1 SD
Sow farm 5.5 17.1 35.5
Finisher farm 2.6 8.8 18.6
Dairy farm 12.0 28.7 52.7
Beef farm 0.5 6.5 19.3
Suckler farm 0.0 3.0 10.8
Other farm 0.0 1.3 4.8
SD = standard deviation
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Table 44. The effects of location, number of contacts and production type of the primary infected 
farm on the predicted probability of the worst-case outbreak.
Parameters 
Farm type of primary infected farm
Sow Finisher Dairy Beef Suckler Other
Vaasa PVO district P(worst) P(worst) P(worst) P(worst) P(worst) P(worst)
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
weighted contacts mean 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.01
Turku PVO district
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
weighted contacts mean 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.01
Other parts of the country
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
weighted contacts mean 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.01
Most risky regions
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.01
weighted contacts mean 0.10 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.02
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.23 0.12 0.41 0.16 0.08 0.04
Risky regions
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
weighted contacts mean 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.01
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.02
Note: probabilities for risky and most risky regions are estimated when they are located in the 
category “other parts of the country”.
The model had sensitivity of 48.0% and a specificity of 16.7% in predicting the 
simulated worst-case scenario if cut-off value of 0.1 was used for separation of the 
outcomes into worst-case and other outbreaks. The predictive value of the model 
has a linear relationship with the simulated probability and distinctively improves 
the prediction of the worst-case outbreak above the general simulated probability of 
a worst-case outbreak. When the predicted probability reaches 0.4, the relationship 
with simulated probability becomes unstable (Figure 39).
Figure 39. The relationship of the
predicted and simulated probability of 
a worst-case scenario (n = 100 000), 
when only predictors related with the 
primary infected farm are used in the 
prediction. The dashed line indicates 
the average probability of the worst 
case in simulations.
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b) Predictive value of the equation when the speed of new detections is also known
This corresponds to a situation after the first detection. The most important predictor 
of equation 2 is how quickly new FMD positive cases are found after the first detected 
case. The more quickly the new cases are found, the more probable the worst-case 
outbreak would be. In addition, information related to the primary infected farm 
still has some predictive value: the location of risky regions, being a dairy farm and 
having more contacts will all increase the predicted probability of worst-case outbreaks 
(Table 45). The sensitivity of the predictions is 76.7% and the specificity 58.7% if 
cut-off value of 0.2 is applied for the separation of outcomes into worst-case and other 
outbreaks. Predicted and simulated probabilities from equation 2 have a much better 
correspondence with the simulated values than those from equation 1 (Figure 40). 
Table 45. The parameters and their significance in equation 2. 
Parameter Explanation Value SE Wald  chi-square P
Intercept 8.616 0.242 1266.0 0.000
Dairy farm indicator of a dairy farm -0.588 0.233 6.4 0.011
Vaasa PVO district indicator of a farm being in the Vaasa PVO district 0.181 0.053 11.7 0.001
Located in most risky 
regions
indicator that a farm is located in one of 
the six regions with highest probability of 
worst-case outbreak (probability 16.80-
27.5%)
-0.804 0.148 29.7 0.000
Located in risky regions
indicator that a farm is located in a region 
where the probability of a worst-case 
outbreak is between 10.8%-16.7%
-0.582 0.068 73.1 0.000
Speed of detection of 
new cases
mean number of  new cases detected 
during  a day -10.444 0.123 7267.6 0.000
Contacts
standardized square root of the sum of 
weighted contacts within the farm type 
during 30 days before suspicion 
-0.270 0.024 124.3 0.000
Figure 40. The relationship between 
the predicted and simulated probability 
of a worst-case outbreak, when 
predictors related to the primary 
infected farm and the speed of detection 
of new cases are used in prediction.
The dashed line indicates the average 
probability of a worst-case outbreak 
in the simulations. The number of iter- 
ations was 67 522. Sporadic outbreaks 
were excluded in the analysis, because 
the speed of detection of new FMD 
cases after the first case would in this 
case always be zero. 
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Table 46. Effects of the speed of detection of new cases, production type, number of contacts 
and location of the primary infected farm on the probability of a worst-case outbreak.
Parameters 
Farm type of primary 
infected farm
Farm type of primary 
infected farm
Dairy Other Dairy Other
Speed of detection of new cases 0.5 new cases/day 0.8 new cases/day
Vaasa PVO district P(worst) P(worst) P(worst) P(worst)
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.04 0.02 0.47 0.33
weighted contacts mean 0.05 0.03 0.54 0.39
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.06 0.04 0.60 0.46
Other parts of the country
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.04 0.02 0.51 0.37
weighted contacts mean 0.06 0.03 0.58 0.44
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.07 0.04 0.65 0.50
Most risky regions
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.09 0.05 0.70 0.57
weighted contacts mean 0.12 0.07 0.76 0.63
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.15 0.09 0.80 0.69
Risky regions
weighted contacts -1 SD 0.08 0.04 0.65 0.51
weighted contacts mean 0.10 0.06 0.71 0.58
weighted contacts +1 SD 0.12 0.07 0.77 0.64
The speed of detection of new cases appeared to have a large influence on the 
predictive value: an increase from 0.5 to 0.8 new cases per day increased the proba-
bility of the worst-case scenario by over ten-fold. The probability of the worst-case 
scenario was additionally increased by being a dairy farm and located in a risky 
region, and contacts had an important effect on this probability (Table 46).
Disease spread and other events in the "worst-case" scenario
Typically, the 18th infected farm was observed within 38 days after the introduction 
of the FMD virus, but the variation in the detection time was large. In the worst-case 
outbreaks, a large proportion of farms (on average, slightly more than half) had 
already been infected before the first detection (Figure 41). The latest infections 
were found to take place within the first two months after the first detection of 
FMD, but usually within 1-1.5 months. The average size of epidemics without vacci-
nation should be a little less than 30 farms (18–52, 90% range). In addition, nearly 
150 farms would be within protection zones (50–300, 90% range). The number of 
premises and animals in surveillance zones would be about five times more than in 
protection zones.
A simulated outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease has three stages. Before the first 
detection of FMD, the infection rises exponentially, after the first detection the spread 
of the disease slows down slightly, and two weeks later most of the spread has already 
occurred and further spread is slow (Figure 41).
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The proportion of infected farms under restrictive measures grows very quickly 
after the initial detection, and the speed of new detections will exceed the speed of 
spread soon after the first detection of FMD. The speed of detected infected farms is 
slower than the speed of infected farms under the restrictive measures (Figure 42). 
The speed of detection will depend on inspections of the contact premises and the 
protection zones, and could require large resources to be carried out within a week, 
as suggested in the EU directive. The speed of detection of FMD cases will exceed the 
speed of spread within a week after the first detection (Figure 42).
Usually, in worst-case outbreaks, there would on average be slightly less than one 
new case per day (expected value = 0.82) for a period of 35 days. This would mean 
that a new infected farm would be found almost every day after the first positive 
diagnosis. There would also be approximately 3–4 new uninfected farms in protection 
zones that need to be inspected, and 14–16 new farms in surveillance zones. In 
addition, there would be 10–11 traced contact farms. This information can be used 
to scale the contingency plan so that adequate resources are available in all cases.
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Figure 41. Proportion of the final number of farms a) infected, b) detected, c) under restrictive
measures and d) initially cleaned as a function of time from the first infection in the country. 
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Figure 42. The speed of spread of infections (solid line) compared against speed of detections (dashed 
line) on the left and against the speed of restrictive measures on infected farms (dashed line) on the 
right. Gray lines indicate the time of first detection.
Vaccination scenarios
It is assumed in the calculations that vaccination would be performed in every zone, 
regardless of the phase of administrative operations within the zone. Four scenarios 
were assessed:
1. Suppressive vaccination in protection zones, applying the threshold defined by 
the expert panel;
2. Suppressive vaccination in protection zones at the earliest possible stage, if 
Finland was the first country in Europe to be infected;
3. Suppressive vaccination in protection zones as early as possible, when the 
disease occurs at the same time in some other parts of Europe;
4. Protective vaccination in the protection or the protection and surveillance zones 
of the epidemic.
1. Suppressive vaccination in protection zones applying the threshold defined 
by the expert panel
The expert panel defined that vaccination would be started when there would be at 
least 18 infected farms in the country. During a real outbreak, only a proportion of 
the infected farms are known, and thus the vaccination decision should be made on 
the basis of this “incomplete” information. On day 38 (when the 18th infected farm 
should have been observed in the worst-case scenario), 90% of the farms that would 
acquire the infection without vaccination would already be infected (Figure 41). If 
vaccination would take two weeks, 95% of the final size of the epidemic would have 
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been reached even before the start of vaccination. Using standard vaccines (Wool-
house 2003), a full protective effect would require 10 days. Suppressive vaccination 
in protection zones would bring a total of nearly 180 culled farms (29 infected/culled 
and 150 suppressive vaccinated/culled). It is highly unlikely that any outbreak would 
be prevented if the vaccination was performed at that time.
From an economic perspective, this option is also not rational. The costs of vaccinating 
150 farms and culling nearly 180 farms, and the production losses due to the reduced 
animal stock would clearly exceed the potential savings from the reduced duration 
and size of an outbreak. As it takes time to vaccinate animals and for the vaccine 
to have a full protective effect, it is highly unlikely that there would be even minor 
benefits from vaccination.
2. Suppressive vaccination in protection zones at the earliest possible stage, if 
Finland was the first infected country in Europe 
According to the expert group, the vaccinations could begin no earlier than two weeks 
after the first detection. At that time, nearly 90% of the farms that will become 
infected will already have been infected (Figure 41). Infected farms are found after 
a time lag, so only 60% of the infected premises would have been identified at that 
time (Figure 41). Due to restrictive regulations, however, more than 70% of infected 
premises would already be under restrictive measures, and thus most of the infectivity 
and contacts would be prevented. Thus, at the time of starting the vaccinations, there 
10% of farms would be uninfected. If the targeting of vaccination was perfect (full 
protection of vaccine is assumed to be 80%), only 8% of the final number of infected 
farms could be protected by vaccination, without any time lags for the protective 
effect. Unfortunately, this seems unlikely, because only 39.1% of infected farms are 
captured by protection zones in the worst-case scenarios. This means that 60% of 
the farms that should be vaccinated are not captured by suppressive vaccination of 
protection zones. If this is taken into account, only 2-3% of outbreaks will be 
protected by suppressive vaccination of all protection zones.  This actually means that 
on average there could be 0.5–0.6 protected farms (at most 3) due to vaccination, 
because the average number without vaccination was 29 farms (maximum 134).
A vaccination campaign would last 2–3 weeks, and full protection with available 
vaccines would require a 10 further days. Full protection would be achieved a month 
after the initiation of vaccination (Figure 43). At this time there would be no further 
spread, even without the vaccination, but some protection would be gained during 
the vaccination campaign. Thus, the protective effect would probably only be half of 
the anticipated number of 0.5-0.6 protected farms, meaning that a realistic range of 
expectations would be 0.2-0.3 farms. When this is compared to the total number of 
culled farms (29 culled farms without vaccination / 177 culled farms with vaccination), 
it indicates that vaccination increases the number of culled farms considerably. 
Typically, the number of culled animals with vaccination would be more than four to 
six times higher under a suppressive vaccination policy than when it is not applied 
(Figure 44).
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Figure 43. Theoretical efficiency 
of protecting a population against 
FMD spread in a susceptible 
population that has been 
vaccinated within two weeks 
after the vaccination decision. 
The protective efficiency of vacci-
nation is assumed to be 80%. A full 
protective effect on a vaccinated 
farm is assumed to be achieved 
10 days after vaccination.
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Figure 44. The distribution of the ratio of culled farms with suppressive vaccination to culled farms 
without vaccination in scenario 2. 
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From an economic point of view, it is likely that this option would not be a rational 
choice. Less than 10% of iterations in the worst-case scenario had the potential for 
cost savings if vaccinations would be started two weeks after the first detection, 
carried out in one day, and if full (80%) protection would be obtained on the day 
after vaccination. However, as noted above, it takes time to carry out vaccinations. 
If vaccinations were started two weeks after the first detection and the campaign 
would take two weeks, less than 1% of iterations in the worst-case scenario would 
have the possibility of generating savings worth on average €3.6 million. If a further 
ten days is required to reach a protective effect, it would be only 0.1% of iterations in 
the worst-case scenario (i.e. 5 iterations out of 100 000). In each step, the scenarios 
with the potential for savings were larger than average in terms of the number of 
infected farms and longer in duration. Hence, the potential benefits are due to cases 
where vaccination is able to reduce the duration of trade distortions. However, this 
effect is obtained by assuming that vaccinated herds can be culled with no delays 
and that vaccination does not increase administrative effort that would prolong trade 
distortions.
3. Suppressive vaccination in protection zones, as early as possible, when the 
disease occurs simultaneously in some other parts of Europe
In this scenario, the vaccine would be available a week earlier than in scenario 2, 
since the vaccine production could have started before the disease is even detected 
in Finland. Only 70% of the infected farms that would become infected without the 
vaccination are already infected at the time the vaccination is started, but most of 
these farms are already under restrictive measures. Using the same assumptions 
as in scenario 2, the expected values for farms whose outbreak would have been 
prevented would be 3 times higher. This means that at most the expected benefit 
from a vaccination campaign could be a couple of farms, if the outbreak would reach 
about 100 farms without vaccination, which is a highly unlikely scenario. Typically, 
the number of prevented outbreaks would be approximately one. The total benefit 
of vaccination would be the sum of all farms that would not become infected due 
to vaccination and the farms that would be in their protection zones. In general, this 
scenario will more probably lead to a larger proportion of animals being culled than 
when the policy is not applied.
From an economic perspective, this scenario behaves similarly to the previous one, 
except that vaccination takes place a week earlier than in the previous scenario. Here, 
the median and the mean return on the vaccination decision is also negative. Hence, 
in most cases it is not profitable to implement this vaccination policy.
If vaccination would be started within a week after the first detected case, the 
campaign would take two weeks and further ten days would be required to reach 
a protective effect, then only 0.4% of iterations would have the potential for cost 
savings. Epidemics in iterations that had the potential for savings were larger than 
the average epidemic, when the epidemic size is measured in terms of the number 
of infected farms and its duration.
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4. Protective vaccination in the protection or the protection and surveillance 
zones of the epidemic
If protective vaccination is timed as in scenarios 2 or 3, vaccination seems to have only 
a small preventive effect. If protective vaccination is applied similarly as in scenario 1, 
it would not prevent any further spread of FMD.
Larger areas would require more resources for vaccination, which makes it practically 
more difficult to perform. If the vaccination would cover a wider area, i.e. around 
each infected detected farm, all farms within a 10 km radius would be vaccinated, 
the number of vaccinated farms would be about six times higher than that in the sup-
pressive vaccination scenarios. The preventive effect could be larger than the effect 
of suppressive vaccinations if vaccination is carried out over a larger area, as 69.3% 
of infected farms are captured by protection and surveillance zones together during 
a worst-case outbreak. In addition, the buffer zone surrounding the vaccination area 
would also increase even further the number of farms affected by protective vacci-
nation.
The economic justification for protective vaccination is dependent on the impacts of 
the decision to vaccinate on foreign trade in livestock products. According to the OIE 
regulations (OIE 2007), protective vaccination increases the duration of the trade ban 
by three months. It would take six months after the rendering of the last infected 
animal in the country for Finland to be able to regain a disease-free status. In addition, 
the vaccinated area should be shown to be FMD-free by extensive surveillance of 
vaccinated animals. This vaccination policy would increase trade losses considerably. 
Assuming that other countries would accept products originating from vaccinated 
animals in their markets, and that third countries would follow OIE regulations, this 
would imply approximately €33 million in additional losses due to prolonged trade 
distortions. Moreover, consumers would be unable to gain further significant monthly 
benefits from falling food prices, as the markets would already be saturated.
In the worst-case scenario, the losses that are incurred after the day of the first 
detection of FMD in Finland exceeded €33 million in only 0.6% of iterations (Figure 
45). On day 34 (day 38) after the introduction of FMD into Finland, only 0.3% (0.2%) 
of iterations in the worst-case scenario are expected to incur further losses worth €33 
million or more. Hence, when the decision to vaccinate is taken along the lines of 
scenarios 2 and 3 above, and trading partners follow OIE regulations, the increased 
trade losses only are sufficient to rule out protective vaccination as a disease control 
measure. In addition to this, the direct cost of vaccination would be quite high, up to 
€16 million, because the number of vaccinated animals could be large.
If potential savings in direct costs only are taken into account, the median observation 
in the worst-case outbreak will incur €4.2 million in additional direct costs after the 
detection of the first case. In 95% of iterations, this potential for savings in directs 
costs falls below €13.4 million. On day 35 after the first infection, the respective 
values are €1.4 and €8.0 million. Because the direct cost of vaccination could easily 
be more than €10 million, protective vaccination in practice would not reduce losses 
caused by an FMD outbreak in Finland.
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Figure 45. Histogram of losses (€ million) that will be accumulated after the first detection in the worst-
case outbreaks.
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Figure 46. The effects of infectivity on the mean epidemic size (number of farms).
Standard indicates the result when the infectivity of contacts in Table 21 was applied, while for other 
points infectivity was either increased or reduced by 50%. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence 
interval of the mean. Each point represents the mean results from 10 000 iterations. 
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In this sensitivity analysis, the infectivity of contacts was manipulated. The mean 
epidemic size achieved by non-manipulated infectivity of contacts was compared 
with the mean epidemic size achieved when the infectivity of contacts was either 
reduced or increased by 50%.
If the infectivity of all contact types is reduced by 50%, this would lead to a similar 
reduction in the mean epidemic size. Conversely, if infectivity is increased by a similar 
magnitude, the increase in the mean epidemic size is even slightly higher (Figure 
46).  Because the outcome is defined by the infectivity of contacts, the number of 
unique contacts and the length of the infective period, similar relative changes in the 
number of unique contacts or length of infective period would lead to equal-sized 
changes in outcomes.
Importance of tracing and zones
This sensitivity analysis was performed by examining the relationship between 
different-sized epidemics at the time of first detection with the final size when 
different combinations of measures have been implemented after the first detection. 
There were two separate simulations, which both used the same iterations until the 
first detection, meaning that the results were same before performing the simulation 
of alternative combinations of official measures. Two alternative sets of administrative 
efforts were examined:
1. Official measures as defined in EU legislation, after first positive diagnosis: tracing 
of contacts, surveillance and protection zones are applied, restrictive measures 
are implemented on all farms in zones and traced by contacts. Culling of animals 
and initial cleaning of infected farms are performed after the positive diagnosis.
2. Official measures as defined by EU legislation except that restrictive zones are 
not established and contact tracing is not carried out
Official measures as in EU legislation
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Figure 47. The relationship 
between epidemic size at the 
time of first detection with 
the final epidemic size when 
normal EU measures are 
implemented.
The points represent the 
iterations. The solidline 
indicates the least square 
fit of the power function, 
dotted lines indicate the 
95% confidence interval 
of prediction. The power 
function (y = final epidemic 
size, X = Epidemic size at the 
time of first detection) and 
coefficient of determination 
(R2) are given in the figure. 
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No tracing or restrictive zones
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Figure 48. The relationship 
between epidemic size at the 
time of first detection and the 
final epidemic size when the 
tracing of contacts and zones 
are not implemented.
The solid line indicates the 
least square fit of the power-
function, and dotted lines 
indicate the 95% confidence 
interval of the prediction. 
The power function (y = Final 
epidemic size,  X = Epide-
mic size at the time of first 
detection) and coefficient of 
determination (R2) are gi-
ven in the figure. The scale is 
different from that in Figure 
47.
Without tracing and restrictive zones, the final epidemic size is larger than when 
applying these measures, as can be seen in Figures 47 and 48. The relationship bet-
ween the epidemic size at the time of first detection and at the end becomes less 
predictable when no tracing or zoning is applied in administration, as the coefficient 
of determination is smaller without the tracing and restrictive zones than when EU 
measures have been applied.
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Figure 49. The implication 
of a delay in culling for the 
mean epidemic size.
Solid line = no additional 
delay, dashed line = 0–7-day 
delay after 10 positive diag-
noses, dotted line = 0–7-day 
delay after 5 positive 
diagnoses. Simulations until 
first detection are the same in 
each set of 10 000 iterations. 
Lines indicate the least square 
fits for the data.
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In this sensitivity analysis, the basic result is compared with the situation where the 
culling of animals of infected farms is delayed by 0–7 days. This delay may occur if 
administrative resources are exhausted or either diagnoses, culling or both are 
delayed. In addition, with the baseline option (without the delay), two alternative 
scenarios were simulated: culling was delayed until after either 5 or 10 farms had 
already been detected as FMD-positive. The mean epidemic sizes of the scenarios 
were then compared. Because the events before first detection are unaffected by the 
scenarios, each scenario was simulated by using the same simulated set until the first 
detection in the country.
It appeared that an additional 0–7-day delay in culling only slightly influenced the 
final epidemic size. The impact was greater if there were more infected farms at the 
time of first detection (Figure 49), or if the time lag appeared in early stage of the 
eradication campaign.
Economic simulations
Sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to selected economic variables. A 
10% increase in direct costs increased the total loss by 0.2% (5th percentile) to 1.2% 
(95th percentile). The impact was this small because direct costs represented only a 
part of the total loss. If exports were not halted at all, the total loss would have been 
close to the estimated direct loss, although not exactly the same, as there would still 
have been market effects. In contrast to this, a 10% increase in the pig sector’s market 
losses increased the total loss by approximately by 4%, and a 10% increase in the 
cattle sector’s market losses increased the total loss by approximately by 5% (Table 
47). This also shows that the pig sector contributed relatively more to the total loss 
when considering its size relative to the dairy sector’s size. Moreover, if price elasticity 
estimates were increased, the losses were decreased, as more price-elastic demand 
would have reduced the effects of trade distortions.
<5% Median Mean <95%  
Basic simulations -22.6 -24.2 -25.8 -34.3
Direct costs +10% -22.6 -24.3 -26.0 -34.9
Pig sector market losses +10% -23.6 -25.3 -26.9 -35.6
Cattle sector market losses +10% -23.8 -25.5 -27.1 -35.9
No trade distortions -0.2 -0.7 -1.6 -6.1
Table 47. Societal losses (€ million) simulated for a typical scenario with and without a 10% change 
in direct costs, a 10% change in market losses and the existence of trade distortions
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8 Discussion
Predicted epidemic size is small
The potential for FMD spread in Finland is low. The results indicated that more than 
one-third of the outbreaks in Finland would be sporadic FMD outbreaks that would 
not cause further spread. These sporadic outbreaks would on average last 3.5 weeks 
until the farm was disinfected and the restrictive measures were lifted. The most 
typical outcome occurred in more than 60% of the iterations and resulted in an 
outbreak that would include an average of 5 infected farms and have a duration of 
approximately 5 weeks. Even in the worst case, the outbreak lasted only 10 weeks 
(77+ days) and included 29 infected farms (Table 34). No escalated outbreak that 
would be out of control was achieved in 100 000 iterations.
Compared to the FMD epidemics occurring worldwide during 1992-2003, which included 
up to 100 infected premises (median <20), and especially the large epidemics in the 
UK in 2001, even the simulated worst-case scenario in Finland seemed to be rather 
reasonable in size (McLaws & Ribble 2007). The reasons for the large 2001 epidemic 
in the UK, which lasted for about 225 days and included more than 2000 infected 
farms, is partly described as being contributed to by late detection, a high livestock 
density, frequent animal movements and insufficient control measures (McLaws & 
Ribble 2007). The livestock density, number of farms and animals and the animal 
movements in Finland differ considerably from the circumstances in the UK. The 
livestock density is smaller and animal markets are not used for animal trading, both 
of which reduce the possibility of disease transmission in Finland. Sheep production in 
Finland is 1/300 of that in the UK. All these factors together resulted in the epidemics 
appearing to be more easily controlled in our simulations than in the UK outbreak in 
2001.
Official measures are effective
Our results indicated that the mandatory EU policy would be able to prevent and 
slow-down the spread of FMD in all cases. Official measures of EU legislation seemed 
to be effective. Even without tracing and zoning, an FMD outbreak would eventually 
die out, given that infected farms are put under restrictive measures, animals are 
culled and farms are cleaned according to the EU directive. Sensitivity analysis 
fortified this view: the largest epidemics would remain under control even if part of 
the EU measures were not carried out as planned. Sensitivity analysis also indicated 
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that even if our registries or basic assumptions of valid key parameters were 
to deviate from the ones applied in the simulations, these deviations would not 
negatively affect the above conclusions. Finnish farm density is low compared to 
several other European countries, farm sizes are clearly smaller, animal transfers 
between farms are controlled by large meat houses and there are no animal 
markets, which all contributed to a low ability of FMD to spread in the simulations. An 
important factor may also be that in addition to the generally low farm density, farms 
are clustered in small groups that are separated by forests and lakes. The results are 
also partially due to the model choice, which will be discussed later.
The endpoint in the epidemiological simulation was the initial cleansing and 
disinfection of the last infected farm in the country. The tracing of contact farms and 
other administrative work, as well as effects on the trade of cattle and pig products, 
will last much longer.
Trade effects determine economic losses
While epidemiological simulations are focused on the course of an outbreak, economic 
analysis mainly focuses on the consequences. Economic results emphasize the role 
of consequential losses, as major economic impacts were due to trade distortions 
rather than the culling and disinfection of infected farms. Consequential losses to 
uninfected farms under restrictions also play an important role, because the number 
of these farms can be large. This is particularly true when protective vaccination 
is being examined. However, the number of infected farms should not be ignored, 
because several factors such as outbreak duration and the number of uninfected 
farms under restrictive measures are strongly correlated with the number of infected 
farms.
One of the factors underlining the importance of consequential effects is that these 
effects can impact on a large number of economic agents. Even a small loss (benefit) 
per individual agent can contribute a substantial amount of losses (gains). For instance, 
in protective vaccination, the direct costs of vaccination can exceed €16 million, even 
if the cost per individual animal is less than €10. On the other hand, in the event of 
effects on consumers, an impact of less than €20 per consumer can contribute over 
€100 million in aggregate gains to Finnish consumers. The aspect of a potentially 
small change affecting large volumes is also relevant in the event of trade distortions 
that affect the entire Finnish production.
A further factor that deserves attention is the role of time. Outbreak duration is 
particularly important when aiming at reducing losses due to trade distortions and 
business interruption losses to farms under restrictive measures. Hence, even if rapid 
eradication of FMD was not important in reducing the number of infected farms, it 
would be important in reducing trade losses and consequential losses to individual 
farms. The results regarding the role of trade distortions are in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Schoenbaum & Disney 2003), whereas the importance of outbreak 
duration has traditionally been given less attention.
One situation that could increase the duration of an outbreak is the case where 
resources available to combat the disease are insufficient. Even if the lack of resour-
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ces did not increase the number of infected farms, time-related costs would already 
increase the costs by almost €1.5 million per additional week. However, epidemiological 
simulations (Figure 49) indicate that an additional delay of 0 to 7 days in diagnosis 
would slightly influence the final epidemic size. In the worst-case scenario, a delay of 
one week in diagnosis could increase losses by approximately €3 million.
Our results suggest that an FMD outbreak would typically result in losses that are 
below €35 million. However, consumers could benefit and producers loose almost 
€100 million. For instance, the magnitude of our simulated losses in the dairy sector 
is similar to the impacts of the global dairy market crisis in 2008, which reduced the 
producer price of milk by over 20%. Because an outbreak occurs unexpectedly, it 
increases the need to acquire additional funding for the livestock industry. The situa-
tion is likely to be most severe in farms that have recently invested and in farms that 
have a low profitability and cannot tolerate unexpected reductions in their revenues. 
Such economic problems in the industry can last for several years and reduce invest-
ments in the industry in the years following an outbreak. Similar problems have been 
observed after a contagious animal disease outbreak, for instance in the Netherlands 
(Saatkamp & Bruijnen 2009) and the UK (Franks et al. 2002). Hence, one of the most 
important issues for public policy and individual stakeholders is to be prepared for 
financial problems following an outbreak. Preventive measures could include reduc-
tion of the risk of disease introduction and providing farms with funding alternatives 
in an epidemic situation.
Spatial differences in epidemic size and their consequences
There were no clear differences in the number of infected farms between PVO 
districts. In addition, it seemed to be possible that the worst-case scenario could start 
in any Finnish PVO district. However, there appeared to be large differences in how 
many non-infected farms would undergo administrative restrictions. Obviously, the 
most densely populated parts of the country would produce the largest number of 
uninfected farms within protection and surveillance zones. In less densely populated 
parts there tended to be slightly more traced, uninfected contact farms outside the 
zones, which is natural, as there were fewer zones, fewer farms in the zones and the 
contact structure between farms was sparser. Consequently, tracing is relatively more 
important in sparsely populated areas, while protection and surveillance zones are 
more important in densely populated areas.
The administrative effort per infected farm tended to decrease as the epidemic size 
increased. This is a consequence of several issues. Contacts tend to be correlated, as 
different infected farms partly share the same contact farms. In addition, the restric-
tion zones of different infected farms may overlap and farms may be located in more 
than one restriction zone. This is especially true in the most densely populated parts 
of the country. Sharing of the same contact farms reduces the administrative costs 
per infected farm, but causes the highest administrative costs per infected farm in a 
sporadic case.
The production sector of the primary infected farm partly defined which types of 
farms would subsequently become infected. An epidemic outbreak in the cattle 
sector would probably remain within the cattle sector. However, if the epidemic 
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outbreak started within the pig sector, it might spread to the cattle sector, but most 
of the infected farms would typically be pig farms. The consequences for uninfected 
farms were also dependent on the production type of primary infected farm. In an 
outbreak starting in the cattle sector, most of the uninfected farms involved were 
cattle farms. In an outbreak starting in the pig sector, however, a higher proportion 
of uninfected cattle farms would be placed in restriction zones than vice versa. These 
dependencies will influence the economic consequences and administrative efforts 
of an outbreak, as tracing and culling, for instance, require different resources in the 
pig and cattle sectors.
There was variation in whether an outbreak would remain in the same PVO district 
where it started or spread to another district. Naturally, the probability of remaining 
within one PVO district decreases with increasing epidemic size in all PVO districts, 
except Turku. Outbreaks would most probably remain within Turku and Vaasa districts, 
which have the highest farm densities. One factor explaining the results could be that 
supplemental animals can more often be delivered and received from local resources 
in these regions, while in the parts of the country with a sparse animal population 
available local resources can be limited. In addition, both regions have large slaughter- 
houses, and it seems apparent that those parts of the country lacking a large slaugh-
terhouse are connected with the districts that have them. In the most animal-sparse 
parts of the country, the probability of an outbreak remaining in the initial PVO district 
seemed to be low, which offers further support for this hypothesis.
Within PVO districts there appears to be large variation in the ability of the disease to 
further spread. It is possible for a worst-case outbreak to start from some farms in any 
PVO district. Knowing the PVO district adds only a little in predicting the probability 
of a worst-case scenario. On the contrary, knowledge of whether a farm is located 
in a municipality where worst-case scenario is more probable than usual had much 
greater predictive power. Therefore, for instance, the PVO district of Oulu, which 
generally has a low farm density, can produce large epidemics in some southern parts 
of the district, where the farm density is as high as in Vaasa district.
Veterinary resources during an outbreak
One issue in contingency planning is how many farms a veterinarian can inspect 
without posing the risk of spreading the disease. The least risky option would be that 
a veterinarian inspects only one farm. An upper limit to avoid the possible spread of 
disease is that when a veterinarian has inspected a farm with FMD, he or she does 
not continue to another farm for inspection until an adequate time has passed from 
the inspection of the farm with clinical signs of FMD. We estimated how many farms 
one veterinarian can in a worst-case scenario inspect before he would on average 
transmit the disease (Table 48).  Inspections of protection zones are more likely to 
identify a new FMD case than inspections in surveillance zones or on contact farms. It 
is more probable to find an infected farm in one inspection in a protection zone than 
in a surveillance zone or among traced contact farms. One reason is that the disease 
can spread by airborne and neighbourhood spread within a protection zone. Another 
reason is that there might be more contacts among farms located close to each other. 
Typically, one veterinarian can inspect six farms before a new FMD case is observed 
(Table 48). Inspection of one protection zone may require more than one veterinarian, 
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because the mean number of farms within a protection zone in Finland is eight. 
Inspections in surveillance zones and on traced contact farms are much less likely 
to result in a veterinarian detecting a new FMD case and not being able to continue 
inspections.
Table 48. Median number of infected farms that could be detected by contact tracing and zone 
inspections. Expected efficiency and the expected number of farms that could be inspected before 
one FMD-infected farm would be found in a worst-case scenario.
Operation
Expected 
number of 
infected 
farms
Expected 
number of 
uninfected 
farms
Upper 
limit of 
expected 
efficiency
Median number of 
farms inspected 
before a FMD case 
is found*
Inspection of protection zones 12 150 <10% 6
Inspection of surveillance zones 9 600-700 1.5% 45
Inspection of traced contact 
farms outside the zones 9 400 2% 34
*Estimated by a negative binomial distribution (r = 1, P = upper limit of expected efficiency)
Although the probability of finding a new FMD case during inspections on contact 
farms and farms in zones seems to be low, an outbreak would be much larger without 
these efforts. The inspections reduce the potential of spread especially in the worst-
case scenario. With these measures, an outbreak involving 18 infected farms at the 
time of first detection would produce an average of 30 infected farms. Without these 
measures, the expected value would be 140 infected farms, i.e. 4.66-fold. Epidemio-
logically, these measures limit the maximum size of an epidemic outbreak in Finland.
Prioritizing of inspections of farms during an outbreak
It could be reasonable to prioritize the order of inspection of farms after the detection 
of the primary infected farm. Prioritization should take into account the potential 
spread by a contact farm in order to prevent the further spread of disease as much 
as possible.
Farms inside the protection zone within a 3 km radius around an infected farm are 
considered potently affected by neighbourhood and airborne spread and comprise 
39.2% of infected farms in the worst-case scenario. These farms are, however, under 
restrictive measures and could only spread the disease further by airborne and neigh-
bourhood spread within the protection zone and nearby farms in surveillance zones. 
Pig farms should be prioritized over cattle farms, because they are more potent virus 
emitters.
Other farms that have been in direct or indirect contact with the primary infected 
farm within 21 days prior to the detection will also potentially be infected. Those 
contact farms that are outside the restrictive zones represent a large risk for further 
spread because their contacts are not under surveillance. Contact farms could be 
further prioritised according to the type of contact they have with the infected farm, 
and the operations of the contact farm. The largest risk of disease transmission 
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is firstly among farms that have received animals, secondly among farms that have 
had contact with the primary infected farm through animal transportation, and thirdly 
via milk tankers and AI technicians. These contact types and their contribution to 
the probability of a worst-case scenario are summarized in Appendix 1 and can also 
be used to prioritize the relative risk of contact farms receiving or delivering the 
disease. The contact farms may be further prioritised due to the risk of transmitting 
infection further. The most likely high risk farms are those that have received animals 
during the early phase of the infective period, as they have most probably been able 
to spread the disease further. One possible rule could be that those contact farms 
that are located in an area with several farms nearby should be inspected first, and 
that inspections should also concentrate on those farms that can be expected to 
bestrongly connected with other farms (such as dairy farms, sow farms and farms 
rearing weaned calves and piglets).
The lowest efficiency would be for inspections of farms in the surveillance zone, 
because these farms are already under restrictive measures. Farms that are situated 
in the outskirts of the surveillance zone should be prioritized over those farms in inner 
parts of the surveillance zone in order to avoid the spread of the disease outside the 
established surveillance zone.
Farm size can be used as a proxy or first indicator of a farm with strong connectivity. 
However, our previous studies have indicated that it is not a good predictor of risk 
(Lyytikäinen & Kallio 2008), as even a low potency spreader can spread the disease 
efficiently if it is connected with potentially high spreaders.  A better estimate could 
be achieved by performing an epidemiological inquiry on an infected farm. Part of 
the inquiry would define the risky contacts to and from the farm. In our prediction 
models of worst-case scenarios, the size of the primary infected farm was no longer 
a statistically significant predictor if its weighted contact number was known. This 
means that when the number of contacts is known, the size of the farm provides 
no additional information in the prediction of the final size of an outbreak. For the 
contact farm, similar estimates can be rapidly estimated, for instance by utilizing 
registry data on animal transportation, milk tanker routes and routes of the AI technician. 
This would provide a better estimate of the relative risk, as contact farms may 
contribute to the further spread of FMD. This would require the development of tools 
to rapidly extract relevant information from the registries and combine it to enable 
real-time risk classification.
Feasibility of vaccination
The results do not support emergency vaccination policies in Finland given that the 
criteria in Table 17 are applied. Emergency vaccination in a sporadic or typical outbreak 
was not considered as rational option to eradicate FMD in Finland due to the small 
size and short duration of the simulated epidemic. Vaccination would not prevent 
the further spread in a sporadic or typical outbreak. Similar conclusions can be 
drawn when recent European FMD epidemics are examined and compared with the 
production conditions in Finland.
A vaccination policy in a worst-case scenario required further elicitation to assess 
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whether in that special case it would generally be a feasible option during a FMD 
outbreak. As a general conclusion, vaccination would have only a small effect on the 
spread of the disease and therefore is not a rational policy to be applied in Finland, 
even in worst-case outbreaks.
A suppressive vaccination campaign was generally not a rational policy to prevent the 
spread of FMD in Finland, either. Because a worst-case scenario is difficult to predict, 
even from simulation results, such a case is also unlikely to be correctly detected in 
the actual policy choice situation. Based on our results, suppressive vaccination would 
probably be an excessive measure, as a mild outbreak would die out due to the 
eradication measures. More animals would be culled than without the suppressive 
vaccination. Protective vaccination could be less damaging for the animal stock than 
suppressive vaccination. However, the benefits of protective vaccination did not 
justify the effort, as the vaccination campaign itself is costly, it is unlikely to reduce 
the number of infections, and most of all, vaccination could severely distort the 
Finnish export of beef, pig meat and dairy products.
Vaccination strategies for FMD have been assessed on several occasions using simulation 
models. For instance, during the UK epidemic in 2001, the conclusions according to 
every model were that the time for successful vaccination had already passed (Kao 
2002). Similarly, in the Netherlands, a study by Velthuis and Mourits (2007) revealed 
little validity in applying emergency vaccination as the sole additional eradication 
measure at farm densities that are far above the highest farm densities in Finland. 
Boender et al. (2010) have estimated that the minimum EU measures are adequate 
up to densities of 5.9 to 6.0 farms per km2, which is four times higher than the 
highest farm density in a 3 km radius kernel in Finland. Vaccination strategies have 
also been investigated in a number of other countries, and several of them have 
failed to show a clear benefit from a suppressive emergency vaccination campaign 
during an FMD outbreak, if the criteria set in this study are applied. Keeling and Rohani 
(2008) examined what would be the lowest limit for a vaccination campaign in the 
UK by comparing it with the number of culled animals achieved by a contiguous 
culling strategy. They predicted that if epidemic outbreak remained at 200 farms 
with culled animals, there would be more damage than benefits from applying a 
vaccination strategy. Similar results have also been obtained in other studies. Ward 
et al. (2009) investigated FMD control policies using the AuSpread model (Garner & 
Beckett 2005) in Texas and showed very little impact on controlling the outbreak by 
vacci-nation or surveillance actions. A limited reduction in the epidemic size by ring 
vaccination was also estimated in the Republic of Korea, where ring vaccination in a 
radius of up to 3 km around infected premises typically produced 309 de-populated 
farms and reduced the number of infected farms from 15 to 14 (Yoon et al. 2006).
Emergency vaccination is not an economically viable option
Our results suggest that emergency vaccination is not an economically viable option 
to control an FMD outbreak in Finland. In principle, protective or suppressive vacci-
nation could be able to reduce the total costs of an outbreak if it was particularly 
large and long-lasting under a no-vaccination policy, but not with vaccination policy. 
However, given the time delay required to reach the full protective effect of vacci-
nation and the minuscule probability of a pareto-optimal  outcome, the value of the 
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option to vaccinate is small. Suppressive vaccination is generally not able to reduce 
the costs.
A number of factors reduce the profitability of emergency vaccination in Finland. 
Probably the most important factor is that the simulated outbreaks were quite small 
and short-lived, even without emergency vaccination. Another important factor is 
that there is a time delay between the decision to vaccinate and the time when 
a maximal protective effect is expected to be reached. Protective vaccination is 
ruled out by reduced access to export markets, because according to OIE regulations, 
trade distortions are prolonged by three months after protective vaccination has been 
applied. Moreover, vaccinating a large number of animals in a protective vaccination 
campaign incurs substantial costs. Suppressive vaccination can substantially increase 
the number of culled animals and thus increase the direct costs of vaccination. Moreover, 
information about the true cost of risk is uncertain and signals about the risk can be 
mixed. Hence, decision makers are poorly informed about the true state of affairs 
when the decision to vaccinate is to be made. The level of confidence that experts 
were requiring from a positive vaccination decision to take place could not be reached. 
The simulations show that the accuracy of prediction of epidemic costs increases 
approximately two weeks after the first detection. However, the value of information 
about the number of detected farms starts decreasing soon after this point.
A rapid vaccination decision is problematic
The rapid initiation of a vaccination campaign is crucial for its success, and it is 
demonstrated in scenarios 1, 2 and 3 (see section on vaccination scenarios). In these 
scenarios, the earlier vaccination campaign resulted in a better outcome than the 
later one. Similar observations have earlier been noted by Schoenbaum and Disney 
(2003). A rapid decision would require the ability to identify the worst outbreaks 
early in the epidemic. This is naturally a difficult task, because available information 
lags behind reality and decisions must be made with only partial information.
It would be very convenient to find a way to be able to predict the size of an 
epidemic directly at the time of detection of the first infection. In order to do so, the 
possibility to predict the size of an emerging epidemic was tested on the basis of the 
characteristics of a primary infected farm. This only gave an indication of the possible 
outcome, and the highest predicted probabilities were approximately 10 times higher 
than the general probability of worst-case scenarios (5.5%). A more reliable prediction 
was achieved if the incidence of new infected, detected farms could be used. The 
problem is that at the time the incidence is known, it is too late to make a decision 
to vaccinate.
Validity of risk assessment
Potential biases of data sources
In some cases, such as dairy logistics and the identification of dairy farms, different 
data sources were combined in order to improve the quality and coverage of the 
database. Similarly, information regarding the number of animals was combined 
from two separate sources:  one was the information collected in connection with EU 
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subsidy applications and the other was the monthly notifications of the number 
of animals. This type of combination improves the reliability of data (Wallgren & 
Wallgren 2007), but also increases the effort required in data handling.
One problem with the registries is that they are often planned for some specific use, 
and thus classifications, definitions and information are solely planned for a specific 
task. This can be seen in incompatible specifications, which makes it difficult to 
combine information from several sources and in some cases may lead to the loss 
of information. Registries should be planned in such a manner that they are easy to 
combine and the information in separate registries should be compatible.
One example of the importance of definitions concerns the number of farms in the 
country. The farm number in our model is higher than that in the official statistics. This 
is because the official statistics are comprise of farms that have applied for subsidies 
and informed the number of animals on the farm on 1 May 2006. In addition, there 
may be farms that ceased to operate before or started operating after that date, 
and which are not therefore included in the official statistics, even though they still 
operated in 2006.
The identification of farms is one problem confronted in risk assessment. Official 
registries apply farm identification numbers, but part of the information is divided 
among the production units of the farm, which have separate EU identification 
numbers. In contrast to official registries, other operators (such as meat companies 
and dairies) do not use the same identification codes but instead use their own 
customer databases and coding, which makes it difficult to combine information 
reliably and rapidly.
The reliability of questionnaires is also sometimes questioned. In our comparisons, the 
results from questionnaires corresponded well with the registry data. The response 
rates were high for both the pig and cattle farm questionnaires, and the veterinary 
questionnaire was consistent with the frequency estimates of both farmer-related 
questionnaires (Sahlström et al. 2009).
Sensitivity of the results to assumptions
The biosecurity aspect has not been considered as a separate factor in the simula-
tion. By using transmission probabilities adopted from the outbreaks in the Nether-
lands and the UK, it is simultaneously assumed that the overall level of biosecurity in 
Finland is equal to that these countries. If the Finnish biosecurity level is higher than 
it was in the UK and the Netherlands during the 2001 outbreak, it would reduce 
the size of the epidemic and the probability of a worst-case outbreak. In that case, 
vaccination would be even less justified. Boklund (2008) estimated that Danish SPF-
free farms are 25% less susceptible to diseases than other farms resulting from direct 
animal contacts and people visiting the farm. These contact types comprise only part 
of the infection pressure of FMD, and the upper limit of the biosecurity effect on the 
infectivity of a farm up to the SPF level is therefore probably less than 25% in those 
iterations where some of the involved farms would have a better than usual bio-
security level. The Finnish pig farm sector has a class in which a higher biosecurity 
level is required. In 2006, less than 10% of Finnish pig farms belonged to this class. 
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On the contrary, in the cattle sector there is no clear definition of a higher biosecurity 
class in the country, although the level varies between farms. Together, these facts 
lead to the conclusion that the extra biosecurity level was not practically relevant 
to the model in evaluating emergency vaccination strategies or estimating the final 
epidemic size in the country.
Sensitivity analysis indicated that should there be severe biases in key parameters, 
the out-of-control spread of FMD would still not occur in simulations. In addition, we 
showed that the EU minimum requirements were able to reduce the expected size 
of the worst-case scenario from 140 to 30 infected farms. The time lag, which would 
delay the culling of animals and initial cleaning of infected farms, had little influence 
on the outcome, but it was apparent that the earlier the delay occurs, the more it 
would influence the final epidemic size.
We applied point values to define the time required after the introduction of FMD 
virus for a farm to become suspected. By using a point-wise approach in our simulation, 
the first infected farm was always the first farm on which FMD was suspected and 
diagnosed. This is a simplification, as the events leading to suspicion are uncertain. In 
an earlier CSF risk assessment (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2005), we applied a distribution 
in defining the time to become suspected, and the FMD model is also capable of 
performing simulations in this way. However, sensitivity analysis indicated that if 
the average time to detection was altered by 50%, the corresponding spread would 
be either an approximately 50% increase or decrease depending on the direction of 
change in time to suspicion. Such random variation (+/- 50%) in the suspicion time 
of the farms would increase the variation in the outcomes, but would not alter the 
average outcome of simulation.
We assumed that tracing was always 100% effective. In some earlier FMD studies, 
slightly lower values (85–95%) have been applied (Ward et al. 2009). In our case, 
sensitivity analysis in which tracing and zoning was not applied resulted in a 4.66-
fold epidemic outbreak in the worst-case scenario. Because tracing was potentially 
important in shortening the infective period on approximately 30% of infected farms 
in the worst-case scenario, the expected effect of a lower tracing efficiency would be 
1/60 of a 4.66-fold increase (5% not traced, 30% traced farms not in zones), which 
corresponds to a 7% increase in the epidemic size in the worst-case scenario. The 
magnitude of this size can be considered insignificant.
In this study we did not apply all possible detection routes. For instance, inspections 
in slaughterhouses could in theory shorten the detection time in some instances. This 
would require that transporter of animals has already ignored or left unnoticed the 
clinical signs of the animals, or that the clinical signs appear during transportation. If 
the disease were already in the country, this would be quite a leakage in the system. 
On the other hand, the inclusion of this detection route would have to shorten the 
detection time more than the administrative routes that have been included (tracing 
/zoning) to be an effective component and to influence the expectation of the final 
epidemic size in a practically significant manner. This is not likely to be the case, as 
for instance in the risk assessment of classical swine fever these routes appeared 
generally insignificant, although the initial time to suspicion was far longer (Raulo & 
Lyytikäinen 2005).
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The importance of exclusions
Sheep and goats, as well as reindeer and moose, were excluded from this risk assess-
ment for different reasons: The populations of sheep (116 000) and goats (6600) are 
small in Finland compared to the production of pigs and cattle, as seen in Table 1. The 
mixing of sheep or goats with other production animals in Finland is also minor (see 
section “sheep and goats” above). This is also supported by the fact that 40% of the 
sheep in Finland are situated either in the northern parts (Rovaniemi PVO district), 
where the cattle and pig population is small, or in the Åland archipelago, which 
was not included in this risk assessment. The production of sheep meat is also often 
organised separately from other production animals; it is, for example, more common 
that sheep and goats are slaughtered in separate slaughterhouses than cattle and 
pigs. The transmission of FMD from sheep is not as likely as from pigs (e.g. Alexan-
dersen & Donaldson 2002; Velthuis & Mourits 2007). At the time of the collection of 
data (2006), there were no existing registries of sheep and goats in Finland.
Although sheep are not an important production sector in today’s Finland, the situation 
in the future may be different. A large amount of lamb meat is imported into the 
country every year, and the domestic demand for lamb meat has steadily increased. 
Lamb may also provide a means for long-distance jumps in disease spread, and it is 
therefore important to verify how common long-distance movements of this kind are, 
and how this can impact on the general risk of the cattle and pig production sectors.
There is a fairly large population of reindeer in Finland. This is, however, situated in 
only the northern part of Finland, in Rovaniemi PVO district, isolated from the areas 
having the main production animal population. This means that there are not natural 
frequent contacts between reindeer and cattle or pigs. Moose, on the other hand, are 
distributed all over the country, but the epidemiological information is scarce. Accor-
ding to serosurveillance by Elbers et al. (2003) after the FMD outbreak in the Nether-
lands in 2001, there was no evidence that FMD had been transmitted to roe deer or 
wild boar. Because of the way cattle and pigs are currently housed, contact with deer 
and wild boar is minimised. After the UK outbreak in 2001, 484 samples examined 
from deer (wild and farmed) were all negative. Elbers et al. (2003) concluded that it 
is very unlikely that deer or wild boar could infect cattle. The real epidemiological role 
of reindeer, moose and deer is difficult to assess, but their likelihood of transmitting 
disease to cattle and pigs is considered negligible in this risk assessment.
The applied model – was it suitable for the assessment?
Applied model was of a type previously referred to as a micromodel (Schley 2007). 
A micromodel attempts to mimic as many events and operations at the farm level as 
possible using Finnish information sources. Regarding the epidemiological parameters 
for FMD, we relied on European research efforts.
Because we applied registry information, the model is a spatio-temporal network 
model. This limits the spread, as contacts have a limited capacity to spread disease, 
and further spread also always requires further contacts that are positioned in the 
time and space of a network in a way that permits further escalation of the disease. 
A network may limit the magnitude of the worst-case scenario and should thus 
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provide more realistic worst-case estimates than if this is not taken in account. Recent 
results from network models in other studies are consistent with this view (see for 
instance Keeling 2005; Kao et al. 2006; Kiss et al. 2006; Smieszek et al. 2009; Natale 
et al. 2009).
Another similar phenomenon that follows naturally from applying registries in simu-
lation is that if there are repeated events, this is taken into account in simulation. 
This can be seen both in mean and worst-case outcomes. Differences are larger in 
worst-case scenarios (Lyytikäinen et al. 2008, 2009). In animal production, repeated 
contacts can be assumed to be quite common. For instance, a dairy tanker drives the 
same route to farms every second day for approximately 6 months. Close-by farms 
may form a production network where animals are only transported between some 
limited set of farms. For instance, nearly 20% of pig production was concentrated in 
different types of operational networks in Finland in 2009. There may also be other 
reasons for repeated contacts, such as geographic locations, logistics and operational 
reasons related to meat companies or persons visiting farms. The importance of 
repeated contacts to the outcome is greater if contacts are infrequent and the infec-
tivity of a contact is low (Smieszek et al. 2009).
One reason for limiting worst-case scenarios by applying registries is that production 
is to a large degree separated. For instance, some farms only keep animals for slaughter 
and never deliver them to other farms. Such farms operate as sinks and slower the 
spread of disease. Similar operations are possible if a farm is just in starting phase 
and is collecting animals from several farms but is not yet actually in full-scale 
production. One benefit of applying registry data is that these operational characte-
ristics are also modelled as they appear in real life. Another reason that is apparent 
when the contacts are repeated is that the number of susceptible farms will dry up 
more rapidly than when repeated contacts are not taken in account.
The model is prepared to reflect the real world and how, for example, official control 
is expected to work.  However, in a real life situation, several unforeseen events could 
occur simultaneously and result in catastrophic situations that are considered to occur 
with low probability. In contrast to a real epidemic outbreak, simulation models can 
consider all the possible realisations that might be a consequence of one particular 
outbreak. In contrast to this, a real epidemic outbreak is only one realisation of all the 
possible outcomes.
There are several other spread models that utilize contacts and transmission 
probabilities as the basis for quantifying the spread of an outbreak by simulating 
state transitions from susceptible to infected and then removed. Such models include 
InterSpread and its varieties (Sanson 1993; Sanson et al. 1994; Morris et al. 2001; 
Stevenson 2003), NAADSM (Harvey et al. 2007) and AUspread (Garner & Beckett 
2005). While these models take contacts into account, they also include airborne 
pathways for spread and are therefore flexible for various prediction purposes. These 
models resemble each other in several ways, but the details of parameterisation, 
assumptions, programming implementation and capabilities of the models vary. The 
first attempts to compare models have been made, and have provided some general 
conclusions and results (Dubé et al. 2007). Despite differences in the absolute 
outcomes, a recent comparison demonstrated that the policy results of these models 
are similar (Sanson et al. 2010).
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In another modelling approach (e.g. Keeling et al. 2001), spread is simulated 
with fewer parameters and the spread around the infected farm is described by a 
spatial kernel in which probability declines with increasing distance. This type of mo-
del has also succeeded well in post-prediction of the UK outbreak in 2001.  Because 
kernels have built-in spatial autocorrelation, this type model may work similarly well in 
predicting an observed epidemic and the potential of spread in similar conditions to 
those in an observed epidemic outbreak. However, the transition of kernels to another 
production environment might not be as successful. Kernel type models do not have 
an interpretation that the spread is driven in some particular way. Rather, they are 
empirical fits to existing data on an outbreak.
One type of model applied in the prediction of FMD spread is aerosol models that try 
to predict the spread of the disease solely by the atmospheric route. This approach 
has been variably successful. In the UK outbreak of 1967/68, the aerosol model 
worked well, while in 2001 this type of model showed poorer predictive power, 
as only 9 out of 160 first-infected premises were estimated to become infected by 
airborne transmission (Kitching et al. 2005). This type of model may also only work 
in some situations due to spatial autocorrelation of the connection patterns between 
farms (as in the kernel model). These models are generally less useful for those 
countries without data on an actual outbreak, and should not be used in designing 
general control strategies.
FMD has also been modelled with mass action-based models, which essentially treat 
the population of susceptible farms as more or less randomly mixed. This type of 
model has also been successfully used predicting the final size of an FMD outbreak 
(Keeling 2005). Nevertheless, models make unrealistic assumptions of a homogeneous 
population and random contact structure, which has been criticized in several studies 
(Kostova 2004; Chowell et al. 2006; Velthuis & Mourits 2007; Dickey et al. 2008). This 
type of assumption ignores spatio-temporal correlations between operations within 
the simulated regions and is not therefore suitable to estimate situations where the 
variance of outcomes may have some value. Because vaccination efficiency is strongly 
dependent on the timing of the campaign, spatial characteristics of the vaccinated 
area and the scale of expected outcomes, this type of model is not very suitable in 
studying the efficiency or feasibility of a vaccination campaign, although these diffi-
culties can be partially solved with more complicated parameterisation.
Validity of economic results
Our results support the choice of risk management measures to combat contagious 
animal diseases in Finland. Besides epidemiological information, it is important to 
have information on the economic impacts of FMD outbreak and the risk management 
measures. This is particularly important in the event of highly contagious animal 
diseases such as FMD, because an outbreak can affect the entire industry, even if only 
one farm is infected. Besides choosing preventive measures, our results can be used 
to design the funding mechanism for animal disease damage.
Economic results are sensitive to price elasticity estimates for livestock products. It is 
therefore important to estimate these parameters carefully and to conduct sensitivity 
analysis that reveals how sensitive the results are to the possible parameter bias. In 
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our case, these parameters were estimated from statistical data by using three-stage 
least squares, which produced valid estimates for this type of estimation problem. 
Moreover, efforts should be devoted to calibrating the model with actual data. In 
our case, the sector models were calibrated to produce figures based on 2006 data. 
The results regarding milk processing are sensitive to which products are the most 
profitable to produce when exports markets become partially closed. These products 
can vary according to the season and global market situation. Therefore, our result 
regarding increased production of creams during an export closure may be sensitive 
to the market situation, relative prices between different dairy products, and elasticity 
estimates. Moreover, the livestock and food processing sector may have other adjustment 
methods available besides those examined in this study. For example, feeding of 
animals could be at least slightly changed in a way that reduces production and 
production costs. However, we considered feed use changes to be of minor importance 
due to animal physiology and risks to animal welfare. High yielding dairy cows, for 
example, require a sufficient protein and energy intake, especially in the early phase 
of the lactation period. We also considered the empirical basis of less intensive 
feeding to be too weak to make generalisations on production effects and cost 
savings, and did not assume the possibility of significantly reducing animal feeding. 
Instead, feeding that fulfills the standard feeding recommendations was generally 
assumed.
Regarding the direct cost of a FMD outbreak, it is important to have information on the 
costs and resource requirements of different tasks to control FMD. No such data were 
available from Finland. We therefore calculated these costs mainly based on data 
from the UK outbreak in 2001. These estimates are sensitive to the large variation 
between farms in their characteristics, and differences between Finland and the UK 
in farm structure, such as unit size and spatial density, production costs and the price 
level of inputs and outputs, as well as in organization, available resources and the 
cost structure of veterinary services.
 
As disease risk management measures involve considerable uncertainty, future 
research should focus on elaborating the role of information in decision making. In 
particular, economic research should examine how uncertainty and imperfect infor-
mation impacts on the choice of control policy. This could include, for instance, the 
examination of various risk management measures by means of real options theory, 
which takes into account the accumulation of information over time, and expected 
utility theory. Moreover, studies that would help to design and implement risk-based 
preventive measures and surveillance in an economically efficient manner would 
provide invaluable information to support risk management. An example of this is 
the risk classification of livestock farms.
How applicable are the results today?
This risk assessment is based on the production structures and operations of 2006. 
Since then, there have been changes in the Finnish animal production sector. The 
number of farms has decreased in both the pig and cattle sectors. An especially 
clear decline has been apparent among dairy farms (-18%) and pig farms (-12–22%) 
between 2006 and 2008.  Simultaneously, the size of the farms has grown 10% in the 
pig sector and 11% in the cattle sector. The number of sheep in Finland grew by 5% 
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between 2006 and 2008, but the number of farms dropped in the same time period 
by 8% (TIKE 2010).
Because the number of farms has decreased, it can be expected that the farm density 
has also declined. The epidemiological importance of this depends on how this decline 
has occurred. Have the farms disappeared from areas where farms are close to each 
other or from more remote areas of the country? Because farm size is increasing and 
because the number of small operators is declining more rapidly than large operators, 
the contact network may have become sparser and the potential for FMD spread may 
have declined. On the other hand, individual farms may have become more effective 
in spreading the disease. To verify these hypotheses, contact structures should be 
compared between the years. Moreover, the potential consequences arising from a 
single infected farm have increased due to the larger number of animals that would 
be involved in culling. If farm disappearance has occurred equally in every part of the 
country and area, it would also reduce the number of uninfected farms involved in 
an outbreak, and thus probably at least part of the administrative work would be less 
nowadays than in 2006. Because the potential for spread among farms has probably 
declined, vaccination is still not feasible as a general policy in Finland.
Among the abattoirs, two large slaughterhouses no longer slaughter pigs and at least 
one no longer slaughters cattle. Similarly, the number of dairies has declined since 
2006. It can be expected that the number of contacts has not been affected by these 
changes.  However, the spatial dynamics of FMD spread could have been altered by 
lengthened transportation distances and changes in logistics.
Further research
In the future, it would be important to include sheep and goats in epidemiological 
studies. These are currently small, but growing populations. It would be important 
to study their role in the Finnish animal production system, and to be able to avoid 
possible misjudgements when choosing the patterns of development for the increasing 
sheep production sector in Finland. Since 2009, there has been a compulsory data 
registry of sheep and goats in Finland.
There is a need for more research on the effect of biosecurity factors. If biosecurity 
measures are effective, they should also be taken into account in simulated predic-
tions of epidemic sizes. These factors would reduce the difference between large and 
small-sized farms in their ability to acquire infection, and would modify the distribution 
of risk of acquiring disease, because biosecurity routines are more often applied in 
large farms than in smaller ones. Biosecurity is also important if certain preventive 
measures are going to be targeted at farms that possess the highest ability to either 
spread a disease or to be exposed to a disease, as measures may modify the under-
lying risk caused by the contact network of the farm.
Risk classification by proactive simulations may enable faster reaction if a worst-case 
outbreak of FMD is initiated in the country, and may help in selecting epidemiologically 
and economically reasonable risk management policies. The usefulness of risk 
classification should, however, be further studied. One option may be achieved by 
assessing the correlation of risk classes with the incidence of other diseases that are 
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nowadays present in the country. If such correlations exist, risk classification can be 
used in the planning of risk-based surveillance and monitoring of other diseases in 
Finland.
Registry based models are unfortunately always looking into past and are not re-
ally suitable for the future predictions or to study the effect of re-organisation of 
contact networks or to define risk-classes of future farms. It is possible to develop 
network-model also for predictions but it would require methodological work. First step 
toward predictions is to understand which factors define key connection rules 
between farms and how these rules may change or remain unchanged in future 
animal production structures.
The development of registries to enable real-time applications is an important general 
goal that should be further empathised. In particular, official registries and different 
data sources containing logistic information should become more compatible. An 
easy way to improve this would be to support individual companies to renew their 
database so that these databases contain the same identification coding as in official 
registries. By increasing compatibility, the general traceability of contacts would 
improve and less effort would be required in true epidemic outbreaks of any disease. 
More research is also needed to support the pre-outbreak financing of contagious 
animal disease damage. Finance issues require information such as how individual 
economic agents respond to risk, the scale of losses an outbreak can cause, and 
what are the benefits of investing in biosecurity practices that reduce the probability 
of disease introduction into Finland and the consequences of an introduction. An 
important issue for economic research is also how production decisions in primary 
production, the storage capacity and food processing could be adjusted to reduce 
economic losses. Moreover, further research is needed to examine the value of 
products originating from disease-free or non-vaccinated animals. This value could 
be examined in the domestic consumer market and in export markets. Such research 
could provide supplementary information on the market premium that is available to 
Finnish producers when they are able to maintain a disease-free status in the country 
in the long term.
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9 Conclusions
According to this risk assessment, the maximum size of an outbreak would be 
relatively small and it would eventually be stopped by applying normal EU eradication 
measures. There would generally be no need to use emergency vaccination in 
Finland in the case of an outbreak of FMD. It would be more useful to ensure that the 
basic eradication procedures are operating smoothly, rapidly and efficiently. Applying 
a suppressive vaccination policy would lead to the unnecessary culling of a larger 
number of animals than would be necessary if the policy were not applied. A protective 
vaccination policy would not be economically beneficial in Finland, even if some 
outbreaks on farms could be prevented.
Despite the relatively small size of outbreaks, the agricultural and food sector could 
suffer relatively large economic damage as a result. This is due to business disrup-
tions and disruptions in the foreign trade of milk and meat products. In contrast, 
consumers may be able to benefit from a possible occasional fall in food prices. 
Moreover, economic losses would increase with an increase in the number of infected 
farms and/or outbreak duration. In particular, direct costs paid by taxpayers would 
increase proportionately more rapidly that the number of infected farms. Regarding 
the vaccination policy, very little in costs could potentially be saved after the day 
when a vaccination campaign is started. Suppressive vaccination increases the costs 
of an outbreak because it boosts the number of culled animals, whereas protective 
vaccination increases epidemic costs by prolonging trade disruptions. Hence, emer-
gency vaccination is concluded to generally not be an economically rational policy to 
combat FMD in Finland.
Spatial differences at the PVO district level in the expected epidemic size are small, as 
a worst-case outbreak could start in any PVO district. By contrast, the administrative 
consequences of an outbreak would deviate considerably. In the most densely 
populated parts of the country, a much higher number of uninfected farms would 
come under restrictive measures than in the more sparsely populated regions. 
The spread of FMD would mostly remain within the production sector in which the 
outbreak had started, more clearly so if the outbreak started in the cattle rather 
than the pig sector. The results of this assessment could be applied in contingency 
planning.
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Legal acts
National legislation
MAF 5/EEO/96 Suu- ja sorkkataudin vastustaminen.
MAF 1296/2001 Decree of the MAF on the identification and registration of swine 
(Maa- ja metsätalousministeriön asetus sikojen merkitsemisestä ja rekisteröinnistä).
MAF 1429/2006 Laki eläinten kuljetuksesta.
MAF 1391/2006. Decree of the MAF on the identification and registration of cattle 
(Maa- ja metsätalousministeriön asetus nautaeläinten merkitsemisestä ja rekiste-
röinnistä).
EU legislation
64/433/EEC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 26 June 1964 on health conditions for the production 
and marketing of fresh meat.
71/118/EEC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 15 February 1971 on health problems affecting the 
production and placing on the market of fresh poultry meat.
77/99/EEC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on health problems affecting the production and 
marketing of meat products and certain other products of animal origin.
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91/495/EEC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 91/495/EEC of 27 November 1990 concerning 
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92/45/EEC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/45/EEC of 16 June 1992 on public health and 
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92/46/EEC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/46/EEC of 16 June 1992 laying down the health 
rules for the production and placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and 
milk-based products.
94/65/EC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 94/65/EC of 14 December 1994 laying down the 
requirements for the production and placing on the market of minced meat and meat 
preparations.
EC 1760/2000 Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification and registration of 
bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97.
Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for 
the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/ EEC and Decisions 
89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC (Text with EEA 
relevance).
EC 1/2005. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the 
protection of animals during transport and related operations and amending Directives 
64/432/EEC and 93/119/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1255/97.
2008/71/EC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 on the identification and 
registration of pigs.
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12 Appendix
Appendix 1 Scaling of the contact parameter used in the predictive 
function of the worst-case scenario
The index variable (contacts) was formed by weighting estimated contacts within 
30 days by coefficients of logistic regression, describing the relationship of different 
contact types with the worst-case scenario. Coefficients were estimated by logistic 
regression and then scaled against the estimated coefficient of direct animal contacts 
(0.044).
index = Nout + (0.015/0.044)Npig + (0.028/0.044)Ncattle + (0.006/0.044)Nslaughter + 
(0.035/0.044)Nmilk + (0.001/0.044)NAI, where
Nout = Number of unique farms where animals have been delivered to the farm within 
30 days
Npig = Number of unique farms that are connected with the farm by a vehicle
transporting pigs within 30 days
Ncattle = Number of unique farms that are connected with the farm by a vehicle
transporting cattle within 30 days
Nslaughter = Number of unique farms that are connected with the farm by a vehicle 
transporting animals to slaughter during a 30-day period
NAI = Number of unique farms that are connected with the farm by an AI technician 
during a 30-day period
Nmilk = Number of unique farms that are connected with the farm by a milk tanker 
during a 30-day period
Because the index variable was highly skewed, it was then square-root transformed 
and further standardised within each farm type (sow farm, finisher farm dairy farm, 
beef cattle farm, suckler farm and other cattle farm) by subtracting the farm type-
specific mean and dividing by farm type-specific standard deviation (Table 1a).
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Appendix 2 Application of covariance-variance matrices in the initial 
phase of an iteration
Covariance-variance matrices were applied when a predictive function was used to 
estimate the properties of the simulated farms. Covariance-variance matrices were 
simulated simultaneously with the predictive function. By including the covariance-
variance matrix as a preliminary step, each farm during the same iteration was si-
mulated by one possible parameter solution of the predictive function, and thus the 
uncertainty related to the parameters and their correlations was included in the calcu-
lations. Variance-covariance matrices were sampled applying the norm_rnd function 
of the Econometrics Toolbox (Le Sage 2002).
Table 1a. Applied standard deviations and means of the square root of the index variable for
Finnish farm types
Farm type Mean Standard deviation Mean at original scale
Sow farm 4.154 1.811 17.1
Finisher farm 2.966 1.357 8.8
Dairy farm 5.361 1.901 28.7
Beef cattle farm 2.541 1.846 6.5
Suckler farm 1.725 1.578 3.0
Other cattle farm 1.137 1.051 1.3

Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira
Mustialankatu 3, FI-00790 Helsinki, Finland
Tel. +358 20 690 999, Fax +358 20 77 24350
www.evira.fi
 C
o
ve
r 
p
ic
tu
re
: M
e
rj
a 
M
an
n
in
e
n
Evira Research Reports 1/2011
ISSN 1797-2981
ISBN 978-952-225-081-0 (pdf)

